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Abstract 
Milrod (2007) identifies persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients whose symptoms of 
anxiety and avoidance have remitted. Through an analysis of the available theoretical and 
clinical literature on agoraphobia, the psychological experience of emptiness, and the 
development of the ego, I argue that agoraphobia is not an anxiety about “open spaces” 
but, rather, about the boundaries between spaces. In agoraphobia, there is a pathological 
persistence of the psychological processes of normal ego development. Recognition of 
the usefulness of agoraphobic anxieties in the development of ego boundaries may help to 
identify the point at which they persist beyond usefulness and into pathology, both 
theoretically and clinically. Following Winnicott (1951, 1969), I argue that the analytic 
frame – the setting of the analysis – has the potential to become a transitional object for 
the analysand. The agoraphobic’s opportunity for new experiences with a transitional 
object – if it can survive her destruction of it – allows the frame to be used in the 
development of the ego’s boundaries.  
Milrod suggests that a deficient Reflective Function (RF) may explain the persistent 
emptiness she identifies in agoraphobia patients. Though Milrod’s patients may indeed 
have a weak RF, I argue that assertions of emptiness in the clinical situation cannot be 
causally attributed to this deficiency. Further, I contend that these patients’ assertions and 
experiences of emptiness can be better explained by the presence of traumatic and 
unmourned losses. I propose several explanations for why agoraphobia patients, in 
particular, defend unconsciously against mourning. I argue that a clinical emphasis on 
interpreting the transference may lead to an impasse in the relief of this emptiness insofar 
as it may impede the development of free association. I contend that the agoraphobic 
requires the freedom to be incoherent, afforded in the psychoanalytic clinic via the 
distinctive method of free association, in order to define for herself the boundaries of self 
and other, and to recognize in action – or, more precisely, in words; in the act of putting it 
all into words – the limits of her affective life. Specifically, these boundaries limit the 
agoraphobic’s fears of destruction of the object and annihilation of the ego. 
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Introduction 
They that live in fear are never free, resolute, secure, merry, but in continual pain…No 
greater misery, no rack, no torture like unto it. 
      (Burton 1621; qtd. in Snaith 1968, p. 673) 
Agoraphobia is commonly described as a morbid fear of open spaces. Psychiatrically, it is 
defined according to two predominant symptoms: anxiety and avoidance. Research with 
American populations finds a 12-month prevalence of 2.7% (American Psychiatric 
Association 1995) and a lifetime prevalence of almost 5% (Kessler et al. 2006). In 
Canada, 12-month and lifetime prevalence rates are 1.6% and 3.7%, respectively 
(Government of Canada 2006). In moderate to severe cases of agoraphobia – which 
affects an estimated 86% of sufferers (Kessler et al. 2006) – individuals may become 
entirely or largely housebound. Along with severity, agoraphobia is also associated with 
impairment (interfering with home management, work, social life, and personal 
relationships) and comorbidity with other mental disorders (including other anxiety 
disorders, mood disorders, and substance use disorders). These statistics indicate that 
agoraphobia presents a significant social problem. While almost all sufferers seek out and 
respond to some level of treatment, relapse is common after treatment ends (see, for 
example, Wiborg & Dahl 1996; Kessler et al. 2006).    
Relapse may be so common because of a third, more pernicious, symptom that 
Milrod, one of the foremost contemporary theorists of agoraphobia,
1
 has recently 
identified – “persistent emptiness”:  
Although the flagrant symptoms of agoraphobia and accompanying panic remit 
fairly readily with these treatments [CBT and pharmacotherapy], from the 
perspective of clinical psychoanalysis some of these patients’ underlying inner 
constriction is striking. This constriction affects ability to think independently and 
to lead emotionally full and intellectually broad and stimulating internal lives. This 
                                                          
1
 Milrod, along with colleagues, is one of the foremost innovators of outcome studies for panic focused 
psychodynamic psychotherapy. Milrod et al.’s (1997) manual, Panic-Focused Psychodynamic 
Psychotherapy, is recognized as a landmark achievement in the integration of psychodynamic approaches 
with CBT and pharmacotherapy (Gassner 2004, p. 229). Milrod has led or participated in numerous studies 
and individual psychoanalytic treatments of patients with panic disorder and agoraphobia (e.g., Klein et al. 
2003; Milrod 1995; Milrod et al. 1996; Milrod 1998; Milrod et al. 2000; Milrod et al. 2001; Milrod et al. 
2007; Rudden et al. 2003; Rudden et al. 2006). 
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problem persists long after agoraphobic symptom remission. The overt difficulty 
that these patients experience in venturing out of their magically designated safe 
space in the real world, punctuated by overwhelming anxiety, parallels a difficulty 
they often have in looking inward, reflecting on their lives or feelings, or permitting 
themselves to experience their feelings at all. (Milrod 2007, pp. 1008-1009)  
Milrod’s experience as a psychiatrist who works with a predominately psychodynamic 
model has led to her familiarity with the advantages and limitations of both the 
psychiatric and the psychoanalytic paradigms. It is from the psychoanalytic perspective 
that Milrod notes the emergence of this persistent symptom in agoraphobia patients.
2
 She 
refers to this phenomenon variously within her article as “emptiness” (p. 1007), “inner 
constriction” (p. 1008), “internal vacancy” (p. 1009), and “subjective sense of 
incompleteness” (p. 1010) without remarking on the very different meanings of each of 
these terms. The complexities of the subjective phenomenological
3
 experiences of this 
emptiness are evident from the connotations of these various terms: emptiness implies a 
nothingness and a complete absence; constriction implies an intense anxiety; and, 
incompleteness implies a something missing along with the presence of something else. 
The nature of these “somethings” remains undefined, which results in the sense of unease 
that is often emptiness’s affective companion. All of these meanings accord with 
Milrod’s descriptions of her patients’ experiences at certain moments; however, Milrod’s 
use of these various terms without clarification obscures her intended meaning, which 
remains unclear throughout the article; or, rather, the complexity of the phenomenon she 
encounters in her patients remains to be explicated. At the same time, my reading of her 
article, which focuses on the meanings of patients’ assertions of emptiness, reveals 
incompatibilities in Milrod’s arguments that undermine her suggestion that her patients’ 
persistent emptiness can be attributed to a developmental deficit in the form of a weak 
reflective function. Milrod’s finding of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients has 
                                                          
2
 This phenomenon of emptiness is anticipated, though not elaborated, in Morgan’s important overview on 
the history of agoraphobia: “the impression conveyed by the phobic personality is of emptiness” (2003, p. 
191). Morgan also notes the relevance of traumatic loss in some phobic patients (p. 196). 
3
 By phenomenological, here and elsewhere, I mean the subjective physiological and psychological 
experiences of agoraphobia. I distinguish the phenomenological from the symptomatological, which I take 
to refer, at least implicitly, to diagnostics; I maintain this distinction to indicate that the phenomenological 
exceeds the symptomatological and that it remains, necessarily, beyond our ability to fully articulate an 
objective definition of psychical experiences, in general, and of agoraphobia, in particular.    
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important implications for the successful treatment of the disorder long-term, namely, the 
need to address this emptiness in patients for whom panic symptoms have remitted. In 
this thesis, I critique Milrod’s explanation for the persistent emptiness and propose an 
alternative explanation with clinical implications. I also provide the theoretical 
foundations for my critique, and provide an analysis of the theoretical implications of this 
emptiness in agoraphobia patients specifically and in the development of psychical reality 
generally.  
 
0.1. The Universalities in Agoraphobia and Emptiness 
There are two broad issues in establishing the framework for this thesis. The first issue 
concerns the relevance of gender in agoraphobia. This first issue bleeds into the second, 
which concerns the wide array of theoretical paradigms within which agoraphobia has 
been considered. Much of the extra-psychoanalytic literature on agoraphobia – 
psychiatric, sociological, psychotherapeutic, attachment, and cultural geographic – 
focuses on the gender variance, namely, that agoraphobia is diagnosed in women much 
more frequently than in men. Ultimately, I suggest that the universal experiences of 
anxiety that are part of ego development and psychical reality tend to be overlooked in 
favour of explanations of agoraphobia that emphasize this gender variance.
4
 In this thesis, 
I focus on the unconscious elements of agoraphobia. Thus, while my thinking on 
agoraphobia has been influenced by arguments from a range of disciplines, my arguments 
strongly depend on the psychoanalytic literature on agoraphobia and emptiness.  
Prior to World War I, agoraphobia was predominantly diagnosed in male patients. 
Currently, it is diagnosed much more frequently in female patients. Statistically, the 
percentage of women in research populations of at least 25 agoraphobics varies between 
63% and 95%. (Bekker 1996, p. 129; see also Chambless & Mason 1986). There are two 
main perspectives on this gender variance in agoraphobia. They can be summarized 
                                                          
4
 Rey, a psychoanalyst, argues that, although more overt in women, the “claustro-agoraphobic syndrome 
[...] is basic to both sexes; only certain manifestations of it are different” (1994, p. 9). I do not disagree with 
those who argue that the differences between these manifestations are significant; however, the focus of 
this thesis is what is, in Rey’s words, “basic to both sexes.” I consider Rey’s work in detail in Chapter Two.  
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briefly as follows: agoraphobia is a “women’s syndrome”; it is both diagnosed and occurs 
in females almost to the exclusion of males because of the socio-cultural conditions in 
which we live. This perspective is exemplified by Seidenberg and DeCrow, who argue 
that agoraphobia is “a paradigm for the historical intimidation and oppression of women” 
(1983, p. 6). This misunderstanding, I suggest, of the psychological nature of agoraphobia 
leads Seidenberg and DeCrow to – in my view, the rather absurd – conclusion that people 
suffering from agoraphobia “have come to terms with their own sense of pride by not 
setting foot on land that is deemed alien and hostile” (p. 7). Carter provides a succinct 
critique of this perspective: “this approach seems to attribute to agoraphobia sufferers an 
insight they don’t have. It risks discounting the suffering, the actual, chronically 
debilitating unease” (2002, p. 209).  
The second perspective on the gender variance in agoraphobia emphasizes that the 
rate of diagnosis likely does not correspond to the rate of incidence. Bekker, for example, 
in a review of the clinical psychology literature on agoraphobia and gender, critiques the 
status quo of accepting agoraphobia as a “women’s syndrome” and argues that the 
prevalence of diagnosis does not equal the prevalence of the disorder. The gap between 
diagnosis and incidence, if it exists, has several explanations, most involving diagnostic 
sex bias and/or socio-cultural etiological sex bias. These biases mean that agoraphobia is 
diagnosed more in women because diagnosticians expect to find it in women, and/or that 
the prevalence of the disorder is affected by socially constructed differences between the 
sexes (namely, gender bias). Bekker suggests that men are more likely than women to 
abuse alcohol to cope with severe anxiety, a hypothesis supported by the high rate of co-
morbid agoraphobia and/or social phobia among patients treated for alcoholism, a higher 
rate of which are male (1996, pp. 130-131). As Bekker indicates, the rates of anxiety-
reducing substance abuse other than alcohol are not known. Although there has been 
much research on this gender variance in agoraphobia since Bekker’s review (see, for 
example, Foot & Koszycki 2004; McLean & Anderson 2009; Starcevic et al. 2007), the 
statistics and concerns remain relatively unchanged. McLean and Anderson, for example, 
find support for Bekker’s suggestion of a socio-cultural etiological sex bias, concluding 
that “gender differences at each level of analysis are likely moderated by socialization 
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processes that prescribe gender-specific expectations regarding the expression of anxiety 
and the acceptable means of coping with anxiety” (2009, p. 503).  
Reuter (2007a, 2007b) considers the contemporary prevalence of female 
agoraphobics in a Foucauldian analysis, addressing the problematic socio-cultural 
(psychiatric) narrative that has developed around the physiological symptoms of 
agoraphobia (including tachycardia, chest pain, shortness of breath, etc.). Reuter critiques 
the “normalizing” diagnostic criteria as a tool for ideological social order. She points out 
that, along with the development of a psychiatric diagnosis, for many social theorists 
agoraphobia became a metaphor for the alienation and social estrangement of modern 
urban space.
5
 Reuter supports her critique of psychiatric methods as socially and 
culturally determined with an analysis of other cultural shifts that coincided with World 
War I. There is no doubt that cultural expectations of women shifted from the late 
nineteenth century – when it was considered inappropriate for (bourgeois) women to 
leave the house unaccompanied (“unchaperoned”) – to the late twentieth century when, as 
Reuter puts it, “what was previously considered normal bourgeois behaviour […] became 
something to see as pathological” (2007a, p. 250). Women’s resistance to the “freedom” 
to move about in public spheres unaccompanied, Reuter argues, may account for part of 
this shift. Reuter also suggests that the advent of “shell shock,” or war neurosis, as a 
(masculine) diagnosis may have predominantly replaced agoraphobia as a diagnosis for 
men with anxiety disorders. Reuter’s critique, then, accounts for both a diagnostic sex 
bias and a socio-cultural etiological sex bias. 
Much of the recent research on agoraphobia uses a framework of attachment 
theory. Attachment theory proposes an evolutionary system of security based on 
proximity and accessibility of care providers during development. A care provider that is 
consistently available serves as a “secure base” (Bowlby 1988) for the child and repeated 
experiences of availability result in a secure attachment. An inconsistently responsive 
                                                          
5
 See especially Reuter 2007b, pp. 28-31. Reuter refers to Simmel’s argument that the modern city and its 
various assaults on the individual in the form of “nervous stimulation” required the construction of a 
protective “inner barrier” (see Simmel 1950). Reuter notes Benjamin’s addition of an external barrier in the 
form of the home as a bourgeois private refuge (see Benjamin 1978). See also Carter (2002), who argues 
that agoraphobia is a “realistic anxiety” of the expanse of modern urban space. 
6 
 
 
secure base results in an insecure attachment, either avoidant or anxious-ambivalent. 
Attachment researchers have investigated the relationship between agoraphobia and an 
anxious-ambivalent attachment style; findings suggest that anxious-ambivalent 
attachment is a risk factor for agoraphobia, but not exclusively. That is, anxious-
ambivalent attachment is a risk factor for a number of mental disorders in adulthood. De 
Ruiter and van Ijzendoorn (1992) provide a review of this research; they also point to 
several studies that suggest that early traumatic events (including death of a parent and 
parental divorce) were related to the development of adult agoraphobia (de Ruiter & van 
Ijzendoorn 1992, p. 377; see Tweed et al. 1989 and Faravelli et al. 1985). By contrast, 
Fleischer-Mann (1995) finds that early traumatic events are not more common in 
agoraphobics than in a control group of non-agoraphobics but that these events were 
perceived more negatively by agoraphobics. Influenced by the development of the fourth 
category of disorganized attachment that specifically concerns an individual’s response to 
loss and trauma, Iddiols (2005) suggests that agoraphobia may follow from disorganized 
attachment rather than from an organized anxious-ambivalent attachment. I discuss the 
significance of traumatic events in agoraphobia in Chapter Three, but, as I am specifically 
concerned with the unconscious aspects of agoraphobia that lead to experiences of 
persistent emptiness, I do not consider in any detail the research on agoraphobia from an 
attachment perspective, which is more applicable in research on the cognitive and 
behavioural aspects of agoraphobia (see, for example, Liotti 1991; Sable 1994).  
Social and cultural geographers with psychotherapeutic practices, notably Bankey 
(2004), Bondi (2005), and Davidson (2000, 2001, 2003), consider the implications for 
agoraphobia and space anxieties in psychotherapy. Davidson (especially 2000, 2001) 
considers with a creative and astute analysis the ways in which cultural femininities shape 
women’s experiences of themselves, their bodies, and others. There are important first-
person accounts of the lived experiences of agoraphobia sufferers in many of these 
works, including also Capps and Ochs (1995) and McWatters (2013). Orr (2006) 
provides an account of her own experiences of agoraphobia. These personal narratives are 
integral to our broader conceptualizations of agoraphobia insofar as, as McWatters 
emphasizes, theorizations about the social, cultural, and political dimensions of 
agoraphobia must account for the agoraphobic’s suffering.  
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In this thesis, I do not refute that agoraphobia, as currently diagnostically defined, 
occurs more commonly in women than in men. The focus of this thesis is not, however, 
an interrogation of agoraphobia’s diagnostic criteria, nor the sex variance in its 
occurrence. While the development of psychiatric narratives is certainly an interesting 
question, it is also not the focus of this thesis. I am particularly concerned with the 
phenomenon – symptom – of persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) has identified in 
agoraphobia patients whose symptoms of anxiety and avoidance have remitted. In this 
thesis, I assume the validity of psychoanalysis as both a distinctive method in the 
alleviation of mental suffering and as a framework for understanding the nature of mental 
life. Unlike some projects (e.g., Busch & Milrod 2013; Busch et al. 2009; Milrod 1995; 
Milrod et al. 1997; Milrod et al. 2007), this thesis is not concerned with demonstrating 
the efficacy of psychoanalysis or psychodynamic psychotherapy in treating panic 
disorder and agoraphobia; nor is it concerned with arguing what constitutes 
psychoanalysis proper, or discounting particular treatments because they are not 
psychoanalysis. Rather, in this thesis, I consider what Milrod’s (2007) finding of 
persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients for whom symptoms of anxiety and 
avoidance have remitted can add to our understanding of the nature of agoraphobia. I 
argue that agoraphobic anxieties, the development of the ego, and the experience of 
emptiness are all inextricably connected to the agoraphobic’s particular uses of language. 
Although I do not wish to engage in the debate of what constitutes psychoanalysis, I do 
argue that specific elements of the psychoanalytic process are more efficacious in the 
relief of the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness than others, namely, the fundamental 
rule: the analysand’s free associations and the analyst’s evenly hovering attention. This 
argument follows from the theoretical and clinical additions I offer in this thesis to the 
understanding of agoraphobia, the significance of emptiness and agoraphobic anxieties in 
the development of the ego, and the particular way agoraphobia patients use language – 
more specifically, narrative – as part of their experience of agoraphobia.  
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0.2. Overview 
I begin this thesis with theoretical considerations of agoraphobia in Chapters One and 
Two in order to lay the foundations for the more clinical developments in Chapters Three 
and Four. Broadly, I begin with a conceptual overview of agoraphobia, and then turn to 
an analysis of agoraphobic anxieties and the experience of emptiness in the development 
of the ego and psychical reality. I then engage directly with Milrod’s (2007) article, using 
the theoretical arguments of the first two chapters to critique her conclusion that a 
developmental deficit in the form of a weak reflective function can explain agoraphobia 
patients’ persistent emptiness. Finally, I suggest a clinical counterpoint to Milrod’s 
emphasis on interpreting the transference relationship within the psychoanalytic setting 
and return to the fundamental psychoanalytic emphasis on language.  
More specifically, in Chapter One I provide an analysis of the conceptualization 
of agoraphobia, including its historical development, psychiatric delineations, and 
psychoanalytic contributions. I review arguments about the “phobia” aspect of 
agoraphobia, which indicate the theoretical and phenomenological distinctions between 
agoraphobia and simple (aka: simple, true, discrete, or specific) phobias. This distinction 
illuminates the nature of the disorder and clarifies both its profound disabling effect on 
sufferers and its chronicity. The use of the term “phobia” to describe the disorder is 
contentious in part because the fear is not, as originally described (and the psychiatric 
definition notwithstanding), of an object (or space) that can be avoided, but, following 
Weiss, a “mental registration of structural disorganization” (Compton 1992, p. 409). I 
then review arguments about agoraphobia’s phobic object, to which “agora” is meant to 
refer and I offer my own theoretical description of the unconscious motivation of the 
anxiety embodied in patients with agoraphobia. Informed by Milrod’s (2007) addition to 
the clinical picture of agoraphobia of persistent emptiness beyond the remittance of the 
overt symptoms of anxiety and avoidance, I argue that agoraphobia involves a profound 
anxiety about the boundaries between spaces, both physical and psychical. This anxiety is 
fuelled – if not caused – by the inability to symbolize (or, more specifically, to engage in 
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the creative process of symbolization
6
). The agoraphobic’s difficulty in putting her 
feelings into words contributes, I argue, to the persistent emptiness Milrod describes. To 
name is to define, and thus to delimit. Without the experience of these limits, the very 
thought of engaging in life is overwhelming. 
 In Chapter Two, I expand on the issue of psychical space. Specifically, I address 
the question of what is internal and what is external, the anxieties fuelled by the 
navigation of these separated spaces, and, especially, the agoraphobic’s anxiety of 
navigating between them – of crossing the threshold, so to speak – via an elucidation of 
the development and functions of the ego. Following Freud and the psychoanalytic 
tradition, I argue that the distinction between “normal” and “pathological” is a matter of 
degree. In agoraphobia, there is a pathological persistence of the psychological processes 
of normal ego development. Recognition of the usefulness of agoraphobic anxieties in the 
development of ego boundaries may help identify the point at which they persist beyond 
usefulness and into pathology, both theoretically and clinically. From an original unity, in 
which no ego exists, the ego comes into being by distinguishing an internal reality from 
                                                          
6
 In this thesis, I use the term “symbolization” in reference to the phobic “object” of agoraphobia; 
specifically, I argue that agoraphobia indicates a fear of symbolization. While I anticipate that the meaning 
of this argument will be clarified through the detailed arguments of this thesis, it is necessary to clarify here 
what I mean by “symbolization.” My sense of symbolization is intimately connected to the concept of the 
transitional object (Winnicott 1951, 1959, 1969) and to Lacan’s notion of the symbolic order (Lacan 1988, 
1958/2006b, 2006d, 2006j). In this thesis, I refer to the individual engaging in the creative process of 
symbolization; it requires the prior existence of an object (via Winnicott) or a linguistic symbol (via 
Lacan), and it also requires the ability to create anew this previously existing object or symbol. The 
paradox of these two simultaneous acts – the finding and the creating – is integral to an individual’s sense 
of living his or her own life. I am primarily referring to the use of language as a system of symbols. 
Engaging in a process of symbolization, here, simply means putting one’s thoughts and feelings into words; 
however, the simplicity of this statement belies the extraordinary difficulty of the task. My use of the term 
symbolization is connected to, but distinct from, much of the psychoanalytic literature on symbolism, 
which tends to focus on objects as symbols of repressed ideas (whether conscious or unconscious, i.e., in 
dreams) or on symbolic thinking (or symbolic equation) as what is more commonly referred to now as 
concrete thinking, where the symbol is taken to be the object rather than understood as referring to the 
object. Often, according to this literature, the function of symbol formation is to substitute for the loss of 
the child’s “primary” objects, the maternal and paternal part objects. We can see the connection between 
this understanding of symbolism and my use of the term symbolization, which merely requires an 
extrapolation of the sense of “symbol” from an object to a word. As I note above, this extrapolation – for 
me – follows primarily from the work of Winnicott and Lacan. For some notable examples within the 
psychoanalytic literature on symbolism, see: Jones (1918); Klein (1923, 1930); Fenichel (1946); and, 
Milner (1952). 
10 
 
 
an external reality. For the agoraphobic, I suggest that something has gone awry in this 
process of creative differentiation. The agoraphobic is not able to take for granted the 
distinction between internal and external, and therefore cannot experience shared reality 
as illusion. This illusion of shared reality is necessary for the creative uses of language. 
Following Winnicott (1951, 1969), I argue that the analytic frame – the setting of the 
analysis – has the potential to become a transitional object for the analysand. The 
agoraphobic’s opportunity for new experiences with a transitional object – if it can 
survive her destruction of it – allows the frame to be used in the development of the ego’s 
boundaries, which can thereby be creatively inhabited, with all of the risks and rewards of 
human vulnerability. 
 In Chapter Three, I argue that assertions of emptiness in the analytic situation 
indicate the unconscious presence of strongly warded-off emotional or cognitive 
experiences. The nature of these experiences must be explored with each patient, as they 
will naturally vary among individuals. Specifically, however, the subjective experience of 
emptiness in agoraphobia patients commonly indicates the presence of significant losses 
that have yet to be mourned. I propose several explanations as to why agoraphobia 
patients, in particular, defend against mourning. Further, I argue that a structural 
emptiness exists in all individuals along with the pathological emptiness evident in 
certain patients. Pathological emptiness, I argue, is a complex defense organization that 
masks overwhelming unconscious material; for the agoraphobia patient, pathological 
emptiness is a defense against one’s own aggressivity and the painful experience of 
overwhelming loss. Structural emptiness, on the other hand, and as Winnicott argues, is 
the basis for all learning; it is an aspect of the psychical apparatus that allows for the 
possibility of new thoughts, feelings, and experiences. An understanding of structural 
emptiness does not elucidate the particular meaning of pathological emptiness, but it does 
provide a technical counterpoint to the therapeutic emphasis on the transference 
relationship. Structural emptiness is a consequence of entering into a language system; by 
following the psychoanalytic method of free association and abiding by the fundamental 
psychoanalytic rule – the pact between the analysand and the analyst of complete candor 
and complete discretion respectively – the analytic couple can make use of this structural 
emptiness in order to elucidate the individual meaning(s) of pathological emptiness. 
11 
 
 
 In Chapter Four, I explore agoraphobia and the uses of language in the 
psychoanalytic setting. Specifically, I consider three main themes: coherence as 
resistance; the analyst’s over-reliance on interpreting the transference as an impediment 
to the development of free and freer associations; and, the concept of Nachträglichkeit 
and the logic of the unconscious. These themes are all connected to the concepts of 
psychoanalytic truth and psychical reality, which provide the frame within which I 
develop my arguments. There is little consensus on what constitutes psychoanalytic truth. 
As I am here concerned with psychical coherence – and, relatedly, psychical reality – I 
follow Faimberg’s concept of psychic truths, which “are the consequence of the psychic 
work resulting from the demands of reality that are fashioned by the unconscious wish 
and the unconscious fantasy” (1997, p. 449). This definition is consistent with my 
arguments in Chapter Two, namely, that psychical reality is created through the ego’s 
mediation of external reality; both the facts of external reality and the ego’s mediation – 
or, better, modification – of those facts is clinically pertinent. Indeed, it is precisely the 
ego’s modification of external reality that is the concern of psychoanalytic work and is 
the realm of that work’s influence.   
 I argue that the tasks of trying to be coherent and trying to say everything involve 
different processes and therefore have different results; likewise, the task of listening 
differs between trying to make sense of what is being said and waiting to see what sense 
emerges. It is not that incoherence in itself is preferable to coherence, but that when 
coherence is demanded, fewer feelings and thoughts are possible; when incoherence is 
tolerated, new and unanticipated feelings and thoughts can develop. The agoraphobic is 
unable to tolerate incoherence: she either produces narratives that are too coherent or she 
produces empty narratives. The agoraphobic suffers from a restricted unconscious 
freedom in addition to the restrictions she places on her freedom of mobility. Following 
Bollas (1995), I argue that there are two aspects of mental health: the ability to construct 
coherent narratives and the freedom to explore the feelings that precede coherence. The 
agoraphobic, I suggest, uses narrative to stave off the overwhelming emotions that 
accompany incoherence. An analytic emphasis on interpreting the transference colludes 
with the agoraphobic’s ego in the resistance of incoherence, inhibiting the development 
of free association. Focusing on narrative coherence forecloses the emergence of the 
12 
 
 
unconscious in the gaps revealed by language, gaps which must emerge in order for new 
thoughts and feelings to be possible. The psychoanalytic invitation “try to say 
everything” provides the space for these gaps to emerge and the opportunity to explore 
them.  
13 
 
 
Chapter One: The Concept of Agoraphobia 
The dictionary definition of agoraphobia depends on the literal significance of its parts; 
that is, agoraphobia is defined as the fear of open spaces: from the Greek agora, meaning 
“an assembly; hence, the place of assembly, especially the marketplace”; and, phobia, 
meaning “fear” (“Agoraphobia” 2014). However, the theoretical understanding of both 
elements of the psychological disorder “agoraphobia” – agora and phobia – is 
contentious. It is evident from agoraphobia’s theoretical and conceptual history that the 
nature of the disorder still eludes our understanding. In this chapter, I first provide an 
overview of the conceptualization of agoraphobia, including its historical development, 
psychiatric delineations, and psychoanalytic contributions. I then review arguments about 
the question of the “phobia” aspect of agoraphobia, which indicate the theoretical and 
phenomenological distinctions between agoraphobia and simple (aka: simple, true, 
discrete, or specific) phobias. This distinction illuminates the nature of the disorder and 
clarifies both its profound disabling effect on sufferers and its chronicity (that is, 
resistance to long-term efficacious treatment). The use of the term “phobia” to describe 
the disorder is contentious in part because the fear is not, as originally described (and the 
psychiatric definition notwithstanding), of an object (or space) that can be avoided, but, 
following Weiss, a “mental registration of structural disorganization” (Compton 1992, p. 
409). I then review arguments about agoraphobia’s phobic object, to which “agora” is 
meant to refer (if not describe) and I offer my own theoretical description of the 
unconscious motivation of the anxiety embodied in patients with agoraphobia. Informed 
by Milrod’s (2007) addition to the clinical picture of agoraphobia of persistent emptiness 
beyond the remittance of the overt symptoms of anxiety and avoidance, I argue that 
agoraphobia involves a profound anxiety about the boundaries between spaces, both 
physical and psychical. This anxiety is fuelled – if not caused – by the inability to 
symbolize (to engage in the process of symbolization). This difficulty, I argue, 
contributes to the persistent emptiness Milrod describes. 
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1.1. Definitions: Historical, Psychiatric, and Psychoanalytic 
For several years patients have repeatedly come to me with the peculiar complaint that it 
is impossible for them to go into open spaces and down certain streets, and because of 
this fear their freedom of movement is disturbed. They yearned for an explanation of the 
nature of their affliction, and I believed I could form the word agoraphobia (from the 
Greek “agora”), dread of outside places, for it. 
     (Westphal 1871; qtd. in Boyd & Crump 1991, p. 80) 
The term agoraphobia was first coined in 1871
7
 by Westphal, a neurologist and 
psychiatrist, to describe three male patients for whom the experience, or contemplation, 
of walking through certain streets was accompanied by a “dread of anxiety” (p. 12; qtd. in 
Snaith 1968, p. 673). Westphal reports that his patients indicated “that they might be 
laughed at or considered to be insane due to the peculiarity of the matter” and that they 
had “no idea what cause[d] the fear, as if it were a fear of fear” (Westphal 1871/1988, p. 
59; p. 62; my emphasis). Their “fear of fear” seemed to be accentuated by the fear of 
being perceived as insane, or otherwise embarrassed.
8
   
Snaith, in his study “A Clinical Investigation of Phobias” (1968), draws attention 
to Benedikt’s article, “Über Platzschwindel,” published in 1870, in which Benedikt 
suggests the term Platzschwindel, meaning “dizziness in public places,” for the 
symptomatological experience Westphal describes. Although the medical community 
adopted “agoraphobia” as the preferred term, Snaith suggests that the connotations of 
each are significant and that Platzschwindel may more accurately describe the experience 
of agoraphobia:  
                                                          
7
 For a review of historical references to “irrational fears” causing extraordinary anxiety and avoidance 
prior to the development of a medical description of phobias, see Snaith, who includes, among others, 
Hippocrates as having noted the presence of what we would now call phobias (1968, p. 673). Knapp 
references Errera’s historical review of the concept of phobia and also indicates Hippocrates’s treatment of 
phobic patients (1988, p. 37). The disorder, then, profoundly predates its nomination. 
8
 Mr. P, Westphal’s third patient, “is simultaneously frightened by the thought that his condition could 
attract attention” (1871/1988, pp. 70-71). This patient also reports fear in crossing the Dirschauer Bridge: 
“during the times he had to cross it, a great feeling of anxiety overcame him, combined with the fear that he 
could become insane and would jump over the bridge during such a condition. When asked, however, if he 
had the urge to do so, he denied it vehemently” (pp. 71-72). This vehement denial points to unconscious 
factors, which I address in detail in Chapters Two and Three. 
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The word Platzschwindel places stress upon the somatic and autonomic 
accompaniments of the symptom at the expense of the psychic experience; and 
indeed, direct questioning of these patients often reveals that unpleasant somatic 
sensations may be a great deal more distressing than the psychic experience of 
anxiety. (1968, p. 673) 
However, Westphal specifically addresses Benedikt’s article and dismisses the proposed 
Platzschwindel precisely because the experiences of his own patients could not be 
described as dizziness or vertigo, but anxiety. Westphal emphasizes the distinction 
between a physical (specifically, ocular) impairment, which Benedikt suggests, and a 
cerebral (psychological) cause, which Westphal emphatically favours. At Westphal’s 
request, each of his patients underwent an independent ophthalmological examination, 
which revealed no evidence of ocular impairment that would cause such dizziness, thus 
supporting his conclusions (1871/1988, pp. 74-79).
9
 Furthermore, distinguishing between 
the psychic and the somatic experiences of anxiety, as Snaith attempts, may be 
impossible.
10
 Indeed, attempting to distinguish between the psychic and the somatic is 
one of the ongoing central issues in theorizing and treating agoraphobia. Although 
Westphal chose the term “agoraphobia,” he indicated that the term was “not entirely 
exhaustive,” given that the fear was “related to certain other situations” (1871/1988, p. 
59) in addition to walking through certain streets. Indeed, opposed to the common-place 
and initial conception of agoraphobia as a “fear of open spaces,” perpetuated in part by 
the literal translation of the word,
 
the actual symptomatology of the disorder as currently 
understood refers to a ranging severity of anxiety reactions concerning space.    
The “other” anxiety reaction concerning space, claustrophobia, was introduced 
sometime between 1878 and 1879. Its precise origin is contested, but credit is accorded to 
Ball and his article, “On Claustrophobia” (1879) (“Claustrophobia” 2014). However, 
Westphal refers to claustrophobic anxieties in his patients, beginning “as soon as they 
were together with many people in closed rooms” (1871/1988, p. 74). A contemporary 
                                                          
9
 The first complete English translation of Die Agoraphobie was not published until 1988, so it is possible 
that Snaith was not familiar with this aspect of Westphal’s article; it is not cited in his study. 
10
 Studies of psychosomatic processes, and the mutual effects of so-called psychological and physical well-
being or illness, are sharply on the rise, especially in the field of psychoneuroimmunology. See, for 
example, Karren, Smith, and Gordon (2013). 
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commentator, Webber (1872), supported Westphal’s use of the term agoraphobia if its 
definition included what is now called claustrophobia: insofar as “agora means not only a 
market place, but also an assembly of people, the term agoraphobia would seem 
appropriate for the dread of crossing a square, or dread of being in a crowded room” (qtd. 
in Knapp 1988, p. 31). White, an American contemporary, suggested that agoraphobia 
and clithrophobia – a form of claustrophobia specifically referring to a morbid fear of 
being locked in – be considered in the same category, “as in both cases the characteristic 
symptom is that the patient cannot by any means form an accurate conception of his 
surroundings” (1884, p. 1140).  
These early speculations on agoraphobia eventually gave way to the standardized 
definitions effected by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) via their compilation 
of the Diagnostics and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), first published in 
1952.
11
 The DSM-IV-TR (4
th
 edition, text revision) provides the psychiatric definition – 
or, “diagnostic features” – of agoraphobia: 
The essential feature of Agoraphobia is anxiety about being in places or situations 
from which escape might be difficult (or embarrassing) or in which help may not 
be available in the event of having a Panic Attack [separately defined] or panic-
like symptoms. […] The anxiety typically leads to a pervasive avoidance of a 
variety of situations that may include being alone outside the home or being home 
alone; being in a crowd of people; traveling in an automobile, bus, or airplane; or 
being on a bridge or in an elevator. (APA 2000, p. 395) 
There are some changes in the recently published fifth edition of the manual (DSM-5, 
APA 2013) in the criteria and description for agoraphobia. Notably, in DSM-IV-TR, 
within the main category of Anxiety Disorders, there are three codable disorders
12
: Panic 
Disorder Without Agoraphobia; Panic Disorder With Agoraphobia; and, Agoraphobia 
Without History of Panic Disorder. Neither Agoraphobia nor Panic Attack, though 
delineated, is considered codable outside of these three diagnoses. In DSM-5, panic 
                                                          
11
 For a critique of the development of the DSM and, in particular, the diagnostic criteria for agoraphobia, 
see Reuter (2007b) (especially Chapter 5, pp. 95-160). For a history of the classification of panic disorders 
from Freud to (at the time, forthcoming) DSM-IV (1994), see Frances et al. (1993).    
12
 Codable disorders are discrete diagnosable conditions, as opposed to delineated symptoms; the 
symptoms, defined, contribute to the diagnosis, but are not diagnoses in and of themselves. 
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disorder and agoraphobia are unlinked: panic disorder and agoraphobia are separate 
diagnoses with separate criteria. In panic disorder, the fear or anxiety is about the panic 
attacks themselves; the phobic object in agoraphobia is considered to be “a variety of 
situations” (APA 2013, p. 219).  
 In DSM-IV-TR (APA 2000), there are three specific criteria for agoraphobia: 
briefly, anxiety typically about situations that include being outside the home alone 
(Criterion A); avoidance of the anxiety situations, which may include enduring the 
situation in the presence of the phobic companion (Criterion B); and, Criteria A and B are 
not better accounted for by another mental disorder (Criterion C).
13
 In DSM-5, there are 
more – and more specific – criteria for agoraphobia: intense fear or anxiety triggered by 
the real or anticipated exposure to variety of situations (Criterion A); upon exposure, 
thoughts that something terrible might happen (Criterion B); fear or anxiety occurs upon 
nearly every exposure (Criterion C); the feared situations are actively avoided (Criterion 
D); fear or anxiety is out of proportion to the actual danger posed by the situations 
(Criterion E); fear or anxiety is persistent (Criterion F); and, it causes clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other areas of functioning 
(Criterion G) (APA 2013, pp. 218-219). A significant addition to the DSM-5 is the note 
that either real or anticipated exposure to the phobic situation can cause marked anxiety. 
Evident in these criteria is the limited or absent capacity of the agoraphobic to locate a 
specific phobic object, despite the delineation of five specific agoraphobic situations (I 
describe these situations below, in Agora-).
 
 
 The underlying phenomenological experiences of the agoraphobic are generalized 
within the psychoanalytic literature beyond the diagnostic criteria used psychiatrically. 
Frances and Dunn, practicing psychoanalysts, describe the clinical situation of 
agoraphobia patients as follows: “patients suffering from these space phobias have a 
disturbing degree of background anxiety punctuated by attacks of panic when they leave 
a safe space” (1975, p. 435). Capps and Ochs suggest that “avoidance in response to this 
                                                          
13
 Some examples regarding Criterion C: Specific Phobia might better account for avoidance limited to a 
single situation like elevators; Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder might better account for avoidance of dirt in 
someone with an obsession about contamination; or, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder might better account for 
avoidance of stimuli associated with a severe stressor. 
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fear is the central feature of agoraphobia” (1995, p. 3). Agoraphobia is the other side of 
claustrophobia and its onset, as Westphal and his contemporaries noted, is often a 
response to a claustrophobic panic. Paradoxically, “agoraphobic persons often describe 
feeling trapped by an ever-present threat of panic and their belief that they cannot risk 
leaving safe havens such as home” (Capps & Ochs 1995, p. 3).14 The co-presence of 
agoraphobic and claustrophobic fears in individuals diagnosed as agoraphobic continues 
to be noted today: “multiple and seemingly incompatible fears (closed places and open 
spaces) are regularly found in agoraphobic patients” (Compton 1992, p. 405).15 Bion, 
within the psychoanalytic tradition, describes this limitation of the psychiatric delineation 
of agoraphobia:  
If a patient presenting such symptoms is investigated psycho-analytically we find 
an extremely complex personality; this in itself is of no significance but for the 
fact, relevant to this discussion, that I am soon unable to use the term 
agoraphobia in a way that is meaningful: the conjunction is not of the elements 
that first appeared to compose it nor are they constant. I need to continue using 
this term, and with it the term ‘claustrophobia.’ [...] In analysis it appears that the 
patient has terrible feelings when he is in open spaces or if he feels shut in. (1965, 
p. 123; emphasis added)
16
 
One of the difficulties in understanding and delineating the specific characteristics of 
agoraphobia is the wide variety of experiences agoraphobia sufferers describe. The 
motivation of the DSM is precisely to be as specific as possible about the diagnostic 
criteria for psychological disorders. Its authority, however, is belied by its constant 
revisions and new editions. It has practical uses, but is theoretically limited. The 
psychiatric definition also does not include the important characteristic of a high degree 
                                                          
14
 Two agoraphobia sufferers describe their experiences: “I was never housebound, but I did find the world 
was getting smaller”; and, perhaps more typically, “I wouldn’t go outside the door. I wouldn’t even go to 
the backdoor to empty the bin” (Davidson 2000, p. 33). 
15
 For a clinical example, see Matte-Blanco (1940), who presents a case vignette from the psychoanalysis of 
a patient with severe agoraphobia and claustrophobia.  
16
 Ferro, a contemporary Italian psychoanalyst practicing in the Bionian tradition, indicates this same 
diagnostic hesitation. Although he makes an initial and basic diagnosis of agoraphobia and claustrophobia 
in his patient, “Carla,” he generally “avoid[s] in-depth diagnosis, for fear of imposing an excessively rigid 
pattern on the material observed and its elaboration” (1996, p. 997). Ferro acknowledges the risk of 
operating according to any established diagnostic framework without an awareness of the reductionist 
structure it implicitly imposes on complex realities. 
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of free-floating anxiety,
17
 which likely contributes to the “variety” of “situations” that 
form the phobic object, as well as the disorder’s chronicity. 
Weiss contributes the important observation that “agoraphobia often develops at a 
particular phase in [the patient’s] life when he is required to take a step forward in the 
direction of independence” (1935, p. 65). Weiss explains its onset as follows: “If he 
succumbs to agoraphobia at such a time it indicates that his capacity for adapting himself 
to reality has broken down before his necessity for emancipating himself” (1935, p. 65). 
A step towards independence would also be – consciously or unconsciously – perceived 
as a step away from the family of origin, which the agoraphobic might perceive as an act 
of aggression against her family (primarily, in most cases, her mother). Compton (1992) 
draws attention to this observation, though Weiss himself did not emphasize its 
relevance, and points to Ruddick’s (1961) similar observations that the onset of 
agoraphobia in his three case studies was related to marriage and parenthood. Jackel 
(1966) offers several clinical examples of patients (not frankly agoraphobic
18
) who, upon 
interruptions to the analytic treatment (for example, notification of summer vacation or 
the need to cancel a session), expressed a conscious or unconscious (namely, in dreams or 
symptoms) wish for a child. He interprets this wish for a child as the conscious 
representation of the unconscious wish to have someone who would not (be able to) leave 
the patient; this wish is a defense against the pain of separation, and of separateness. 
Jackel suggests that this wish derives from the pre-oedipal narcissistic wish “to establish 
a mother-child relationship in which the patient is both mother and (by identification) 
child”; thereby, the patient “can never be deserted and […] is never alone” (1966, p. 
733).
19
 Milrod develops this theme by exploring the pregnancy fantasies of two panic 
patients, suggesting similarly that these fantasies become “important dynamic organizers 
                                                          
17
 “Background anxiety” has also been identified as “general,” “free-floating,” and “pessimistic expectant” 
anxiety and refers to patients’ level of anxiety when they are in their “safe space.” These terms are used 
interchangeably to refer to an individual’s level of anxiety when he or she is not confronted with the phobic 
object: for an agoraphobic, his or her anxiety while at home in a “safe space.” 
18
 That is to say, these patients would not be diagnosed with agoraphobia. However, and as I argue in 
Chapter Two, agora-claustrophobic anxieties are part of each individual’s psychical structure; therefore, in 
circumstances that threaten the defenses against these anxieties, agoraphobic moments arise. For patients 
who are frankly agoraphobic, I mean that agora-claustrophobic anxieties are not primarily unconscious 
structures, but predominate and are conscious influences in their psychic lives. 
19
 Jackel reports this wish in both male and female patients.  
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of their panic experience [...] because of the way they permit the avoidance of real, 
painful separations by means of a fantasy restitution, and foster regression through 
identification with the baby” (1998, p. 675).20 There seems to be an unconscious paradox: 
a step towards apparent independence, such as marriage or parenthood, can also be a 
narcissistic step away from autonomy.
21
   
 
1.2. -phobia 
With this general description of the agoraphobic experience in mind, I turn to the 
meanings of agoraphobia’s specific aspects, namely “phobia” and “agora.” Snaith (1968) 
provides a study comparing the symptomatology of patients suffering primarily from 
agoraphobia with that of patients suffering primarily from “other” phobias (that is, more 
discrete and circumscribed fears, such as thunderstorms, eating in public, spiders, etc.
22
). 
For the purposes of his study, Snaith considers patients “agoraphobic” if their most 
prominent fears are of leaving home and being in the open.
23
 His findings suggest that 
                                                          
20
 Milrod (1998) discusses the presence of pregnancy fantasies in both male and female patients. Davidson 
(2001) explores the connection between pregnancy and agoraphobia from a different perspective, 
emphasizing the bodily aspects and instability of bodily boundaries of both. All (15) of the agoraphobic 
women Davidson interviews had experienced pregnancy and most of them linked the experience of 
pregnancy and the onset or increase in their agoraphobic anxieties (p. 291). Further, it is not just the 
experience of pregnancy but also the subsequent responsibility of caring for an entirely dependent infant 
that appears to be connected to agoraphobic anxieties. 
21
 Others have suggested that the marriage relationship is the significant precipitating factor, rather than the 
marriage event, though Arindell (1987) finds no support for this hypothesis. I suggest that the relationship 
is not irrelevant insofar as all dependency (which agoraphobia can surely be described as) is mutually 
enacted. In this vein, see Symonds (1971). I discuss this element of dependency in more detail in Chapter 
Three in my critique of a clinical emphasis on interpreting the transference.  
22
 Perhaps following the diagnostic codes of the DSM, Snaith includes fear of crowded places in the 
category of discrete phobias. By contrast, and following many theoretical and clinical descriptions, I argue 
that such a fear is intimately connected to agoraphobia.   
23
 Snaith excludes from his study those patients suffering primarily from schizophrenic or depressive 
psychotic illnesses. The exclusion of such patients from so-called scientific studies of mental disorders is 
required in order to arrive at any statistically significant results; this exclusion reduces the complexity of 
phenomena being studied, necessarily, for the study’s purposes, but also significantly limits our 
understanding of the complexities of mental life. Milrod’s (2007) finding of persistent emptiness in 
agoraphobia patients for whom panic symptoms have remitted connects agoraphobia, psychiatrically 
defined, and agora-claustrophobic anxieties, psychoanalytically delineated, with a range of other disorders, 
including borderline disorders (see, for example, Fonagy 1991; Kumin 1978, LaFarge 1989; and, Singer 
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agoraphobia is significantly different from discrete phobias and are highlighted by 
Frances and Dunn: agoraphobia is “more gradually developed, more generalized, less 
demonstrably related to conditioning, more resistant to treatment and more likely to 
involve extensive character pathology [than specific phobias]” (Frances & Dunn 1975, p. 
435). Agoraphobia is distinguished, then, from what might be called true phobias, insofar 
as its characteristics are so distinct from the shared characteristics of specific phobias. 
Snaith argues, in fact, that the agoraphobic’s high level of generalized anxiety24 “is 
directly responsible for the occurrence of the uncommon fears of the agoraphobic 
constellation” (1968, p. 692). Paradoxically, avoidance is one of agoraphobia’s central 
features and yet there is no object to avoid. This paradox distinguishes agoraphobia from 
the simple phobias and partly accounts for the suffering it causes. A discrete phobia, 
ironically, provides relief from anxiety by circumscribing it to a particular object that can 
be avoided. The object-less nature of agoraphobia induces its own specific kind of 
anxiety, which searches, so to speak, for an object in the attempt to define and limit it. 
Hence, “the onset of a state of generalized anxiety tends to increase the patient’s 
sensitivity to all common fears” (Snaith 1968, p. 692).25    
Phillips (1993), writing on phobia, conflates discrete phobias (or, phobias 
generally speaking) with agoraphobia; in so doing, he unwittingly provides us with some 
ideas about the particular nature of agoraphobia. Phillips makes three points about 
phobias that do not pertain to agoraphobia: 1) “one can only become phobic by believing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1977a, 1977b), psychotic disorders (see, for example, Ellonen-Jéquier 2009), and, as Rey (1994) 
demonstrates, in psychical states between borderline and psychotic. Likewise, many descriptions of 
borderline and psychotic patients’ psychological complexes include agora-claustrophobic anxieties. 
24
 Again, the agoraphobic’s high level of generalized anxiety distinguishes agoraphobia from specific 
phobias; individuals suffering from specific phobias tend to experience very low anxiety as long as their 
phobic object is not present. If, for example, a person suffers from arachnophobia (fear of spiders), he or 
she may have a panic attack when confronted with a spider but is not likely to be anxious otherwise. An 
agoraphobic individual may have a panic attack when he or she leaves the house, but will also tend to have 
significant levels of anxiety at home, in their “safe space.” See also infra note 17.     
25
 Cf. Phillips, who provides a different comparison of the relative comfort offered by phobic objects: “A 
phobic situation, broadly speaking, one can choose to avoid, but a phobic object can turn up unexpectedly” 
(1993, p. 19). Nevertheless, his suggestion that “a person who imagines that his hate could turn up at any 
moment, like an unwanted guest – who has to live in a state of continual internal vigilance to ensure that he 
will always be fair – might choose an object rather than a situation” (p. 19) coincides with my argument 
that agoraphobia might follow precisely from this inability to “choose an object.” 
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that there are an external and an internal world that are discrete” (p. 24); 2) “it is part of 
the developmental project to find a phobia, to localize the impossible in oneself 
elsewhere” (p. 25); and, 3) “if one can tolerate some of one’s badness – meaning 
recognize it as yours – then one can take some of the fear out of the world” (p. 25). None 
of these three points describe the agoraphobic’s experience, which tells us three important 
qualities of the agoraphobic’s psychical reality: 1) she does not, on a profound level, 
believe in discrete internal and external worlds; 2) she has not been able, 
developmentally, to find a specific phobia; the impossible, therefore, remains (internally) 
unlocalized; and 3) she is unable to recognize and tolerate her own “badness,” and is 
therefore unable to take any of the fear out of the world.  
The developmental issues we can tease out of Phillips’s description of phobias is 
evident in Freud’s Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy (1909), the case of 
“Little Hans,” which, I argue, can be read as a description of Hans’s struggle to achieve a 
phobia.
26
 Freud identifies Hans’s anxiety as a phobia – with the phobic object as the 
horse, that a horse will bite him, and of the street – but specifically chooses not to 
consider it a case of agoraphobia; Friedman, by contrast, refers to Hans precisely as an 
example of a case of agoraphobia (1985, p. 529), as does Morgan (2003, p. 181). This 
diagnostic discrepancy is partly explained by the ongoing uncertainty, both theoretically 
and clinically, about the distinctions between agoraphobia and discrete phobias. Further, I 
suggest that Hans is struggling, through the course of the analysis, to achieve a specific 
phobia and avoid the more pervasive and disabling experience of agoraphobia. Rather 
than detail a complete analysis of this case study, I wish to draw out the distinction 
between true phobias and agoraphobia via the development of Hans’s symptoms: Hans’s 
father writes to Freud, concerned about his son’s fear of being bitten by a horse in the 
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 Midgely (2006) provides an analysis of the theoretical and clinical issues in Freud’s analysis of Little 
Hans, as well as the subsequent analyses of Little Hans by Freud himself (who revisited the case in 1926’s 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety), Klein, Bowlby, and Lacan. Midgley indicates the primary theoretical 
concerns of Klein’s, Bowlby’s, and Lacan’s re-readings of Little Hans – primitive anxieties, separation 
anxiety due to real attachment experiences, and anxiety about Little Hans’s movement from imaginary 
oedipal triangulation (mother-child-phallus) to symbolic oedipal quaternity (mother-child-phallus-symbolic 
father) and argues that the case of Little Hans, with all of its re-readings, provides a framework for 
understanding how psychoanalytic theory has changed and developed – without, of course, providing any 
sort of “truth” about the development of Little Hans’s (agora)phobia. See Chapter Four, below, for my 
discussion of historical, narrative, and psychical truths. 
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street. Freud connects the onset of Hans’s anxiety with an increased affection for his 
mother, which Hans represses; thereby, this (perhaps overwhelming) affection is 
expressed as anxiety. The primary meaning of Hans’s dislike of streets, prior to fixating 
on the horse as the phobic object, is, Freud suggests, that he missed his mother and 
preferred to be near her. When Hans was upset, his mother would comfort him; this 
comfort reinforces the unconscious association between the repression of his desires 
(which cause anxiety) and satisfaction (his mother comforts him when he is anxious); in 
Freud’s words, “his affection for his mother triumphantly achieved its aim” (1909, pp. 
139-140). However, a pathological anxiety ensued, when the attainment of his longed-for 
object (his mother) did not extinguish his anxiety of the street. As Freud emphasizes in 
his discussion of the case, “his anxiety was no longer reconvertible into longing” (p. 
114).
27
 Thus, the anxiety must find an object, which, for Hans, became the horse. Yet, 
what might have been a simple phobia was somehow compounded into an anxiety 
neurosis more closely resembling agoraphobia.   
The phobic object, which is a substitution for reality, covers up, so to speak, the 
loss of reality – the mother as object of desire – in the two-phase development of the 
neurosis.
28
 Because of Han’s ambivalence towards his father – that is, the co-occurrence 
of affection and hostility – his wish for intimacy with his mother is transformed into fear, 
and the original wish is repressed. Freud describes this ambivalence and its effect on the 
phobia’s development:  
Hans’s anxiety had two constituents: there was the fear of his father [a result of 
Hans’s libidinal desire for his mother, which his father thwarted] and fear for his 
father. The former was derived from his hostility towards his father [for 
                                                          
27
 I expand on the relation between anxiety and longing, loss, and emptiness in Chapter Three. For now, I 
will say that longing is a very painful state, perhaps more painful, or less bearable, than anxiety, for there is 
nothing to do to relieve it. Anxiety is relieved by repression or, in the case of phobias, by avoidance. In 
agoraphobia, there seems to be no relief of anxiety or of longing, compounding the suffering this disorder 
causes.  
28
 Freud describes this process in “The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis.” Briefly, “the ego, in the 
service of reality, sets about the repression of an instinctual impulse. This, however, is not yet the neurosis 
itself. The neurosis consists rather in the processes which provide a compensation for the portion of the id 
that has been damaged – that is to say, in the reaction against the repression and in the failure of the 
repression” (1924, pp. 185-187). Repression is never complete and unqualified: this failure of repression, 
not repression itself, results in neurosis.  
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preventing the satisfaction of his libidinal desire for his mother], and the latter 
from the conflict between his affection, which was exaggerated at this point by 
way of compensation, and his hostility. (1909, p. 45) 
The movement of the analysis demonstrates the diffusion of anxiety, which begins with 
no known cause (but is actually due to the – always incomplete – repression of a 
forbidden libidinal desire for the mother), to the phobic object, horses (which is explained 
by Hans’s experiences of horses combined with his phantasies about them and about his 
father
29
), and then to a fear of going out into the street (where a horse might be 
encountered any time). As the analysis progresses, the connection is made between the 
anxiety-instigating scene with the horse, who fell down and “made a row with his feet” 
(p. 50), and Hans’s own habit of stamping his feet when he is angry; that is, he is anxious 
about his own aggressive impulses as much as his libidinal ones; or, better, he is afraid of 
the interplay between the two.
30
 His identification with the horse is supported by an 
account of playing “at horses” with some other children, when they would take turns 
pretending to be the horse (pp. 58-59). There are times when Hans is afraid a horse will 
come into his room and bite him, indicating the internal source of the fear and the 
diminishing “safe space,” as he realizes he cannot escape from his psychical reality. 
I discuss these developmental aspects of agoraphobia, and the complex relation of 
internal and external realities, in detail in Chapter Two, but they are also relevant to the 
particularly agoraphobic phenomenon of the “phobic companion” (Frances & Dunn 1975, 
p. 435).
31
 Freud suggests that he would have identified Hans’s phobia as agoraphobia 
except that he does not present with the symptom of the phobic companion; that is, his 
anxiety about horses – which is exacerbated while he is in the street as it is more likely he 
will there encounter a horse – is not entirely relieved by the presence of his mother, who 
would otherwise have been considered the phobic companion. However, Freud perhaps 
overstates this characteristic of agoraphobia, suggesting that locomotion “can always be 
                                                          
29
 I detail in Chapters Two and Four the ways in which the development of psychical reality is a 
consequence of the interdependence of historical, or real, experiences and unconscious fantasy. 
30
 I will note here that Hans most often stamps his feet in anger when he must stop playing in order to use 
the bathroom, or “lumf,” as Hans says (Freud 1909, p. 54; p. 95). Furthermore, Hans’s father indicates the 
difficulty Hans has always had with his stools, requiring frequent aperients (laxatives) and enemas. Later in 
the analysis, the connection is made between “lumfs” and the birth of Hans’s little sister.   
31
 The phobic companion is DSM-IV’s Criterion B for a diagnosis of agoraphobia. See also Deutsch (1929). 
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easily performed” with the phobic companion (1909, p. 115; my emphases).32 Even at the 
earliest stages of agoraphobia’s conception, Westphal notes this phenomenon, indicating 
that his patients “experienced great comfort from the companionship of men or even an 
inanimate object, such as a vehicle or a cane” (1871/1988, p. 12; qtd. in Snaith 1968, p. 
673). Frances and Dunn clarify the centrality of the phobic companion to experiences of 
agoraphobia, which is an alternative protective measure that fluctuates along with the 
degree of necessary avoidance. Some agoraphobics are “afraid to go out of the house at 
all”33; others can leave the house with their phobic companion (who can variously be 
only one particular person, or almost any other person); sometimes a sort of safety object 
is employed to tolerate feared situations, which might include a cane or vehicle (as 
Westphal indicates of his patients), or “carts, kittens, and dark glasses” (Compton 1992, 
p. 409). The phobic companion, a consistent – though not universal – aspect of 
agoraphobia, is unique among phobic disorders; the relief the phobic companion offers to 
the agoraphobic individual further suggests that this is no simple phobia. The task of 
disambiguating the fear of the external world from the fear of leaving the supposed safety 
of the home, and the fear of being alone (without the companion) from the fear of others 
is a formidable one, again pointing to the complex relation of internal and external 
realities, a relation with which the agoraphobic struggles.        
Freud describes the behaviour of a man with agoraphobia as that of “a small 
child” insofar as a child is taught to avoid the dangers of the street unaccompanied by an 
adult and the agoraphobic patient “will in fact be saved from his anxiety if we accompany 
him across the square” (1917, p. 400). Freud makes the same distinction as Snaith 
regarding the specificity of “phobias,” which are psychically bound and symbolically 
attached to particular objects or situations, and anxiety neurosis, which is characterized 
by “free floating anxiety” and a “tendency to an expectation of evil” (p. 398). However, 
in contrast to Snaith’s later findings, Freud includes agoraphobia in the group of specific 
(and, he finds, inexplicable) phobias. Freud suggests, in fact, that “people whose whole 
                                                          
32
 Fenichel argues that the phobic companion is not an essential feature of agoraphobia, occurring only 
variably (1944, pp. 314-315).  
33
 Frances and Dunn suggest that, for these housebound agoraphobics, the house itself has become their 
phobic companion (1975, p. 438).  
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existence is restricted by agoraphobia may be entirely free from pessimistic expectant 
anxiety” (p. 400).34 He seems to have made the common error of considering the specific 
phobia rather than addressing the general anxiety experience.   
 Agoraphobia’s unique character, in comparison to true (that is, discrete and 
specific) phobias, supports Snaith’s argument that the use of the term “agoraphobia” is, at 
best, inaccurate and, at worst, misleading resulting in errors in both the conceptualization 
and treatment of the disorder. 
 
1.3. Agora- 
Fear itself cannot be wrong, even if it is difficult to find out where it fits. 
        (Phillips 1993, p. 13) 
DSM-5 lists the following five “situations” as specifically agoraphobic: 1) using public 
transportation (e.g., automobiles, buses, trains, ships, planes); 2) being in open spaces 
(e.g., parking lots, marketplaces, bridges); 3) being in enclosed spaces (e.g., shops, 
theaters, cinemas); 4) standing in line or being in a crowd; and, 5) being outside of the 
home alone (APA 2013, p. 217). These examples are “not exhaustive” (p. 218), but at 
least two of them must cause marked anxiety in any one patient for a diagnosis of 
agoraphobia.
35
 This attempt to list the various, and often conflicting, agoraphobic fears 
points to the historical contention surrounding it and also indicates the difficulty in 
theorizing it.  
Freud defines agoraphobia as the “anxiety to walk along a street or cross a square 
in his own familiar home-town” (1917, p. 399) and identifies the phobic object as “the 
square” or the “open street.” The phobic object, according to early psychoanalytic 
theorizing (including those of Abraham 1913/1979, Deutsch 1929, Fenichel 1944, and 
                                                          
34
Although Deutsch follows the Freudian paradigm otherwise, she suggests that agoraphobic patients “must 
always have a tendency to anxiety, which breaks out under certain conditions associated with the street” 
(1929, p. 69).  
35
 I note the inclusion of claustrophobia (“being in enclosed spaces”) as one of the agoraphobic situations. 
In DSM-IV-TR, claustrophobia is coded as a simple phobia but it is excluded entirely (as a distinct disorder) 
from DSM-5. 
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Freud 1909, 1917, among others), is a symbolic substitution for conflicting instinctual 
demands, the manifestation of repressed desires. The temptation of the street arises out of 
the danger of, and desire for, a sexual relationship characterized by prostitution, as well 
as a “danger to exhibitionistic impulses” (Deutsch 1929, p. 69). It is considered a 
derivative of castration anxiety. In the same vein, Freud indicates that the agoraphobic’s 
anxiety of being left alone is ultimately “an endeavour to avoid the temptation to engage 
in solitary masturbation” (1926, p. 128). Compton (1992), in a contemporary review of 
the psychoanalytic understanding of agoraphobia, indicates the ongoing issue of 
identifying the content of agoraphobic anxieties given the variety of fears agoraphobia 
patients articulate (for example: going crazy, losing control, wide streets, narrow streets, 
stores, bridges, tunnels, open spaces, closed spaces, etc.). Furthermore, the content of 
agoraphobic anxieties are not always explored in the literature, at times identified only as 
“street fear” (Compton 1992, p. 413).   
Freud makes a particular point in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) about 
defining the symptom of a neurosis: in the case of Little Hans, it may have seemed 
obvious that the symptom from which Hans suffered was a fear of horses; however, 
Freud emphasizes the importance of the unconscious specificity of the symptom, which 
leads to the identification of the fear that a horse was going to bite him. The “nucleus” of 
the symptom, however, is still further repressed. The neurotic character of Little Hans’s 
phobia is defined by the displacement of his fear of his father onto a horse (Freud 1909, 
p. 103). The repression of the specific meaning of the fear is part of the work of the 
neurosis as it removes the content of the fear from consciousness and replaces it with an 
“undefined phobia in which only the anxiety and its object” appear (p. 101). In the case 
of agoraphobia, we must be careful to avoid overstating our knowledge of the symptom, 
which has been indicated, but perhaps not emphasized (as I have suggested above) in the 
literature. Rather than a “fear of sexual temptations” (invariably connected to castration 
anxiety) (Freud 1909, p. 109), Deutsch suggests a more profound and disturbing 
experience: “a genuine dread of death”; or, “put into words, […the feeling that] ‘I shall 
suddenly die’” (1929, p. 51). The displacement of the fear from an unconscious fear of 
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death onto a “variety of situations” is not surprising and, as with Little Hans’s phobia, the 
displacement is the symptom.
36
 
Compton, referring to Weiss’s extensive discussion on agoraphobia in 
Agoraphobia in the Light of Ego Psychology (1964), suggests that the fear of an internal 
danger is the paradigmatic characteristic of agoraphobia. The perception of this “internal 
danger” precedes the overwhelming anxiety and includes: “a profound sense of being ill, 
loss of feeling of identity (depersonalization, loss of ‘ego feeling’), derealisation, 
dizziness, fainting sensations, loss of orientation” (Compton 1992, p. 408) and amounts 
to “an unbearable feeling of ill-being” (Weiss 1964, p. 3; qtd. in Compton 1992, p. 408). 
Weiss’s characterization of agoraphobic anxieties does not exclude Deutsch’s similar 
characterization, “a genuine dread of death” (Deutsch 1929, p. 51), though Weiss adds 
that “it is an actual process of destruction, emanating from the patient’s own death-
instinct” (1935, p. 81). To emphasize, this “dread of death” is a far cry from the common-
place notion, and literal definition, of agoraphobia as a fear of open spaces, and also has 
quite different implications than both the DSM-IV and DSM-5, and current clinical 
understanding as a fear of leaving a safe space. These various fears may actually 
characterize agoraphobia insofar as they may be part of the conscious phobic “object,” 
but they do not approach the nucleus of the anxiety.
37
 Weiss is the first theorist to suggest 
that the agoraphobic’s feeling of ill-being is “a direct mental registration of structural 
disorganization, rather than representing a meaning” (Compton 1992, p. 409). 
Specifically, rather than a symbolic fear, agoraphobia indicates the fear of symbolization 
itself.
38
 The persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) describes, along with the agoraphobic’s 
inability to limit her anxiety by locating a specific phobic object, are indicative of this 
inhibition of symbolization. To anticipate briefly my arguments to follow in Chapter 
Two, agoraphobic anxieties are more accurately described as residing in the boundaries 
of spaces, both internal and external, and are related to Klein’s (1940) theories of 
                                                          
36
 Displacement, generally, refers to “a shifting hither and thither of various affects and conflicts” (Katan 
1951, p. 43). Katan provides a clinical example of the role of displacement in agoraphobia. 
37
 If we consider the case of Little Hans, we can say that he truly was afraid of horses, but horses became 
the phobic object to account for his startling anxiety in order to avoid the heart of his fear, his own internal 
desires and, thus, of punishment for his desires in the form of castration. 
38
 Snaith notes that agoraphobic “fears” do not depend on the mechanism of symbolism, as true phobias do 
(1968, p. 692). 
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primitive anxieties and Winnicott’s (1974) theory of the fear of breakdown. The 
agoraphobic is unable to creatively inhabit the spaces between and, instead, defends 
against all of the vulnerability and possibility inherent in them.  
Davidson argues that “agoraphobia can be characterized as a disorder that 
problematizes sufferers' experiences of bodily boundaries” (2000, p.31). Based partly on 
individual interviews and self-help group discussions, Davidson draws attention to two 
important issues: the first, which I discuss above, is that the agoraphobic experience often 
includes claustrophobic anxieties; and, secondly, that the anxiety about “space” has more 
to do with other people in the space than the space itself.
39
 Davidson’s description of the 
agoraphobics’ boundaries includes both physical and psychical space, explicating 
agoraphobics’ very distressing experience of derealization, or depersonalization. I agree 
with Davidson’s thesis, and similarly argue that agoraphobia is not merely an anxiety 
about space but more specifically about the boundaries between spaces, including the 
boundaries between psychical spaces. This focus on the boundaries between spaces 
follows from the qualities of agoraphobia that distinguish it from true phobias and, 
further, from Milrod’s (2007) finding of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients for 
whom symptoms of anxiety and avoidance have remitted.
40
   
 Agoraphobia confounds absolutely the boundary between inside and outside. 
Although it may seem a simple question of what is external and what is internal, the 
agoraphobic is not able to take this separation for granted. The ill-defined boundary 
between spaces, both physical and psychical, leads to the constant anxiety of the 
confrontation between self and other, forcing the agoraphobic to diminish her external 
world
41
 and also, as Milrod (2007) indicates, the freedom she experiences in her internal, 
                                                          
39
 Cf., for example, Carter (2002), who argues that agoraphobia is a “realistic anxiety” caused by the 
expanse of modern urban space. 
40
 I address Milrod’s (2007) article in detail in Chapter Three. 
41
 This diminution is partly explained by the theory of reinforcement, which, as Snaith explains, leads to the 
strengthening of the phobic person’s fears “every time he escapes from the situation he dreads” (1968, p. 
680). Furthermore, anxiety exacerbates this reinforcement, indicating that “a patient is more likely to form 
conditioned fear responses (‘phobias’) if he is already suffering from an anxiety state” (Snaith 1968, p. 
680). See also Katan 1951, p. 45: “She fought her anxiety by far-reaching, self-imposed restrictions, 
gradually gave up her profession and her social life, until finally the anxiety attacks also befell her within 
the confines of her home, so that she felt dislodged from her last refuge and, at last, came into analysis.” 
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or psychical, world. This is not to say that the agoraphobic entirely lacks a sense of 
externality and internality, or that she lacks the ability to differentiate between her own 
self and others. What the agoraphobic (unconsciously) lacks, then, more precisely than 
the boundary between self and other, is a sense of what belongs to the self and what does 
not, and thus of the limits of the self. There persists a confusion of what it means to be 
individuated, hence agora-claustrophobic anxieties’ forceful irruption around the events 
of marriage and (impending) parenthood, and the phenomenon of the phobic companion. 
For the agoraphobic, this confusion does not result in (frank
42
) paranoia – although 
paranoid expectations are evident – but in a sense of helplessness and an unconscious 
refusal to become independent.
43
 As Freud states, a person with agoraphobia resembles, 
in some way, “a small child” (1917, p. 400), a description which accords both with 
Milrod’s sense of her patient, Deborah, and with Deborah’s description of herself (2007, 
p. 1012). The shrinking external world increases the claustrophobic impingement of the 
internal world from which the agoraphobic cannot escape, fuelling an ever-tightening 
spiral of avoidance. As I argue in Chapter Four, the analytic method of free association 
affords the agoraphobic patient the opportunity to risk exploring the boundaries of her 
world, which leads to more established boundaries and also to the development of the 
capacity to creatively inhabit the emptiness of the spaces between, “out of which all new 
things emerge” (Winnicott 1974, p. 106). 
                                                          
42
 As above (see infra note 18), frank refers to an overarching mode of being in the world and is opposed to 
the paranoia that is part of each individual’s psychic development that occasionally emerges in moments of 
particular stress, but also is part of the unconscious psychic structure: blatant, rather than underlying, 
paranoia.  
43
 Frances and Dunn draw attention to the similar psychical processes at work in agoraphobia and paranoia: 
“The defences involved in phobia and paranoia – repression and denial, projection, symbolization and 
avoidance – are essentially the same. Both patients externalize internal conflicts, find the world diffusely 
threatening and avoid. The more purely phobic individual, however, has a safe place and a safe object 
relationship, a haven in a frightening world. The more paranoid person has no safe place or person and is 
more ambivalent and distrustful about attachment to any possible source of dependency gratification. It 
follows that the paranoid’s symptoms drive people away rather than capture a partner. It is as if the 
paranoid’s fears of dependency and/or dedifferentiation render him unable to project out of the dyad the 
dangerous hostile impulses” (1975, p. 437). I have two comments on Frances and Dunn’s comparison: 
firstly, I suggest that they overstate the safety of the agoraphobic’s “safe place”; secondly, and of more 
relevance here, I suggest that, unlike true phobias, agoraphobia results from a failure of symbolization. I 
agree that the difference between these two disorders likely develops due to the state of the individual’s 
aggressivity, which, as I discuss in Chapter Three, is predominately repressed in the agoraphobia patient. 
For the paranoid individual, rage is likely more conscious than in the agoraphobic.  
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1.4. Conclusion 
Agoraphobia is not, then, a phobia as traditionally understood. It is distinguished from 
simple, or discrete, phobias by the sufferer’s high levels of background anxiety, the 
phenomenon of the phobic companion, and by the nature of the phobic “object,” which 
resists description, both clinically and phenomenologically. The adoption and retention of 
the term “agoraphobia” is significant because it influences theoretical formulations and 
has implications for treatment.
44
 For example, Seidenberg and DeCrow’s (1983) politico-
sociological argument is derived from the claim that the object of agoraphobia anxieties 
is the marketplace. John Bowlby, by contrast, suggests that “all workers now agree [that] 
the central symptom of the condition under scrutiny [agoraphobia] is fear of leaving 
home” (1973, p. 299; my emphasis). Of course, Bowlby’s views on agoraphobia, derived 
from attachment theory, depend on this symptom.
45
 It is clear that Bowlby overstates the 
level of consensus on this issue. The tension between the etymology of the term – and 
definitions that follow the etymology, including clinical descriptions that take its 
definition for granted – and the subjective experiences of the disorder create a conflict in 
the theoretical understanding of agoraphobia. Accepting the etymological significance of 
“agoraphobia” as exhaustively descriptive of the phenomenological experiences of the 
disorder, or even as a basis for an argument concerning the nature of the disorder, is 
clearly a misrepresentation of the situation, leading to errors in both the conceptualization 
and treatment of the disorder. 
  
                                                          
44
 Boyd and Crump (1991) also draw attention to the manner in which terminology has likely influenced 
theoretical, conceptual, and clinical developments in understanding agoraphobia. 
45
 However, Bowlby is one of the few theorists to emphasize the relation between agoraphobia and 
depression (or “bereavement”), which I take up in Chapter Three. Although Compton (1992) points to 
Bergler’s (1935) important observation of the association between agoraphobia and depression, he implies 
that this association has been integrated into the psychoanalytic literature. Furthermore, Compton suggests 
that the “alternation of depressive states with anxiety states is so regular that it should be included as a 
descriptor of the agoraphobic syndrome” (1992, p. 415). However, while some analysts write of alternating 
depression and agoraphobia, there is no consistent indication in the subsequent analytic literature that 
depression is part of the agoraphobic syndrome. Mention of depressive symptoms in agoraphobia patients 
are, when indicated, noted only in passing, without any analysis of the meaning between them. 
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Chapter Two: Realities: Internal, External, and Intermediary 
In Chapter One, I argued that agoraphobia is distinguished from discrete phobias in part 
due to the nature of the phobic object. In discrete phobias, the phobic object is easily 
identified, limited, and determined on the basis of symbolization and conditioning. In 
agoraphobia, by contrast, the phobic object is ambiguous; it resists description, both 
clinically and phenomenologically. Rather than a fear of ‘open spaces’ or a ‘variety of 
situations,’ I suggested that agoraphobic anxieties are more accurately described as 
manifesting in the boundaries between spaces, both internal and external. The 
agoraphobic’s anxiety at the frontiers of space – in the internal as much as in the external 
world – indicates, as many others have argued,46 issues with separation-individuation or, 
in Lacan’s terms, the transition from the “spectral-I” to the “social-I” (2006f, p. 79). 
Mahler indicates the importance of the threshold in the normal process of individuation, 
noting the toddler’s arrest and return to mother upon first reaching the threshold, then a 
significant pause and assessment before crossing the threshold, and, finally, an eager 
preference for the other playroom, “which had so much more diversification” 
(1975/2000, p. 27). For the agoraphobic, as Phillips describes, “[t]he threshold between 
this one moment and the next is aversive” (1993, p. 14). The agoraphobic never arrives at 
the normal toddler’s eager preference for “so much more diversification,” preferring the 
safely limited and relatively known space of the original ‘playroom.’47  
 In this chapter, I expand on the question of what is internal and what is external, 
the anxieties fuelled by the navigation of these separated spaces, and, especially, the 
agoraphobic’s anxiety of navigating between them – of crossing the threshold, so to 
speak – via an elucidation of the development and functions of the ego. Following Freud 
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 See, for example: Bowlby (1973); Fairbairn (1941, 1952); Fonagy (1991); Frances and Dunn (1975); 
Guntrip (1961); Rey (1994); and, Sable (1994). 
47
 Rey describes the schizophrenic’s double-bind of claustro-agoraphobic-philia, where the aversive 
threshold is the only space inhabitable, as both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are overwhelming. There is no escape 
from one’s own internal reality: “One [schizoid patient] dreamt that he was quite happy inside mother. He 
then felt he wanted to find out about outside, so he got out and started enjoying himself sexually and also 
doing aggressive things. He then became anxious as he felt some people might be angry with him, and that 
he was outside in the open and unprotected. So he got back inside mother. Unfortunately, he realized that it 
was not much safer because he could do things to his mother from inside that would put him in danger just 
the same” (1994, p. 26). 
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and the psychoanalytic tradition, I argue that the distinction between “normal” and 
“pathological” is a matter of degree. In agoraphobia, there is a pathological persistence of 
the psychological processes of normal ego development. Recognition of the usefulness of 
agoraphobic anxieties in the development of ego boundaries may help identify the point 
at which they persist beyond usefulness and into pathology, both theoretically and 
clinically.  
 From an original unity, in which no ego exists as such, the ego comes into being 
by distinguishing an internal reality from an external reality. For the agoraphobic, I 
suggest that something has gone awry in this process of creative differentiation. The 
agoraphobic is not able to take for granted the distinction between internal and external, 
and therefore cannot experience shared reality as illusion. This illusion of shared reality is 
necessary for the creative uses of language.
48
 Following Winnicott (1951, 1969), I argue 
that the analytic frame – the setting of the analysis – has the potential to become a 
transitional object for the analysand. The agoraphobic’s opportunity for new experiences 
with a transitional object – if it can survive her destruction of it – allows the frame to be 
used in the development of the ego’s boundaries, which can thereby be creatively 
inhabited, with all of the risks and rewards of human vulnerability.  
 
2.1. In/Sanity 
The distinction between nervous health and neurosis is [...] reduced to a practical 
question and is decided by the outcome – by whether the subject is left with a sufficient 
amount of capacity for enjoyment and of efficiency.  
        (Freud 1917, p. 457)  
There is, from the psychoanalytic perspective, only a tenuous divide between sanity and 
insanity – or, health and pathology. This divide is at the same time, as Freud discovers 
and reiterates, also a relative correspondence; that is to say, the same psychical processes 
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 I consider the agoraphobic’s (pathological) uses of language resulting from this absence of illusion in 
Chapter Four. Briefly, I argue that without this illusion, the agoraphobic is unable to tolerate incoherence: 
she either produces narratives that are too coherent or she produces empty narratives. 
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are evident in both healthy and pathological individuals.
49
 Rather than a difference in 
kind, pathology occurs when “the logical processes underlying ‘normal’ human 
experiences [...] degenerate into symptoms” (Kristeva 2001, p. 8). Winnicott reminds us 
that “every detail of the insane person’s insanity” points to a universal phenomenon, even 
though not every individual is overwhelmed by their underlying insanity (1974, p. 103). 
Klein indicates the fluidity between the normal and the neurotic, suggesting “that in all 
human beings at some time or other neurotic anxiety has been present in a greater or 
less[er] degree” (1923, p. 79). Within the psychoanalytic paradigm, the pathological is, in 
fact, prior to the normal. The priority of the pathological is evident in the normal 
development of the infant, which proceeds from pathological (excessive) process to 
mature psychic (dynamic) structure.  
 Frances and Dunn imply the priority of the pathological in their parenthetical 
addition of “the normal infant” to their description of the agoraphobic’s psychic process:   
The agoraphobic (and the normal infant) protects the integrity of the bond to the 
partner (mother) by projecting what is threatening to that bond out of the dyad and 
on to the outside world. The dyad is preserved and its boundaries delimited at the 
expense of the creation of a frightening outside world. (1975, p. 437) 
The agoraphobic’s aggressive impulses are threatening to the dyad’s cohesion. The 
agoraphobic’s feelings of hate, rage, and an unconscious wish to destroy the partner (or, 
phobic companion) are projected into the external world; thus, experiences of the outside 
world are sacrificed to maintain the (phantasy
50
) dyad. Projection, as Frances and Dunn 
indicate, is a necessary part of healthy ego development; the inability to project hostility 
outward results in paranoia. However, the extent to which the agoraphobic adult projects 
                                                          
49
 Freud discusses the relative correspondence of neurotic mental life and normal mental life in a number of 
places. For example: “no sharp line can be drawn between ‘neurotic’ and ‘normal’ people – whether 
children or adults – [and] our conception of ‘disease’ is a purely practical one” (1909, pp. 145-146). And: 
“it is not scientifically feasible to draw a line of demarcation between what is psychically normal and 
abnormal; so that that distinction, in spite of its practical importance, possesses only a conventional value” 
(1938, p. 195).    
50
 While “fantasy” refers to conscious mental processes, like daydreams, and suggests a degree of conscious 
fictionalization, “phantasy” refers to primarily unconscious mental content, which may or may not become 
conscious. 
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is pathological.
51
 As I argued in Chapter One, the agoraphobic is unable to recognize and 
tolerate her own “badness” – namely, her own aggressive impulses – and is therefore 
unable to take any of the fear out of the world.  
 Writing on emptiness, Kumin includes a comparison between the schizoid patient 
and the infant similar to the comparison Frances and Dunn make between the 
agoraphobic and the infant:  
It is thus that experiences of emptiness, for the schizoid patient as well as for the 
infant, are essential stages in the ultimate constitution of self in the world. The 
loss of the mother by the infant through repetitive experiences of cold, hunger, 
frustration and separation, which must be experienced by the infant as 
excruciating emptiness and annihilation, is a necessary precursor of introjections 
of the maternal imago and the development of internalized object relations, which 
strengthen the process of separation-individuation and the formation of the self. 
(1978, p. 214; my emphasis)  
Evident in schizoid patients, the experience of emptiness is essential to ego development. 
The experience of emptiness is thus essential to all individuals, including the 
agoraphobic. The excessive projection of the agoraphobic, when ‘relieved’ of her 
symptoms, reveals, as Milrod (2007) finds, a persistent emptiness,
52
 which we can posit 
is a result of an excessive splitting of the self similar to the emptiness of the schizoid 
patient.  
 Recalling Klein’s primary positions (paranoid-schizoid and depressive), the 
agoraphobic has been unable to move successfully through the paranoid-schizoid position 
and is therefore unable to develop the capacity for relating in new non-anxious ways. The 
paranoid-schizoid position is characterized by splitting and persecutory anxieties.
53
 For 
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 Kristeva describes the pathological and normal manifestations of projection: “On the one hand, projective 
identification describes pathological states, particularly states of manic-depressive psychosis or 
psychosomatic illness. On the other hand, however, the endless game of projection and introjection 
constitutes what Florence Guignard calls a veritable ‘psychic exhalation’ because its underpinnings reveal a 
sort of normalcy, even universality” (2001, pp. 70-71). 
52
 I explore this phenomenon of emptiness, in both its pathological and developmental facets, in detail in 
Chapter Three. 
53
 The mechanism of “splitting” referred to here as a fundamental aspect of the paranoid-schizoid position 
is anticipated by Freud in his short discussion of fetishism: “there is a splitting of the ego” in all psychoses 
as well as the neuroses. The behaviour of fetishists is “simultaneously expressing two contrary premises. 
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the infant, the breast becomes a “bad” object because of the (inevitable) experience of 
deprivation; further, “the baby projects its own aggression” on to it (Klein 1940, p. 
262).
54
 The infant’s projection of his own aggression causes the bad objects to become 
also dangerous, as “persecutors who [the baby] feels will devour…” him (p. 262). These 
dangerous objects cause “quite little children [to] pass through anxiety-situations (and 
react to them with defence-mechanisms), the content of which is comparable to that of 
the psychoses of adults” (p. 262). When the infant reaches the developmental stage where 
he is able to integrate the good and bad objects – that is, when total rather than partial 
incorporation of the object occurs – he realizes that the bad breast that he has attacked 
and destroyed in phantasy is the same good breast that has loved him and that he has 
loved; he is thus beset by depressive anxiety. The depressive position is characterized by 
the guilt resulting from ambivalence, followed by feelings of regret, remorse, and the 
wish for reparation. The movement from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive 
position is in itself threatening. In the former, the infant fears annihilation; but, in the 
latter, the infant fears that he has destroyed his good object. The possibility of the loss of 
the good object is terrifying. This terror is especially salient from the perspective of the 
paranoid-schizoid position, where the good object protects against the threat of the bad 
object. If the good object is destroyed, the threat of the bad object is overwhelming.
55
  
 These earliest object-relations set the stage for adult experiences. Although the 
paranoid-schizoid position precedes the depressive position developmentally, both are 
primary positions and neither is ever ‘overcome,’ psychically speaking. In health, both 
positions remain active in psychic life and as the infant grows into an adult, she vacillates 
                                                                                                                                                                             
On the one hand they are disavowing the fact of their perception – the fact that they saw no penis in the 
female genitals; and on the other hand they are recognizing the fact that females have no penis and are 
drawing the correct conclusions from it [that they, too, could be castrated]. The two attitudes persist side by 
side throughout their lives without influencing each other. Here is what may rightly be called a splitting of 
the ego” (1938, pp. 202-203; original emphasis). 
54
 Kristeva adds that the infant projects not only his aggression but “bits of the baby [himself] as well (his 
organs – the mouth, the anus, and so forth – as well as his bodily products)” (2001, p. 63).   
55
 Scott (1981) writes on the development of a zest for life when we can have faith in our ability to mourn. I 
understand him to mean that we develop an enthusiasm for life when we have faith that we will not be 
annihilated by our bad objects once we have destroyed our good objects; rather, we will ‘humanize’ our bad 
objects by destroying our good objects, which have, in fact, been limiting our experience of life. I discuss 
this further in Chapter Three. 
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between them. In health, the individual develops more kinds of relating than persecutory 
and depressive anxieties, although various object relations and traumatic experiences will 
inspire these anxieties anew. Klein chooses the term “position” to emphasize the 
association between the child’s early developmental anxieties and the adult’s psychoses 
(Klein 1940, pp. 275-276, ft.). For the agoraphobic, the entire outside world becomes the 
“bad,” and therefore dangerous, object. The agoraphobic has not been able to integrate 
the good and bad objects; thus, the bad object – namely, the outside world – remains both 
dangerous and terrifying. She fears the outside world as it threatens the integrity of her 
ego with the possibility of annihilation.
56
 She is also terrified of destroying her good 
internal objects with her aggressive impulses, which would leave her vulnerable to the 
threat of her bad internal objects. Following Fairbairn (1941, 1952) and Guntrip (1961), I 
argue that insofar as agora-claustrophobic anxieties are a necessary structuring 
experience for the development of the infant’s psychic life, they are not pathological57; 
however, the inability to move beyond primitive anxieties in adulthood becomes 
pathological. As a corollary to the movement from pathological to normal, I suggest we 
can also construct the inverse movement, from a “normal” experience of agora-
claustrophobic anxieties that occur, for example, as part of the mourning process, which I 
describe in Chapter Three, towards a better understanding of what might go wrong in that 
process that becomes pathological.    
 Rey (1994) develops the implications of the structuring aspects of agoraphobic 
and claustrophobic anxieties, which he calls “claustro-agoraphobia.” He identifies the 
pervasive and yet hidden claustro-agoraphobic anxieties in his work with 
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 Many researchers have noted a common experience of annihilation anxiety among patients with 
agoraphobia, borderline, and psychotic disorders. See, for example: Hurvich (1989); Hurvich et al. (1993); 
and, Levin & Hurvich (1995).  
57
 In her clinical illustrations of Rey’s claustro-agoraphobic syndrome, Catan draws attention to Fairbairn’s 
and Guntrip’s recognition of agora-claustrophobic anxieties in normal development, “originating,” as she 
notes, “in the phase of ‘transitional’ or ‘quasi-independence’, between infantile and mature dependence. 
[…F]ailure to separate and develop age-appropriately as a distinct individual drives the child back into a 
state of secondary infantile dependence, a re-identification with the maternal object and a longing to return 
to the security of a merged, undifferentiated state – the ‘safe inside policy’. While enabling a regressive 
escape from the demands of maturity and independence, such dwelling in safe-seeming maternal space 
remains inherently vulnerable to the threat of annihilation as an individual” (2011, p. 244). See also infra 
note 58. 
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schizophrenics.
58
 This identification also points to the limits of diagnostic categories, 
insofar as Rey’s psychoanalytic work with patients with schizophrenia “reveal claustro-
agoraphobic basic fears not in the least evident when their behaviour is assessed from a 
purely phenomenological psychiatric approach” (1994, p. 21). As Milrod (2007) finds 
with her agoraphobia patients, the psychiatric diagnosis does not approach the nucleus of 
a very painful and persistent disturbance. The similarities and differences between the 
claustro-agoraphobia of ‘schizoid’ patients and that of ‘agoraphobic’ patients remain to 
be elucidated but are beyond the scope of my thesis
59
; however, several connections are 
instructive here. Firstly, Rey argues that “the emergence of depression, as well as a 
developing capacity to think and experience mourning and reparation” (1994, p. 85) was 
extremely useful for these patients; secondly, that “claustro-agoraphobia-philia not only 
concerns objects and their domains but also words and their domains” (p. 2); and, thirdly, 
he argues for an extension of “the claustro-agoraphobic syndrome from a specific 
syndrome to a basic universal organization of the personality” (p. 24). As I argue in 
Chapter Three, the persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) identifies in her patients indicates 
the presence of traumatic and unmourned losses; as with Rey’s patients, I suggest that the 
“emergence of depression” (in the sense of the depressive position and the affects 
associated with facing and mourning loss
60
) would be extremely useful for Milrod’s 
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 Fairbairn notes this same claustro-agoraphobic feature of schizoid patients, connecting it to the conflict 
of both a desperation for and an extraordinary reluctance to move beyond infantile dependence: “During 
the course of analysis, such an individual [a schizoid patient] provides the most striking evidence between 
an extreme reluctance to abandon infantile dependence and a desperate longing to renounce it; […] the 
patient, like a timid mouse, alternately creep[s] out of the shelter of his hole to peep at the world of outer 
objects and then beat[s] a hasty retreat” (1941, p. 261). Fairbairn continues with the following description, 
particularly resonant of the agoraphobic’s dilemma: “In the absence of such evidence [that he is loved by 
his parents and that his parents accept his love] his relationship to his objects is fraught with too much 
anxiety over separation to enable him to renounce the attitude of infantile dependence” (p. 261).   
59
 I might only tentatively suggest here that agoraphobia is a defense against a further breakdown towards 
schizophrenia. This suggestion accords with LaFarge (1989), who suggests that the empty states of her 
borderline patients are a consequence of a severe strain on the borderline organization of the personality, 
and are a defense against further regression to a psychotic state. 
60
 I repeat here and in Chapter Three Steiner’s important note about the use of the word “depression” and 
the distinction between the depressive position and depressive illness: “It is confusing that the word 
depression has been applied both to the state that accompanies mourning and to that which results from the 
defences mounted against mourning. The path that leads towards facing the loss, and mourning it, is 
associated with painful depressive feelings, involving guilt, regret, remorse, and a wish to make reparation. 
These feelings were thought by Klein [1952] to represent the depressive position and are very different 
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patients. As I argue in Chapter Four, the method of free association particular to 
psychoanalysis is called for to aid agoraphobia patients in the relief of their emptiness 
insofar as it affords them the freedom to approach words (and thus affects) previously 
anxiously avoided. And, as I argue in this chapter, the psychical apparatus is inherently 
neurotic and agoraphobic anxieties, specifically, are both necessary and pathological, but 
they are not inevitably pathological. Agora-claustrophobic anxieties are a necessary 
structuring experience for the development of the infant’s psychic life. Recognition of the 
usefulness of these anxieties helps to identify the point at which they persist beyond 
usefulness and into pathology, both theoretically and clinically.
61
 The developmental and 
the clinical thus overlap insofar as something gone astray in the developmental project is 
manifested in the clinic as symptom.  
 
2.2. The Development and Functions of the Ego  
The boundaries between ego and external reality develop out of an original state where, 
psychologically, there are no boundaries and therefore there is no distinction between 
the two.  
        (Loewald 1951, p. 14)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
from those observed in depressive illness. Although mixed states are common, severe depressive illness or 
melancholia results from defences against loss and hence against all those feelings associated with the 
depressive position. The clinically depressed patient is likely to suffer anxiety and persecution, to harbour 
grievance, and to deploy manic and obsessional defences that aid in denying the reality of the loss” (2011, 
p. 151). I discuss mourning and melancholia in agoraphobia patients in Chapter Three.   
61
 Further similarities between Rey’s and Milrod’s patients are evident in Rey’s descriptions of his patients’ 
experiences of emptiness. Rey writes of one patient: “One remarkable example [of pathological splitting] 
was a man who suffered from the worst claustro-agoraphobic syndrome I have ever come across. He 
complained of hypochondriacal sensations in his body, and although very intelligent was amazingly devoid 
of phantasies. On a very rare occasion, he remembered one dream of himself with a sort of bubble coming 
out of his mouth. It was like the bubbles in children’s comics that contain the words that people in the 
drawings are speaking. However, the bubble was empty; there were no words in it” (1994, p. 143). Of 
another schizophrenic patient, Eva, he writes: “She always discussed the same subject – of not being able to 
receive from her mother what she was missing. At first it was mainly that the giving part of mother was 
giving nothing good, which was causing a kind of emptiness inside her that was characterized by something 
negative” (p. 158).  
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2.2.i. Creative Differentiation 
The question of what is external and what is internal is deceptively simple. The challenge 
emerges upon recognition that one cannot assume a shared reality; frequently, 
pathological thinking is apparent in a mistaken assumption about the existence of a 
shared internal reality. As we will see, however, there is little theoretical agreement upon 
what is meant by internal and what is meant by external. Freud suggests that what is truly 
external and truly internal can only be theoretically posited:  
The unconscious is the true psychical reality; in its innermost nature it is as much 
unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as incompletely 
presented by the data of consciousness as is the external world by the 
communications by our sense organs. (1900, p. 613) 
For all that, internal and external are no less real, and each brings its own significant 
weight to bear on the individual’s experience of the self in the world.62  
 The ego’s primary “task” is “self-preservation” (Freud 1938, p. 145). This task 
depends on the ego’s capacity to mediate between internal and external excitations:  
As regards external events, it performs that task by becoming aware of stimuli, by 
storing up experiences about them (in the memory), by avoiding excessively 
strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through 
adaptation) and finally by learning to bring about expedient changes in the 
external world to its own advantage (through activity). As regards internal events, 
in relation to the id, it performs that task by gaining control over the demands of 
the instincts, by deciding whether they are to be allowed satisfaction, by 
postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favourable in the external 
world or by suppressing their excitations entirely. (Freud 1938, pp. 145-146) 
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 Hallucination is one phenomenon that arises from confusion between internal and external, specifically, 
when “internal reality succeeds in passing for external reality” (Green 1999, p. 170). I do not discuss 
hallucination here, as it is beyond the scope of my thesis. I briefly consider negative hallucination, where an 
external stimulus is not perceived in internal reality, in Chapter Three. For some thoughts on hallucination 
as a psychical process, see Bion (1958, 1965), De Monchaux (1962), and Garma (1946, 1969). Ferro offers 
this useful insight, which supports my argument that the analyst can function as a transitional object for the 
analysand: “The discriminating function of the analyst, for the patient, seems to me to be that of precursor 
of the formation (activation) of the ‘contact barrier,’ which enables him or her to distinguish between 
conscious and unconscious, between external and internal reality” (1993, p. 390).  
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The ego is a portion of the id that has adapted to the pressures of external reality and, in 
that adaptation, comes into conflict with itself, to which it must also adapt. The ego 
develops through conflicts: firstly, between the id and the world; and, secondly, through 
conflicting instinctual demands. Instinctual demands only come into conflict with one 
another once the ego begins to accommodate the pressures of the external world. The ego 
is a process that structures the individual’s id experiences (instinctual impulses) and 
external experiences. It is the fact of the ego’s organization and the ego’s capacity to 
make judgements (about, for example, danger-situations) that allows (or causes) the ego 
to produce anxiety. So, although the id cannot have, so to speak, anxiety, “it very often 
happens that processes take place or begin to take place in the id which cause the ego to 
produce anxiety” (Freud 1926, p. 140), viz., a conflict of libidinal impulses, or a conflict 
between a libidinal impulse and the demands of reality. The ego is also, as Lacan (1988) 
argues, one among many of the subject’s internal objects. The contact between the ego 
and the subject’s other internal objects is equally as fraught for the agoraphobic as the 
spaces between the ego and the world. The conflict that gives rise to, or motivates, 
anxiety, is thus located at the points of contact between the ego and the world, and the 
ego and its objects. It is important to note that, as I argue, the agoraphobic “object” of 
anxiety is this contact, which occurs in the spaces between self and other.  
 The construction of the ego’s boundaries involves, as Rey describes, the creation 
of internal and external spaces, as well as personal and universal spaces:  
[T]he infant, by taking in and putting out ‘objects’ from his body, has also created 
an internal space inside himself bounded by his body surface. The other boundary 
is the boundary between his personal space and the universal space created by the 
displacement of himself and of his objects. (1994, p. 167)  
The ego distinguishes internal from external in a process of creative differentiation. That 
is, the process involves both identification of what is internal and what is external and the 
creation of a uniquely individual internal reality at the same time. This task is vital, for 
the inability to do so leads to the ego’s own annihilation. The agoraphobic has only a 
tentative ability to distinguish internal from external, mine from not-mine. Significantly, 
her anxiety is not a mere fear of open spaces but a signal of the realistic danger of 
annihilation if this tentative ability disintegrates. Anxiety about the ego’s vulnerability as 
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it is constituted as both subjective process and object in the world mobilizes agoraphobic 
panic.  
 The ego must define itself against the world, but it must also locate itself as an 
object in the world. Lacan emphasizes the impossibility of this task insofar as the ego 
“fragment[s]” the subject (1988, p. 177). The impossibility of this task – the ego’s task to 
both define and locate itself – is the central problematic of psychoanalysis. The nature of 
psychical reality is thus of critical importance to psychoanalytic work. It is no wonder, 
then, that the nature of psychical reality has been much debated.
63
 And yet, as Lacan 
points out, the term that has been taken for granted – namely, “reality” – is used “in such 
a careless way” (1997, p. 36).64 Zachrisson (2013), a contemporary psychoanalyst 
working in the tradition of object relations, suggests that much of the theoretical 
confusion surrounding the nature of reality stems from an imprecise use of the term 
“object.”65 He suggests three terms to clarify different types of object relations: “internal 
object” to refer to the more traditional notion of the object in object relations, which is to 
say, the object as it exists in psychical reality distinct from external reality; “actual other” 
to refer to another subject when the otherness of that subject is recognized; and, “external 
object” to refer to the projection of an internal object onto an individual in external 
reality. This third term carries with it the greatest possibility for confusion, as it is the 
externalization of an internal object. The otherness of the “actual other” is not recognized 
insofar as its qualities are assumed; curiosity is not possible, as the “external object” is 
already known, so to speak (Zachrisson 2013, p. 261). These terms always refer to the 
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 Much of this debate has focused on the use of the term “phantasy.” For a seminal explication of the 
development of the term “phantasy” and its relevance in psychic life, see Isaacs (1948). For both Klein and 
Lacan, as Leader points out, phantasy is “that which organizes one’s reality, rather than that which is 
opposed to it” (1999, p. 93). Parsons argues that external reality can be used defensively to avoid attending 
to psychical reality; in such cases, “the analyst must work all the harder to hold a position within psychic 
reality, knowing that that is where analytic work is done” (2000, p. 173). I return to the question of 
psychical reality in Chapter Four. 
64
 Rey also notes that, in the analysis of borderline and psychotic patients, the assumption of external reality 
(and the external object) as given “is wrong” (1994, p. 35). 
65
 Although Zachrisson frames his article in terms of internal and external realities in general, his clinical 
example is of a man whose character is marked by separation anxiety and the inhibition of aggression. 
These characteristics are also found in those patients who might be, in different clinical settings, diagnosed 
with agoraphobia, thus indicating that the question of reality is particularly relevant in patients with these 
characterological disturbances. 
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object relations of a particular subject, so that two individuals’ object relations are never 
the same. This basic point bears repeating: even when one is referring to an “actual 
other,” it is only ever more or less free from the influence of internal objects; thus, the 
“actual other” of one subject never corresponds exactly to an “actual other” of a second 
subject even when the relations are with the same third subject. Zachrisson’s explanation 
of the term “actual other” brings us back to Lacan: “every object relation can only be 
infected with a fundamental uncertainty by it” (1988, p. 169). Lacan employs his 
trademark dramatic flair to counter the ego’s pressure to cover up this “fundamental 
uncertainty,” which is so hard to bear consciously. I emphasize this important point: 
within a relationship between two “actual others,” there is always a fundamental discord 
based on the impossibility of an unmediated experience of the other.      
 There is no possibility of an unmediated experience of the other; there is only a 
mediated experience of the other. This mediated experience depends on the determination 
of internal and external, which is required for an individual to have an object relation 
with, in Zachrisson’s terms, an “actual other.” Without this determination, all object 
relations can only be with external objects, which are, as we recall, projections of internal 
objects onto individuals in the external world. As we also recall, projection dominates the 
agoraphobic’s psychical processes; she is unable, therefore, to have an experience of an 
actual other or an experience of an actual other world, a world of curiosity and 
possibility.  
 There is an original instinctual impulse to (r)eject all that the ego judges bad and 
to introject everything that is good: “What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is 
external are, to begin with, identical” (Freud 1925b, p. 237).66 Firstly, the ego judges 
whether a thing is good or bad. If the ego judges a thing to be good, then it is internalized; 
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 Fairbairn prefers the terms “satisfying” and “unsatisfying” objects to “good” and “bad” objects (1944, p. 
83). He argues that the unsatisfying object is internalized prior to any other in order for the infant to bring it 
under his control; the infant internalizes the satisfying object to help manipulate the unsatisfying object. 
Fairbairn indicates two aspects of the unsatisfying object: the desired, alluring aspect and the frustrating 
aspect. It is bad, or unsatisfying, precisely because it contains both of these two aspects. The infant has 
internalized the unsatisfying object to attempt to bring it under his control but in doing so has transformed 
an external conflict into an internal one. Fairbairn suggests that the infant deals with this internal conflict 
utilizing aggression in the service of repression. 
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it becomes an object in psychical reality. If the ego judges a thing to be bad, than it is 
rejected from the internal world. Secondly, the ego must judge the reality of the good 
internal objects; the ego must judge if each internal object also exists in the external 
world. Freud writes: “It is, we see, once more a question of external and internal. What is 
unreal, merely a presentation and subjective, is only internal; what is real is also there 
outside” (1925b, p. 237; original emphasis). The ability to move beyond the first 
judgement, of whether a thing is good (and therefore to be introjected) or bad (and 
therefore to be ejected), to the second judgement of whether a thing is real, is a 
developmental accomplishment based on intellectual activity; or, rather, based on the 
mutual cooperation of affective and intellectual capacities. The “precondition” for this 
development – the ability to determine the objective reality of an object; the refinding of 
the internal object in the external world – “is that objects shall have been lost which once 
brought real satisfaction” (Freud 1925b, p. 238). Loss, then, is the precondition for the 
development of the capacity for reality-testing, which is basic to the ego’s ability to 
differentiate between internal and external in the process of creative differentiation.  
 As I develop in Chapter Three, there are two possible responses to any kind of 
loss: mourning or defending against mourning. Defending against mourning includes 
denying the very fact of loss. There is a difference between the loss of an object in 
Freud’s sense here – in the process of reality-testing during which the object can be 
refound in external reality – and the loss of an object in the sense of death – in which the 
object cannot be refound as it no longer exists in external reality – only insofar as the 
mourning called for in response to the latter is based on the developmental process of the 
former. There is not a difference in kind, as even if in the process of development a 
child’s object is lost in external reality, it can be refound if the loss of the object is talked 
about by others. The object itself is not refound in external reality, but the fact of the 
object’s existence in external reality is reaffirmed insofar as others acknowledge the real 
loss of the object. I explicate this significance for the agoraphobic in Chapter Three and, 
further, argue that it cannot just be loss that leads to the development of this capacity; 
mourning one’s losses – suffering one’s losses – is required. The agoraphobic’s basic 
limitation in this ability to differentiate between internal and external indicates her need 
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for a greater capacity for mourning.
67
 A greater capacity for mourning leads, in turn, to a 
more secure sense of what is internal and what is external.  
 Loss of the external object, then, is one precondition for this process of creative 
differentiation; as we will now see, destruction of the internal object is another. Echoing 
and expanding on Freud’s formulation of negation, Winnicott emphasizes the movement 
of the destructive drive, which “creates the quality of externality” (1951, p. 93). As I 
detail below in my discussion of transitional objects, the internal object must be 
destroyed, in phantasy; if the external object survives, the individual gains a greater sense 
of what is internal and what is external, and consequently a greater capacity for object 
use. Ogden indicates the persistence of this process of destructive creation: 
 Externality is not created once and for all by a single act of ‘destruction’ 
 (renunciation) of the internal object. The pull of the primitive tie to the internal 
 object must be consistently resisted. In psychological terms, the internal object 
 must be constantly destroyed in unconscious fantasy, thus continually making 
 room for the rediscovery of the external object. (1986, pp. 199-200) 
If the individual is unable to mobilize her aggression, unconsciously, to destroy the 
internal object, the question of what is internal and what is external must be continually 
confronted without resolution. The resolution would not be, as Ogden points out, a 
singular act of renunciation; but the repeated acts of renunciation lead to an unconscious 
faith in the internal versus the external. The distinction, and the fact of a distinction, can 
be taken for granted. The inability to effectuate this renunciation is profoundly disabling, 
as the object can then never be used. Winnicott distinguishes between object-relating and 
object-use in these terms of internal and external realities insofar as object-relating, as 
Winnicott understands it, “is an experience of the subject that can be described in terms 
of the subject as an isolate” (1969, p. 712). In Zachrisson’s terms, as described above, 
object-relating concerns an internal object or, perhaps, an external object. Object-use, on 
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 Reeder, in an article on Lacan’s concept of symbolic castration and das Ding, comments on Freud’s 
words: “Freud's train of thought here seems to imply that a primordial loss appears in conjunction with the 
symbolic function of representations: the object is lost when the child begins to form thoughts independent 
of its immediate perception of the surrounding world” (2012, p. 38; original emphasis). Loss and the 
capacity to symbolize thus go hand-in-hand; an inhibition of symbolization and unmourned losses are thus 
also expected to occur coextensively. I discuss the implications of this point in Chapter Three. 
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the other hand, requires that the object “be real in the sense of being part of shared reality, 
not a bundle of projections” (Winnicott 1969, p. 712).68 In Zachrisson’s terms, object-use 
requires that the object in question be an “actual other”; that is, that the otherness of the 
object is recognized.  
 If the distinction and the relation between inner and outer realities – variously 
termed internal and external, subjective and objective, psychical and real – appear 
nebulous, it is, as Hämäläinen (2009) suggests, perhaps unavoidable. Hämäläinen brings 
to the foreground of our attention the difficulty, both terminological and conceptual, of 
evaluating ‘objective’ reality insofar as it is impossible to observe beyond our subjective 
reality. Returning to Freud’s declaration that our “innermost nature [...] is as much 
unknown to us as the reality of the external world” (1900, p. 613), Hämäläinen provides 
this reminder:  
This distinction, in which a situation is observed either externally or internally, is, 
however, only clear in a theoretical sense. In practice and at the level of the 
experiential world it is more ambiguous, due precisely to the impossibility of 
observing another from inside and the impossibility of being objective with regard 
to one’s own boundary either. Nor is external perception of another objective, 
because we cannot with certainty say, for instance, where the boundary of 
another’s illusion lies because our own experience is also subjective. (2009, p. 
1286) 
Hämäläinen argues that we rest on our understanding of what constitutes internal and 
external without examining too closely what we mean by these terms because to do so 
would be, in Winnicottian terms, to question the paradox that sustains our illusion of 
shared reality. Winnicott refers to shared reality as the third area of experience and 
suggests that it is characterized by the same paradox as the transitional object: the infant 
creates the transitional object and the object existed waiting to be created by the infant. 
To ask the question, is it created or is it found, destroys the paradox necessary to sustain 
it as a transitional object. As with the transitional object, the question of whether shared 
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 I return to Winnicott’s concept of a capacity for object-use below in relation to transitional phenomena 
and the analytic frame. For now, I remain with the question of internal and external realities and the ego’s 
process of creative differentiation. 
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reality is created or found must not be asked. The illusion of shared reality, as 
Hämäläinen notes, depends on this paradox: 
A consequence of separateness is that individuals do not actually share an 
experiential world nor, as a result, do we share any area where we would know for 
certain that we share an other’s experience. And yet we need the illusion of a 
shared world, and in everyday life this illusion is not necessarily challenged. 
(2009, p. 1281) 
I amend Hämäläinen’s statement slightly: we share an experiential world but it is not the 
same world for each individual. In health, we share the illusion of a more or less similar 
shared experience. In order to sustain this necessary illusion, there needs to be some 
space and time in which, as Milner states, “it will not be necessary for self-preservation’s 
sake to distinguish clearly between inner and outer, self and not-self” (1952, p. 192). 
Paradoxically, the agoraphobic needs the opportunity to develop this necessary illusion of 
a shared world. She needs the illusion as illusion instead of as terrifying reality, which 
will only become possible once she has a clearer sense of what is internal and what is 
external. As I argue below, the agoraphobic needs a new experience of a transitional 
object that can survive her destruction of it and thus demonstrate the non-correspondence 
between internal and external objects; the analytic setting, including the frame and the 
analytic stance maintained by the analyst, can potentially become this transitional object. 
 
2.2.ii. Original Unity  
There is neither world nor ego, psychologically speaking, for the newborn infant. 
Loewald (1951) addresses the development of the complicated relationships between the 
ego and the world and the ego and its objects by returning to the theoretical “original 
unity.” As we will see, the agoraphobic attempts to preserve this unity, which is, as I 
explain below, the ego’s phantasy of unity, at the expense of more experiences – more 
pain and more joy – in the outside world. In Mahler’s terms, as I refer to above, the 
agoraphobic is developmentally stuck, so to speak, at the threshold between the infant 
room with the mother and the toddler room, “which ha[s] so much more diversification” 
(1975/2000, p. 27). As Mahler suggests, “[s]tanding on the threshold would seem to be 
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the perfect symbolization of conflicting wishes – the wish to enter the toddler world away 
from the mother and the pull to remain with mother in the infant room” (1975/2000, p. 
96). The agoraphobic shies away from the threshold and from diversification, as she is 
not confident that she can survive all that she may encounter; likewise, she is not 
confident that she will be able to return to the mother in the infant room if she finds that 
the toddler room – the outside world – proves overwhelming. The agoraphobic fears that 
her preference for the outside world will destroy the mother; indeed, it will, insofar as 
their dyad will become more complex, altered permanently by the increasing 
diversification of experiences. She does not have the experience of the mother surviving 
destruction, the experience of which, as I have noted, would demonstrate for her the non-
correspondence between the internal and external worlds. I consider this process in detail 
below in my discussion of transitional objects. 
To begin with, Loewald argues, the ego and the outer world are undifferentiated: 
“The relatedness between ego and reality, or objects, does not develop from an originally 
unrelated co-existence of two separate entities which come into contact with each other, 
but on the contrary from a unitary whole which differentiates into distinct parts” (1951, p. 
14). It is not that the yet-to-be ego experiences a unity with the environment; rather, 
everything belongs to the ego. There is not a world in which or to which the ego belongs, 
but a world that belongs to the ego. The only way we can know the world is via the ego’s 
relation to it; therefore, from the ego’s perspective, the ego precedes the world. The 
difference between these two belongings, so to speak, is apparent in the fantasy of 
omnipotence that characterizes the early stages of the child’s psychic life: because the 
world belongs to the ego, or, to be more accurate, because the infant perceives everything 
external to her as her own creation, the infant or young child believes in her omnipotent
69
 
control over the world.
70
 Thus, the young child – and the agoraphobic – unconsciously 
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 Ogden’s definition of “reality” (as part of a reality-fantasy dialectic) indicates the significance of this 
original state out of which reality and fantasy develop: “The term reality is used here to refer to that which 
is experienced as outside of the realm of the subject’s omnipotence” (1986, p. 216). 
70
 An understanding of the fact of the child’s earliest fantasies of omnipotence is vitally important to the 
development of many psychoanalytic ideas. As early as 1926, Ferenczi emphasizes the movement from 
omnipotence to conditional potency paralleling the movement from the pleasure principle to the reality 
principle: “before it has assumed its first disappointments a child believes itself to be unconditionally 
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believes that her aggressive impulses are powerful enough to destroy the world. As 
Winnicott will emphasize, the presence of the mother’s breast, which satisfies the infant’s 
hunger, helps to maintain the fantasy of wholeness; the absence of the mother’s breast, 
necessarily repeated over time because in reality it cannot always be present, leads to the 
concurrent development of an ego and a world against which the ego defines itself.  
Loewald expands on Freud’s characterization of the ego as “a coherent 
organization of mental processes” (1923, p. 17). He argues that the essential organizing 
function of the ego is to maintain the original unity – which is always already lost in 
order for the ego to exist – “on more and more complex levels of differentiation and 
objectivation of reality” (1951, p. 14). Unity refers to the phantasy of the original 
libidinal relationship with the mother; although the unity is not entirely fantastical, it is 
the ego’s phantasy insofar as the ego does not exist prior to the fragmentation of that 
unity. The ego’s essential defensive function is not against a threatening reality, but from 
the threat of reality’s loss, which is to say, the loss of differentiation from the original 
unity. The threat of reality’s loss encroaches from two positions: the paternal castration 
threat of being cut off from objects and the maternal womb threat of engulfment, of 
boundary loss between ego and reality. The ego can be annihilated either by being cut off 
from the world or by being reabsorbed into its unity. If each threat is as strong as the 
other, the ego is protected from both insofar as the one protects the ego from the other. 
The psychic struggle against these threats continues through normal oedipal development, 
and constitutes an ongoing process of maintaining both individuation and object relations.  
Lacan (2006f) revisits the question of an original unity – which he will describe as 
belonging to the imaginary dimension – via his concept of the mirror stage; he describes 
the earliest formation of the ego as the infant’s response to his mirror image.71 To 
reiterate, the agoraphobic is stuck somewhere between this original unity and the 
development of a differentiated ego. Her experience of the world, then, reflects the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
omnipotent, and further […] it clings to this feeling of omnipotence, even when the effectiveness of its 
power in the fulfillment of its wishes is bound up with the observance of certain conditions” (p. 312). 
71
 Lacan (2006f) refers to the analytic term “imago” to designate the series of unconscious identifications 
that constitute the ego. Lacan’s argument here is that the individual’s (unconscious) assumption of various 
imagos is based on the specular image, namely, what is reflected.  
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qualities of the imaginary dimension: the imaginary precedes the mirror stage (and, as we 
will see, the symbolic). Fink describes the qualities of the imaginary dimension:  
Prior to the advent of the symbolic, the delimitation of myself (ego) is not clear; 
there is no essential barrier between what I call me and what I call you (egoʹ), 
because I perceive and construct who I am only on the basis of what I see in you, 
and I perceive and construct you only on the basis of my own self-perception and 
self-construction. (2005, p. 560) 
The imaginary relation depends on what is seen; hence, the imaginary: emphasis on 
“image.” The self is apprehended via the image of the other; the other is seen as a self, 
like my self, but not my self; that is, the other is not radically other from the self, only 
more or less similar to the self. Fink argues that, for Lacan, this otherness is constituted 
by size: the other is either bigger and stronger or smaller and weaker than the self.
72
 Size 
is fundamentally linked to aggression insofar as the imaginary relation is used to ascertain 
the threat of the other or the possibility of being the other’s aggressor: “The question here 
seems to be that of domination or submission: Either the other is a threat to oneself or is 
not, but there is no recognition of the other as possibly operating on altogether different 
principles than one’s own” (Fink 1995, p. 554). Fink emphasizes the lack of limits in the 
realm of the imaginary; there are no limits to the threat posed by the other’s aggression 
towards oneself and no limit to the damage the self can do to the other: “There are no 
innate limits here to what can be done in the course of the struggle for survival” (1995, p. 
557). And it is a question of survival. The agoraphobic does not have a secure sense of 
the limits between herself and her objects, her self and the world. The agoraphobic 
experiences the threats of the imaginary dimension in their unlimited state, unimpeded by 
the symbolic order (which I return to below). Her survival, therefore, is always in 
question.    
 Strikingly, the agoraphobic is not able to rest in “the mirage of a unity” (Lacan 
1988, p. 169); instead, the threat of unity – namely, ego annihilation – is always looming. 
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 In his discussion of Little Hans’s analysis, Freud remarks: “The ego is always the standard by which one 
measures the external world; one learns to understand it by means of a constant comparison with oneself” 
(1909, p. 107). Little Hans expresses this standard by his concerned comparison of the horse’s “widdler” 
with his own, and of his own with his parents’.  
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As I note above, Lacan reiterates the necessary discord between objects (including the 
ego as one of the subject’s objects) that the subject masks with illusions of unity:  
This disarray, this fragmentedness, this fundamental discordance, this essential 
lack of adaptation, this anarchy, which opens up every possibility of displacement, 
that is of error, is characteristic of the instinctual life of man […]. If the object is 
only ever graspable as a mirage, the mirage of a unity which can never be grasped 
again on the imaginary level, every object relation can only be infected with a 
fundamental uncertainty by it. (1988, p. 169) 
 In so many words, Lacan returns to Milner’s proposition: that the individual needs to be 
able to rest, so to speak, in the “mirage of a unity.” To reiterate: the existence of the ego 
depends on differentiation; at the same time, the ego needs to be able to take this 
differentiation for granted so that it is not always necessary – for the sake of the ego’s 
survival – to be effectuating it. The question of survival can fade into the background of 
experience so that curiosity about the world can develop. 
 For Winnicott, the mother provides the infant’s first mirror, reflecting back to the 
infant “an image of himself that accurately derives from his inner experience: if he is 
distressed, she soothes him, and in doing so provides him through a changed inner 
experience with a self that matches her own tranquility” (Bollas 1995, p. 241). This 
characterization of the infant’s mirrored experience is starkly different from Lacan’s, a 
difference that is reflected in their distinctive views on trauma (which I return to in 
Chapter Three; for now, I only point out that, for Winnicott, the “good-enough” mother is 
both ideal – in the sense of satisfying the infant’s needs in the process of development – 
and also normal, in the sense of not being an unusual or outlying phenomenon. Trauma, 
for Winnicott, is not assumed.). Rather than disarray and fragmentation, Winnicott 
emphasizes the child’s psychical processes within the mother-child dyad. For Winnicott, 
it is not that the infant experiences an original unity with the mother; rather, there is a 
single psychological entity comprised of the mother-infant unit. The mother experiences 
the original unity as much as the infant does. Winnicott describes this state, for the 
mother, as “primary maternal preoccupation” (1956, p. 304). Winnicott theorizes that the 
mother’s preoccupation with her infant creates the phantasy of the original unity for the 
infant until the infant is developmentally mature enough to bear the frustrations of 
52 
 
 
separation. Despite the differences, the mirror function for both Winnicott and Lacan 
provides the infant with the illusion of coherence. While Lacan concerns himself 
primarily with the paternal law, language, and symbolization (which I return to below), 
Winnicott emphasizes the importance of the maternal environment in which the 
infant/child develops. Ogden indicates the paradox that Winnicott postulates is the 
mother’s role: “the mother must shield the infant from awareness of desire and 
separateness, and the mother must safeguard the infant’s opportunity to experience desire 
and the accompanying knowledge of separateness” (1986, p. 175).73 For Winnicott, the 
mother creates the illusion of unity; and, she gradually allows the infant to become aware 
of the fact that it is illusion. The satisfaction of this paradox is what Winnicott calls 
“good-enough mothering.”74 If we recall Mahler’s description of the child poised to cross 
the threshold from the infant room to the toddler room, we can suggest that the 
agoraphobic’s mother anxiously draws the toddler’s attention to all of the potential 
dangers rather than confirming for the child that some combination of curiosity, 
eagerness, and caution is appropriate, with the assurance that mother will be waiting in 
the infant room if comfort is required. We can speculate that the agoraphobic mother has 
not, to repeat Ogden’s words, “safeguard[ed] the infant’s opportunity to experience desire 
and the accompanying knowledge of separateness” (1986, p. 175). 
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 Green emphasizes the temporal dimensions of this process, which necessarily accompany the spatial 
considerations in the establishment of self and other. Referring to Winnicott’s work, Green writes: “If the 
response [from the mother/object] is immediate, without delay, symbiotic omnipotence sets in, depriving 
the infant’s ego of the possibility to say no to the object and therefore yes to itself. […] On the other hand, 
when the delay is too great, it is despair, stamped by the experience of pain, which makes one say no to 
everything (including oneself)” (1999, pp. 272-273). Milner also draws attention to the importance of the 
temporal aspects of this process: “I suggest that, if, through the pressure of unsatisfied need, the child has to 
become aware of his separate identity too soon or too continually, then either the illusion of union can be 
what Scott calls catastrophic chaos rather than cosmic bliss, or the illusion is given up and premature ego-
development may occur; then separateness and the demands of necessity may be apparently accepted, but 
necessity becomes a cage rather than something to be co-operated with for the freeing of further powers” 
(1952, p. 192).   
74
 Green (1999) and Kristeva (2001) draw attention to the fact that good-enough mothering is also bad-
enough mothering.  
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2.2.iii. Trauma in the Process of Creative Differentiation 
Freud insists “that the ego owes its origin as well as the most important of its acquired 
characteristics to its relation to the real external world” (1938, p. 201). In the 
development of neuroses, “demands from within, no less than excitations from the 
external world, operate as ‘traumas,’ particularly if they are met halfway by certain innate 
dispositions” (Freud 1938, p. 184; my emphasis). The development of neuroses and the 
development of the ego  
is made possible by hereditary disposition; but it can almost never be achieved 
without the additional help of upbringing, of parental influence, which, as a 
precursor of the super-ego, restricts the ego’s activity by prohibitions and 
punishments, and encourages or compels the setting up of repressions. We must 
therefore not forget to include the influence of civilization among the 
determinants of neurosis. (Freud 1938, p. 185)   
“The influence of civilization” includes parental influence and traumas from the external 
world. Traumas from the external world – real events, as it were – must not be neglected 
any more so than the neurotic traumas of phantasy. We can extrapolate and emphasize 
this important point: all trauma, like all object relations,
75
 is both externally and internally 
effectuated. Trauma is a psychical event connected in some way to an external event; the 
nature of this connection may be contentious,
76
 but the trauma itself necessarily involves 
both the external event and the psyche’s response to that event. 
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 See, for example, Opdal 2013, p. 3: “we must acknowledge that the object is related both to external and 
to internal reality.” 
76
 On trauma, Fairbairn writes: “Frustration of his desire to be loved and to have his love accepted is the 
greatest trauma that a child can experience; and indeed, it is the only trauma that really matters from a 
developmental standpoint” (1941, p. 261). Lacan disagrees, suggesting rather that “there is something 
originally, inaugurally, profoundly wounded in the human relation to the world” (1988, p. 167). Klein’s 
position can be found between these two, as she argues that “the capacity for love and happiness which 
develops in the child is [not] in direct proportion to the amount of love afforded him” (1930, p. 336). If the 
individual has “little capacity to tolerate frustration, and if aggression, fears and feelings of guilt are very 
strong, then the actual shortcomings of the parents […] may become grossly exaggerated and distorted in 
the child’s mind” (Klein 1930, p. 339). As I discuss in Chapter Three, I agree with Winnicott (following 
Fairbairn) that a failure of the maternal holding environment to provide a good-enough mothering 
experience for the mother-infant dyad surely leads to some level of trauma. At the same time, I agree with 
Lacan (and Freud, as above) that there is something “profoundly wounded” in the very fact of being a 
human in the world. Both levels of trauma, I contend, must be addressed. 
54 
 
 
 As I describe above, the psychical structure is inherently neurotic – or, more 
accurately, it is initially comprised of psychotic processes. In the development of a 
mature psychical structure, the individual moves from pathological process to mature 
psychic (dynamic) structure. Part of that process is, as I also note above, the experience 
of emptiness. The psychical experience of emptiness is derived from the physical 
experience of hunger. The infant will necessarily experience hunger; the very experience 
of hunger’s emptiness, no matter how temporary, is perceived as a deprivation. The 
experience of emptiness stimulates aggression and leads to the further development of the 
ego.  
 Winnicott refers to the need for emptiness prior to learning, which includes the 
potential for new experiences, and developing one’s ego and new object relations; to wit, 
“[t]he basis of all learning (as well as of eating) is emptiness” (Winnicott 1974, p. 107). 
Without the experience of hunger (emptiness) and the resulting aggression, the individual 
is unable to experience satisfaction or love. When emptiness is defended against, and/or 
when aggression is repudiated, there are many consequences, one of which is the 
inability to achieve ambivalence and therefore, as I describe above, the inability to 
progress from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position. The world turns 
monstrous and, as the agoraphobic shows us, intolerable. The ego’s vulnerability, then, 
and the capacity to utilize that vulnerability for growth, is ironically repudiated in 
agoraphobia patients who are commonly characterized, and commonly characterize 
themselves, as childlike and unable to care for themselves in a manner appropriately 
corresponding to their actual age.
77
  
 For Winnicott, the infant experiences some level of trauma if the mother imposes 
on the infant the fact of his or her separateness before the infant is developmentally 
capable of bearing that reality, or if the mother forecloses the possibility of the infant’s 
recognition of their separateness.
78
 Winnicott suggests a distinction between trauma and 
“nothing happening when something might profitably have  happened” (1974, p. 106). If 
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 See, for example, Milrod (2007, pp. 1012, 1020). 
78
 Ogden adds that there may be some “breaches in,” rather than failures of, the facilitating environment, 
such as an infant’s severe or chronic illness (2014, p. 210, n. 5). 
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“nothing” happened, then “emptiness needs to be experienced, and this emptiness belongs 
to the past, to the time before the degree of maturity had made it possible for emptiness to 
be experienced” (p. 106). For these patients, emptiness “turns up as a state that is feared, 
yet compulsively sought after” (1974, p. 106). Winnicott relates the experience of 
emptiness – as both feared and compulsively sought after – with the fear of breakdown in 
certain individuals. As a constituting experience, emptiness is related to primitive 
anxieties.
79
 The term “breakdown” refers in the first instance to the failure of a defence 
organization; which is to say, it refers to a failure of the ego’s functions. Recalling 
Loewald’s explanation of the ego’s organizing and defensive functions, “breakdown” 
refers to “a reversal of the individual’s maturational process” (Winnicott 1974, p. 103). 
The two most relevant of the primitive anxieties Winnicott lists are a return to an 
unintegrated state and loss of the capacity to relate to objects, which Maizels (1985) 
understands as forming the basis of agoraphobic and claustrophobic anxieties.
80
 
Winnicott contends that psychotic illness is a defence organization in relation to a 
primitive anxiety, the fear of which is overwhelmingly unthinkable. This contention 
implicitly refers to Klein’s concepts of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, 
which are always already, or at least, in the first instance, psychotic anxieties. 
Subsequently, the defence-mechanisms that correspond to the infantile anxiety situations 
form, as Klein argues and I discuss above, “the basis of the most severe psychoses” 
(1940, p. 262). The anxiety is overwhelmingly unthinkable precisely because, Winnicott 
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 Although Winnicott refers to these anxieties as “agonies” to impress upon us their painful profundity, I 
will maintain the more common terminology of anxiety without losing sight of the severity of the 
experience. Along with the infant’s anxieties, Ogden adds the mother’s inevitable narcissistic wounds of 
not knowing “what it is her baby needs and whether it is within the power of her personality to provide it 
even if she somehow could discover what he ‘wants’” (1989, pp. 202- 203). Ogden’s addition deepens our 
understanding of the connection between pregnancy (and/or impending parenthood) and the onset or 
exacerbation of agora-claustrophobic anxieties, which I discussed in Chapter One. 
80
 Maizels (1985) proposes a model of psychological conflict based on two opposing tendencies: the first 
tendency, similar to Freud’s conceptualization of the death instinct, moves toward non-conflict and is 
accompanied by the unconscious fantasy of a return to the mother’s womb; the second tendency moves 
towards autonomy and the capacity to exert oneself in the overcoming of frustrations. He identifies 
agoraphobic and claustrophobic anxieties as the “two ‘basic’ anxieties” (p. 188) corresponding to these 
tendencies and offers a clinical example of a patient who exhibits the fluctuations between them, indicating 
an inability to tolerate either situation (either being protected in the womb or being independent of the 
womb) and therefore an inability to move freely between forays towards independence and moments of 
intimacy and comfort. 
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argues, it is the fear of a breakdown that has already been experienced.
81
 The fear of 
breakdown refers to Loewald’s original unbounded state, in which the ego did not exist 
because it had not yet differentiated itself from the world. In the sense that the ego was 
relatively undeveloped, the individual did not experience the breakdown in the past. The 
individual needs to experience intellectually what they are only affectively aware of in 
order to organize her realities. Winnicott refers to experiences that occur prior to the 
development of the ego, and, as such, no subject existed, so to speak, to have the 
experience (in order to organize it) (1974, p. 104).
82
 I add to this description experiences 
for which the subject has no words. The problematic insufficiency of (some particular 
element of) language persists beyond ego development. Therefore, the subject may 
experience a debilitating anxiety perceived to be future-oriented but caused by a previous 
experience that the subject is unable to put into words. This argument is anticipated by 
Rivière: “The worst disasters have actually taken place; it is this truth that [the patient] 
will not allow analysis to make real, will not allow to be ‘realized’ by him or us” (1936, 
p. 312).
83
 The agoraphobic’s emptiness that Milrod (2007) describes suggests this 
possibility. 
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 In Chapter Four, I discuss the relevance of this anxiety in the analytic situation via the concept of 
Nachträglichkeit. C. Winnicott provides a clinical example of Winnicott’s theory of the fear of breakdown, 
linking her patient’s unconscious fear of breakdown – which was inhibiting her capacity to function in the 
world – with the patient’s early experiences of trauma. The patient relays a recurring dream relatively early 
in the analysis in which she is in a “vast empty sandy space” (1980, p. 352; original emphasis). This 
emptiness is linked to the patient’s disavowal of a part of herself that is a terrified and utterly alone little 
child. Significantly, and as I explore in more detail in Chapter Four, the patient remarks of her relationship 
with her analyst: “‘You don’t press me into any kind of shape. You give me elbow room and space to move 
around in.’” Her analyst comments that she [the patient] “felt that the space included me [the analyst] – it 
was the space between [them], and this was different than emptiness – the emptiness of the desert” (p. 353). 
82
 Ogden considers that Winnicott’s (1974) article, likely written in the year before his death and 
posthumously published, is unfinished. Ogden works to clarify some of its ambiguities and, to that end, 
suggests that each of the primitive agonies that Winnicott lists “is an agony only because it occurs in the 
absence of a good enough mother–infant bond” (2014, p. 210; original emphasis).   
83
 See also Freud 1914b, p. 151: “We have learnt that the patient repeats instead of remembering, and 
repeats under the condition of resistance”; and, Freud 1937, p. 268: “The transposing of material from a 
forgotten past on to the present or on to an expectation of the future is indeed a habitual occurrence in 
neurotics no less than in psychotics. Often enough, when a neurotic is led to an anxiety-state to expect the 
occurrence of some terrible event, he is in fact merely under the influence of a repressed memory (which is 
seeking to enter consciousness but cannot become conscious) that something which was at that time 
terrifying did really happen.”  
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 Winnicott’s emphasis on the mother-infant dyad and the maternal holding 
environment indicate that he considers the effects of real experiences on psychical 
development. Winnicott’s theory of the fear of breakdown, I suggest, can also refer to 
experiences for which the subject has no words, which leads to Lacan’s clinical emphasis 
on the symbolic. As Bollas (1995) and Fink (2004) point out, this clinical emphasis 
requires the articulation of real traumatic experiences. Ogden implies this potential 
connection between Winnicott and Lacan, noting that “Winnicott points to a theory of the 
psychopathology of the symbolic function [...] that remains to be completed” (1986, p. 
214).
84
  
 As I gesture towards above, the inauguration of the subject into the symbolic 
order – the development of the ego as object – divides the subject from himself: the 
“subject [is] fundamentally fragmented by this ego” (Lacan 1988, p. 177). The 
unconscious, “excluded from the system of the ego” (p. 58), comes into existence as the 
limitless drives of the imaginary are repressed. The unconscious, according to Lacan, 
“has the radical structure of language,” which is to say that “a material operates in the 
unconscious according to certain laws, which are the same laws as those discovered in the 
study of natural languages [langues] – that is, languages [langues] that are or were 
actually spoken” (1958/2006b, p. 496).85 The murderous, unbounded rage that exists in 
the imaginary register is limited by the internalization of the Law, the superego, le nom 
du père (the Name of the Father, the No of the Father) – which takes place as the 
individual enters into the symbolic register and becomes part of discourse, a part of the 
chain of signification. The symbolic intervenes in the murderous rage of the imaginary; 
the word intervenes in the image. As the symbolic introduces limits into the imaginary, 
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 Luepnitz draws an explicit comparison between Winnicott and Lacan, suggesting that “Winnicott and the 
Middle Group [are] a corrective to Lacanian abstraction, and turning back to Lacan [is] a corrective to the 
absence of reflection on language in Winnicott” (2009, p. 962). Luepnitz indicates a further difference, the 
significance of which will become more evident in Chapter Three: “[f]or Winnicott, the central drama will 
turn around the infant’s loss or feared loss of maternal connection. For Lacan, […] something even more 
profound is at stake – the lack built into subjectivity by the mere existence of the unconscious” (p. 964). 
See also infra note 76. 
85
 See also Lacan 1997, p. 32: “We only grasp the unconscious finally when it is explicated, in that part of it 
which is articulated by passing into words. It is for this reason that we have the right – all the more so as the 
development of Freud’s discovery will demonstrate – to recognize that the unconscious itself has in the end 
no other structure than the structure of language.”   
58 
 
 
the boundaries of the ego are created. Speech draws attention to our vulnerability, as it 
can never be complete, never whole. As we speak, our words slip along the signifying 
chain, always missing the mark. And yet, speech relieves the vulnerabilities inherent in 
instinctual life:   
The power of naming objects structures the perception itself. The percipi of man 
can only be sustained within a zone of nomination. It is through nomination that 
man makes objects subsist with a certain consistence. […] Naming constitutes a 
pact, by which two subjects simultaneously come to an agreement to recognize 
the same object. (Lacan 1988, p. 169) 
Lacan’s formulations are instructive here, as the symbolic order is that which interrupts 
the imaginary and introduces limits, both to the ego as object of the subject and to the 
ego’s attribution of limits to others.86  
 The agoraphobic’s emptiness that replaces her symptoms of anxiety and 
avoidance, which Milrod (2007) describes, indicates her particular difficulty in, not just 
entering but, inhabiting the symbolic. The symbolic dimension is part of Winnicott’s 
third area of (cultural, shared) experience and thus has the qualities of a transitional 
object, which I describe in detail below. Like all individuals, the agoraphobic is born into 
a language system, but she is unable to make it her own; she finds language, but does not 
create it. Of course, the agoraphobic is not the only type of patient for whom 
symbolization is fraught; it is, on the contrary, one of the features of psychoanalytic 
practice that the process of putting it all into words is resisted. However, the 
agoraphobic’s specific complaint of emptiness upon remission of anxiety and avoidance 
indicates the need for the analyst to emphasize and encourage the use of symbolization 
via the psychoanalytic method of free association, which would thus stabilize the 
agoraphobia patient’s psychical experience of limits: of her ego’s limits and the limits of 
others.
87
 
 Lacan’s development of the symbolic dimension and his clinical emphasis on 
language cannot be read as dismissing the effects of reality – Freud’s “influence of 
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 Similarly, Bacon suggests that “phobias may well arise in the absence of the name, or metaphor [of the 
father], in an attempt to make good the loss or absence” (2003, p. 158).  
87
 I expand on this aspect of clinical technique in Chapter Four. 
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civilization” – on an individual’s psychical reality. To the contrary, Lacan, as Bollas 
writes, specifically accounts for the real dimension and provides some thoughts with 
which to think through the question of internal and external realities clinically: 
 The psychoanalytical insistence on the priority of the imagined – juxtaposed, if 
 necessary, to the happened – is understandable, if regrettable. […] Lacan, 
 however, ascribes powerful influence to the real. It is there. It may evade 
representation but the fact is, reality happens to one, and there is a kind of 
categorical memory of its nature. So, according to Lacan, we do not remember the 
actual event that happened to us, because our perception of reality is disqualified 
by our own subjectivity – guided as it is by its imaginative capacity and the latent 
rules of the symbolic order – but we do recall the categorical moment, if one can 
put it that way. We recall that something happened from the real (not the 
imaginary or the symbolic) that profoundly affected us. (1995, pp. 103-104)
88
 
Bollas continues:  
The analyst must return to the patient’s presentation of his or her facts of life not 
because they bear some meta-truth in themselves that will displace the patient’s 
projective constructions of an internal world, but because the patient is entering 
the intrinsically traumatic in the process of analysis, unconsciously asking that 
the trauma of things done be addressed. (1995, p. 113; original emphasis) 
The nature of agoraphobia in particular, characterized by an unconscious confusion of 
self and other and the boundaries between, requires a theoretical perspective that takes 
into consideration real – that is, external – experiences and the patient’s representation of 
these experiences. The patient represents her experiences primarily via language, which 
is, as Green articulates, both a perception and a representation: “it represents the relation 
between things and the relations of thought relations making it possible for the latter to be 
perceived” (1999, p. 197). In Lacan’s words, the symbolic order (the order or dimension 
of natural – spoken – language) “preexists the infantile subject” and it is in “accordance 
with [this symbolic order that] he has to structure himself” (1958/2006b, p. 497). A 
clinical emphasis on language – as opposed to narrative, which implicitly demands 
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 See also Freud 1914b, p. 149: “There is one special class of experiences of the utmost importance for 
which no memory can as a rule be recovered. These are experiences which occurred in very early childhood 
and were not understood at the time but which were subsequently understood and interpreted.” 
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coherence
89
 – provides the opportunity to consider the patient’s perceptions, or real 
experiences, and representations, or phantasies. Lacan’s emphasis on language, then, is a 
clinical one, and maintains the unconscious at the forefront of psychoanalytic practice. 
 The demands of the analytic situation pressure the ego to relinquish its familiar 
and neurotic organization in favour of a more painful but ultimately more satisfying 
mediation of internal and external pressures.
90
 Resistance is a defence that arises, in 
particular, in response to these demands. Resistance is the work of the ego struggling to 
maintain its coherent and familiar self, to not admit conflicts into its being. As I argue in 
Chapter Four, the agoraphobic is too coherent; she is unable to tolerate incoherence, 
which thus restricts her unconscious freedom in addition to the restrictions she places on 
her freedom of mobility. For Lacan, resistance indicates the real dimension and provides 
evidence of its dominant quality: the real is “the domain of that which subsists outside of 
symbolization” (2006g, p. 324).91 More pointedly, “the real resists symbolization” (Fink 
2004, p. 172, n. 24; original emphasis). The subject does not resist; rather, the real resists. 
The real resists discourse, resists symbolization. The real is that which resists 
symbolization and, thus, resists the analytic process. Fink clarifies the qualities of the 
real, as Lacan conceives it, in terms of resistance in the clinical situation: “Lacan wants 
us to consider the idea that it is not the patient who is in any way willfully resisting the 
therapeutic process; rather, it is the very nature of the job that the patient is faced with 
that is fraught with resistance” (2004, p. 172, n. 24).92 The real resists symbolization; but 
only through the symbolic dimension can the real be apprehended, again underscoring the 
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 In Chapter Four, I consider the movement between coherence and incoherence in psychical life. 
90
 See Bion (1979) on the pain of living and Scott (1981), who amends Bion’s account with his particular 
emphasis on mourning, and faith in our capacity to mourn as contributing to “making the best of this sad 
job” of life. 
91
 See also, Lacan 2006g, p. 324: “what did not come to light in the symbolic appears in the real” (original 
emphasis). 
92
 Fink describes resistance in relation to the imaginary: “Now the analysand cannot help but fall back into 
the imaginary realm of defenses and resistance when the real that she is trying to put into words (trauma 
and other experiences that have never before been articulated by the subject) resists symbolization” (2004, 
p. 25). Further: “The real that the analysand is up against always resists symbolization” (2004, p. 26). The 
real is that which resists symbolization, but the imaginary is the realm of resistance; that is, in the act of 
resistance and defending against the real, the analysand uses the imaginary, i.e., the ego. Lacan is not 
unique in identifying the ego as the agent of defenses; see, for the most prominent and influential example, 
A. Freud (1937/1966/1993). 
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clinical use of language (rather than, for example, a clinical focus on the therapeutic 
relationship as the mechanism of change). In Lacan’s words: “we have no means of 
apprehending this real – on any level and not only on that of knowledge – except via the 
go-between of the symbolic” (1988, p. 97).93 A clinical emphasis on coherence, as I argue 
in Chapter Four, is a kind of resistance to the analytic process insofar as it is complicit 
with the ego’s struggle to maintain its familiar (neurotic and unsatisfying) coherence; an 
intolerance of incoherence impedes the work of analysis, which needs to include a 
destabilization (and subsequent re-ordering) of the ego’s organization. For the 
agoraphobic, something has gone wrong in the process of ego development; I argue in 
Chapter Three that, for the agoraphobia patients Milrod (2007) describes, persistent 
emptiness indicates the presence of unmourned traumatic losses. As I suggest above in 
my description of the process of reality-testing, the fact of the lost object’s existence in 
external reality is reaffirmed insofar as others acknowledge the real loss of the object. 
The analyst must, I argue, return to these real experiences of loss in order to address the 
agoraphobic’s emptiness. Only when these real losses are symbolized will the 
agoraphobic be able to develop clearer boundaries between the internal and the external, 
and create the world that is waiting outside for her to find.  
 
2.3. Transitional Phenomena and the Analytic Frame 
Language, in my view, is the heir to the first transitional objects. 
         (Green 1975, p. 11) 
As a particular element of shared reality, language is characterized by the paradox of the 
transitional object, which precedes it developmentally. The use of a transitional object – 
an external object that the infant does not yet fully recognize as belonging to external 
reality – is a necessary aspect of psychic development. As I gesture towards above on the 
question of internal and external realities, the infant both finds and creates the transitional 
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 See Miller on extimité, or “extimacy,” a term Lacan uses to denote the real in the symbolic (1994, pp. 74-
87). The term denotes, as Miller explicates, that that which is “most interior – [which is to say, that which is 
intimate] – has, in the analytic experience, the quality of exteriority” (p. 76). Further, “[e]xtimacy is not the 
contrary of intimacy. Extimacy says that the intimate is Other” (p. 76). 
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object; this object aids in the process of reality testing and creative differentiation. Ogden 
writes: the relationship with the transitional object is “a reflection of the development of 
the capacity to maintain a psychological dialectical process” (1986, p. 213). This 
dialectical process is paradoxical, referring to the movement between unity and 
individuation, or individuation within unity and unity with individuation. The transitional 
object is the hinge of this dialectic, of “separateness in unity, unity in separateness” 
(Ogden 1986, p. 212).  
 The transitional object, as hinge, attaches to the gap between the experiential – 
that is, external – world and the internal world. Green draws attention to this gap, noting 
that the emptiness localized in the “potential space between the self and the object” is 
“essential to psychic development” (1975, p. 18). This potential space depends on the 
vitality of the transitional object, which contains the paradox of interconnected 
separateness. As I note above, one does not ask the question of the child’s transitional 
object: did you find it or did you create it? To do so would destroy the illusion that covers 
up the paradox. I propose that the analytic frame has the potential to become a 
transitional object for the analysand.  
 The analytic frame is the setting of the analysis; it marks off the space – physical, 
temporal, and psychical – from everything outside of it. Aspects of the frame include, for 
example: the position of the couch and chair, the room in which the analysis takes place, 
the time at which a session starts, and its duration. The two participants – analyst and 
analysand – agree to an absence of physical contact and the payment of the analyst’s fee. 
Further, the analyst commits to maintaining confidentiality, the analysand agrees to try to 
say everything, and the analyst agrees to try to listen. The frame is a physical setting, a 
set of behavioural conventions, and a psychical space.
94
 The qualities and aspects of the 
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 In a discussion on the analyst’s use of a home office, Maroda (2007) explicitly connects the analytic 
frame with the analyst’s boundaries, specifically the boundary the analyst maintains between analyst-as-
professional and analyst-as-private individual. Although I disagree with much of Maroda’s argument, 
particularly her views on self-disclosure, she draws attention to the importance of the question of internal 
and external, or, more specifically, what belongs to the analyst and what belongs to the analysand. Again, 
the answers to these questions are not as straightforward as one might think. Indeed, as Bromberg argues, 
“it is only because the line between ‘personal’ and ‘professional’ is permeable rather than hard-edged that it 
is possible for the therapeutic relationship we call psychoanalysis to exist in the first place” (1998, p. 13).   
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frame have been the subject of much debate.
95
 Discussions about the frame tend to 
connect it to the phenomenon of transference insofar as it is assumed that the frame 
demarcates a particular space distinct from outside of the analytic setting wherein the 
illusion of transference may develop.
96
 Some analysts – for example, Busch (1995) and 
Opdal (2012) – consider the method of free association to be the distinguishing aspect of 
the analytic frame. I return to these considerations below. 
 I argue that the frame can be used in the creation of the ego’s boundaries insofar 
as it offers the analysand the possibility of new experiences with a transitional object. 
When the individual has participated in the creation of his ego boundaries, the potential 
space between the self and the object can thereby be creatively inhabited, with all of the 
risks and rewards of human vulnerability. Green, following Winnicott, implies this 
possibility: “[Winnicott] supplements through verbalization the lack of maternal care in 
order to encourage the emergence of a relationship to the ego and to the object, until the 
moment is reached when the analyst can become a transitional object and the analytic 
space a potential place of play and field of illusion” (1975, p. 17). I add that the frame 
itself, and not just the analyst, can become a transitional object. For the agoraphobia 
patient, the analytic frame may be more accessible, so to speak, than the analyst in 
becoming a transitional object. The agoraphobic is already acutely aware of the 
significance of crossing the threshold between spaces. While each analysand requires a 
certain psychical dexterity in order to traverse the threshold from the outside world into 
the analytic room, to put oneself onto the couch as the analysand and accept the position 
of the seated, out-of-sight analyst, for the agoraphobic this crossing is particularly 
                                                          
95
 For a recent debate on the nature and function of the frame in psychoanalytic work, see: Bass Anthony 
(2007a, 2007b, 2008); Bromberg (2007); Federici-Nebbiosi (2007, 2008); Gabbard (2007); Hernández-
Tubert (2008); Laor (2007); and, Tubert-Oklander (2008). Despite a number of clinical, theoretical, and 
pedagogical disagreements, the conclusions of this debate suggest a general consensus that the analytic 
frame is an integral aspect of psychoanalytic work that is co-created by analyst and patient, and that 
negotiations to the frame, whether initiated by the analyst or the patient, must be attended to as part of the 
analytic work, with particular attention to the unconscious meanings implicit in frame negotiations and 
associations thereof. 
96
 See, for example, Freud (1913) and Milner (1952). Sabbadini (1989) also connects his discussion of the 
frame with the development of the transference, but he uniquely emphasizes the threshold experiences, 
arguing for the necessity of interpreting the events that occur immediately preceding and following an 
analytic session.  
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fraught. Like the distinction between internal and external realities, the agoraphobia 
patient cannot take the integrity of the analytic frame for granted. She may, however, be 
capable of performing “minor frame violations” (Holmes 1997, p. 244) to experiment 
with the developing frame and, along with the frame, her developing sense of her own 
capacities and limitations.
97
  
 In order for the analytic frame to become a transitional object for the analysand, it 
must survive the analysand’s destruction of it, just as, paradoxically, the child must 
destroy the object (in fantasy) and the object must survive its destruction. This 
destruction is part of the transition from object-relating to object-use. The object is 
valuable because it survives the subject’s destruction of it; now, having survived, it can 
be used. The object’s survival in external reality demonstrates to the individual the 
imperfect correspondence between internal and external; thereby, the distinction between 
internal and external becomes clearer.
98
 The subject begins to be able “to live a life in the 
world of objects,” but at the same time must accept “the ongoing destruction in 
unconscious fantasy relative to object-relating” (Winnicott 1959, p. 90). The child creates 
and destroys the transitional object; the object exists prior to the child’s creation of it and 
survives the child’s destruction of it. This survival of destruction is an unconscious 
paradox but, on a conscious level, is clear and easily understood, as Winnicott clarifies 
that “to survive” means to “‘not retaliate’” (1969, p. 714). 
 Clinically, the analyst, analytic technique, and the analytic setting must all survive 
the analysand’s destruction. Fromm indicates the significance of this process for the 
establishment of usable boundaries:  
[T]he treatment environment must be tested and used fully and survive in a vital 
working way for the patient to finally and securely achieve these differentiations, 
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 Ferro notes: “As Bleger (1966) writes, breaches of the setting by the analyst may ultimately be useful and 
inevitable, but can by no means be perpetrated on purpose” (1999/2006, p. 6; my emphasis). The analyst 
has the responsibility of maintaining the integrity of the analytic frame. Adler and Bachant describe this 
analytic asymmetry: “While it is the patient’s process, it is the analyst’s situation. In the organization of the 
analytic situation, it is always the analyst’s obligation to safeguard the analytic dyad from potentially 
disruptive intrusions, whether they arise from mounting pressures within the analytic situation or from the 
needs of an outside party” (1996, p. 1041). 
98
 As Parsons argues, “what allows experience to be processed is the separation between the representation 
in psychic reality and the thing itself in literal reality” (2000, pp. 174-175).   
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along with the shrinking to life-size, in Harry Stack Sullivan's phrase, so joyfully 
experienced upon being survived. This is the task of establishing real and helpful 
boundaries – boundaries that are not barriers but that establish “edges” for both 
interchange and contact. (1995, p. 242) 
The “shrinking to life-size” describes, in Lacan’s paradigm, the symbolic’s intersection 
and interruption of the limitless imaginary. In Kleinian terms, the bad objects are no 
longer monstrous and the good objects no longer saintly, but all objects – including the 
ego as one of the subject’s internal objects – are experienced as something more akin to 
‘human, all too human.’ As Fromm indicates, contact between objects becomes possible 
without the risk of annihilation. There are vulnerabilities, of course, but they come to be 
anticipated as ‘worth the risk,’ as they say, rather than so anxiously avoided, as the 
housebound agoraphobic has needed to do. 
 Milner provides a clinical example of the destruction and survival of the object, 
and the way in which the patient is able to make use of it: “The repeated discovery that I 
went on being friendly and unhurt by him, in spite of the continual attacks on me, 
certainly played a very important part [in the mutative effects of the analysis]” (1952, p. 
193). She links this effect directly to her patient’s developing creativity, in Winnicott’s 
sense:  
[W]hen I began to see and to interpret, as far as I could, that this use of me might 
be not only a defensive regression, but an essential recurrent phase in the 
development of a creative relation to the world, then the whole character of the 
analysis changed; the boy then gradually became able to allow the external object, 
represented by me, to exist in its own right. (1952, p. 194) 
As I note above, Winnicott distinguishes between object-relating and object-use in these 
terms of internal and external realities. Object-relating, as Winnicott understands it, “is an 
experience of the subject that can be described in terms of the subject as an isolate” 
(1969, p. 712). Object-use, on the other hand, requires that the object “be real in the sense 
of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections” (p. 712). In this way, through 
the analysand’s destruction of the frame and the frame’s survival (including the analyst’s 
ability to survive: as analyst, as maintaining an analytic stance), the frame can become 
something like a transitional object for the analysand. Further, as Rappaport suggests, the 
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analysand’s capacity for object-use will extend beyond the specific object that has 
‘survived’ – in this case, the analytic frame – and will ideally include the analysand’s 
own mind (1998, p. 378).
99
 
 Winnicott describes the fate of the child’s transitional object and elaborates the 
meaning of the third area of experience. The first two areas of experience are psychic 
reality, to which internal objects belong, and external or objective reality. The third area 
of experience, which Winnicott associates with cultural life, “corresponds to the infant’s 
transitional phenomena and […] actually derives from them” (1959, p. 57). The 
successful use of the transitional object is required for the third area of reality to be 
accessible to the mature individual. The transitional object is 
gradually allowed to be decathected, so that in the course of years it becomes not 
so much forgotten as relegated to limbo. […] In health the transitional object does 
not “go inside” nor does the feeling about it necessarily undergo repression. It is 
not forgotten and it is not mourned. It loses meaning and this is because the 
transitional phenomena have become diffused, have become spread out over the 
whole intermediate territory between “inner psychic reality” and “the external 
world as perceived by two persons in common”, that is to say, over the whole 
cultural field. (1951, p. 5)  
This third reality is defined by the same paradox characteristic of the infant’s relation to 
the transitional object: “the transitional object is symbolical of the internal object which is 
kept alive by the alive mother’s presence” (Winnicott 1951, p. 58). Paradoxically, an 
experience is both created by the individual and would have existed even if the individual 
did not. As opposed to internal objects, which do not require any sort of maintenance 
from external reality, transitional objects – the use of which becomes the capacity to 
enjoy cultural experiences – depend upon some play between inner and outer reality. This 
third area of experience, characterized in part by a shared illusion and also by the 
exchange of internal and external phenomena, supports the difficult task of keeping the 
                                                          
99
 Before this development, pseudo-debility, pseudo-stupidity, and/or pseudo-imbecility may be evident. 
Cohn describes pseudo-stupidity as an “inhibition, characterized by a generally (not focally) diminished 
curiosity, intellectual interest, and astuteness relative to one’s potential” (1989, p. 132). Mahler suggests 
that pseudo-imbecility is a particularly effective way of “restoring or maintaining a secret libidinal rapport 
within the family” (1942, p. 149). It is often accompanied by a similar inhibition of affect. This 
phenomenon is connected to the capacity for mentalization, which I discuss in Chapter Three. 
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ego and its objects separate and connected; that is, keeping the ego alive within and 
against the world. The nebulous boundaries between the agoraphobic’s inner and outer 
realities lead to her inability to inhabit Winnicott’s third area of experience, and the 
inability to continually navigate the paradox of individuation and object relations. Lacan 
characterizes the symbolic dimension in the same way as Winnicott’s shared reality and 
emphasizes this aspect of language: we are born into a discourse that we must learn to 
make our own, even as it shapes us beginning before we are born.
100
 Again, as Green 
writes, “[l]anguage [...] is the heir to the first transitional objects” (1975, p. 11). The 
agoraphobic, unable to inhabit this space of creativity, is unable to engage with a process 
of symbolization – to bear the frustration of the absence of the thing in order to name it – 
leading to melancholia and the persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) identifies in her 
agoraphobia patients.
101
 
 Winnicott’s conception of creativity is unique and is essential to his sense of 
“potential space.” Creativity is possible only when the fear of annihilation is not too 
great; creativity is possible only when one’s continuity of existence can be taken for 
granted. Creative living is the doing that comes out of being. It is distinguished from 
artistic creativity by the fact that “what we create is already there”; the creative aspect 
involves “the way we get at perception through conception and apperception” (Winnicott 
1965, p. 52).
102
 Kumin connects creativity in Winnicott’s sense with the experience of 
emptiness, the transitional object, and the process of separation-individuation:  
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 Rey also indicates language’s “personal” and “universal” meanings. See Rey 1994, p. 185. 
101
 Steiner conceptualizes a pathological kind of transitional space – a psychic retreat – out of which a 
patient must emerge for any progress to occur (1993, p. 41). Specifically, Steiner suggests that melancholia 
can be thought of as a psychic retreat away from the depressive position – that is, mourning: “If the patient 
can shift from melancholic denial towards facing reality, then it is mourning that he has to confront and 
work through” (2011, p. 15). Milrod’s (2007) patients seem to have replaced their ‘safe’ physical space of 
the home, from which they feared to emerge, with the psychical space of emptiness that has, indeed, 
removed them from an area of experiencing, thus indicating, as I argue in Chapter Three, the need for 
mourning in order to emerge into the painful world of vulnerability, loss, and, of critical importance, 
potentiality. 
102
 Winnicott perhaps overstates this distinction, as Milner’s productive thoughts on the analytic frame, 
symbol formation, and the boundary between inner and outer realities are inspired by her artistic creativity, 
and the inhibition of her artistic expression. Her sense of the nature of intermediary spaces is inspired by 
her experiences as psychoanalyst and as artist. She writes, for example: “To be able to break down the 
barrier of space between self and other, yet at the same time to be able to maintain it, this seems to be the 
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The transitional object, and its use at bedtime to help deal with the separation 
represented by sleep, may therefore be viewed as the first primordial work of art: 
created by the infant in ‘external reality’; symbolizing the mother, her holding and 
her breast; regressive, but in the service of the ego; ultimately an expression of the 
self and utilized in its own differentiation. The transitional object is the first 
artistic creation and it grows out of emptiness. (1978, p. 214)  
The paradox of creativity, if we are sane, is that “we only create what we find” 
(Winnicott 1965, p. 53). 
 The analytic frame can become a transitional object for the analysand if it is able 
to, as I describe above, survive the analysand’s destruction of it. Busch, however, 
emphasizes the particularly analytic function of the frame, suggesting that the analytic 
frame is characterized “by the principle that the analysand’s free associations are the 
primary data upon which the two participants base their understanding” (1995, p. 453; 
original emphasis). Further, he argues, “the frame I believe it is necessary to establish is 
that it is the patient’s free associations that we will be analyzing, for the purpose of 
increasing freedom of thought and the capacity to see these thoughts as psychologically 
meaningful” (pp. 453-454). Opdal concurs with Busch’s view, arguing that the  
analyst's main task is not to understand everything, but to sustain the analytic 
setting. The analyst will support the continuous flow of associations in both the 
analysand's and the analyst's minds as well as the evolving experience of objects 
and others that may be staged in the analytic setting. (2012, p. 7)  
The establishment of a firm analytic frame marks a different space from all that is 
uncontained by the frame. Paradoxically, this containment provides a safe space in which 
the analysand is given a greater degree of freedom, freedom with which to experiment 
and be creative, to play with the psychic material that has previously been only 
oppressive. The analytic frame, which marks the analytic space as that in which free 
association is the ‘rule’ that the analysand must follow, can survive if the analyst supports 
the analysand’s developments of free and freer associations.103 The analyst must be aware 
                                                                                                                                                                             
paradox of creativity” (1950, p. 144). Artistic creativity and creative living might therefore both depend on 
the same psychological processes of finding and creating reality. 
103
 R. Lowenstein argues that the analytic setting is part of the fundamental rule and helps to facilitate free 
association (1963, pp. 458-459). I investigate these elements of the analytic process – the fundamental rule 
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of, and beware of, her own resistance to the psychoanalytic process, be cognizant of the 
things she does not want to hear the analysand say. The analyst must maintain her own 
boundaries between internal and external in the onslaught of the analysand’s – 
particularly the agoraphobic’s – unconscious destruction of them.   
 In Chapter Four, I argue that it is necessary to follow the method of free 
association particular to psychoanalysis in order to effectively address the agoraphobic’s 
persistent emptiness. Part of the efficacy of free association is, as Bollas articulates, its 
nature as “creative destruction” (1995, p. 53). Using the destructive drive in the service of 
creation parallels the creative differentiation at work in the construction of the ego’s 
boundaries. Thus, establishing and maintaining the analytic frame in the sense that Busch 
describes – that is, as demarcating the analytic space as particular insofar as the 
analysand’s free associations are the primary data of analysis – is particularly useful in 
countering the therapeutic emphasis on interpreting the transference, which, following 
Bollas (2013), can lead to the inhibition of the development of free association.  
  
2.4. Conclusion 
Agoraphobia is a problem of boundaries; it is the psychic defence against the insufficient 
capacity to experience the world with others without being consumed by them or 
destroying them, to share external reality while maintaining ego integrity. Rather than 
risk the loss of reality from the threat of a world that is too big, that threatens to 
overwhelm and engulf, the agoraphobic closes herself off from experiencing the world at 
all and in so doing loses herself regardless. Neither the world nor the self is wholly 
satisfying to the individual; one must learn to navigate the in-between and risk the 
disintegration of boundaries in order to establish them. The agoraphobic’s threshold 
anxiety indicates a lack of clarity as to what is internal and what is external, which leads, 
paradoxically, to the absence of “the illusion of a shared world” (Hämäläinen 2009, p. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and the method of free association – in detail in Chapter Four, as well as the relationship between the free 
associative process and the development of the transference.  
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1286). Instead of illusion, the agoraphobic experiences the shared world as terrifyingly 
real.  
 The agoraphobic patient is overwhelmed by her anxieties, but the correspondence 
between the psychical processes of the agoraphobic patient and the normally developing 
infant indicates that a developmental tool – namely, the transitional object – may be of 
use in the relief of the agoraphobic symptoms of anxiety and avoidance, and also in the 
development of a capacity for object-use, which would, I suggest, relieve the persistent 
emptiness Milrod (2007) identifies. Clinically, the analytic frame has the potential to 
become a transitional object for the analysand. Language (as both perception and 
representation), and the particularly psychoanalytic method of free association, is the 
means by which this potentiality can be realized. The possibility of new experiences with 
a transitional object – if it can survive the analysand’s destruction of it – allows the frame 
to be used in the creation of the ego’s boundaries. The non-correspondence between the 
unconscious destruction of the internal object and the survival of the external object 
creates and clarifies the individual’s sense of internal versus external, which the 
agoraphobic has thus far been unable to take for granted. Once ego boundaries are 
established, the potential spaces between self and other, and between the ego and its 
objects, can thereby be creatively inhabited, with all of the risks and rewards of human 
vulnerability. 
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Chapter Three: Agoraphobia and Emptiness  
In Chapter One, I argued that agoraphobia involves a profound anxiety about the 
boundaries between spaces, both physical and psychical. This anxiety is fuelled – if not 
caused – by the inability to symbolize (or, more specifically, to engage in the creative 
process of symbolization). In Chapter Two, I expanded on the nature of this anxiety and 
argued that the agoraphobic is not able to take for granted the distinction between internal 
and external, and therefore cannot experience shared reality as illusion. This illusion of 
shared reality is necessary for the creative uses of language. The arguments of both 
chapters are informed by Milrod’s (2007) finding of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia 
patients whose symptoms of anxiety and avoidance have remitted. In this chapter, I 
consider Milrod’s article in detail and provide an analysis of the meanings of emptiness 
in the psychoanalytic setting.  
Standard psychiatric treatment of agoraphobia includes cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT) combined with pharmacotherapy. This treatment is often effective in the 
remission of overt agoraphobic symptoms.
104
 However, the incidence of relapse is 
striking, with rates between 83% and 91% when medication is discontinued without 
prolonged maintenance treatment (Wiborg & Dahl, 1996). Milrod, one of the foremost 
contemporary theorists of agoraphobia, addresses this problem from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, presenting case material of agoraphobia patients who are technically in 
remission but experience a persistent psychic emptiness, which, she suggests, may 
contribute to agoraphobia’s chronicity (Milrod 2007). Given the important implications 
of her finding of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients for the successful treatment 
of the disorder long-term, that is, the need to address this persistent emptiness in 
agoraphobia patients for whom panic symptoms have remitted, I critique Milrod’s 
analysis of the persistent emptiness and propose an alternative explanation with clinical 
implications.
105
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 I discuss the characteristic symptoms and various definitions of agoraphobia in Chapter One. Here, I am 
referring specifically to the DSM definition and the particular symptoms of high levels of anxiety and 
avoidance of the world outside a self-defined safe space.  
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 These findings have not otherwise been addressed in the literature. Strubbe and Vanheule (2014) 
provide a technical counterpoint to Milrod and colleagues Panic-Focused Psychodynamic Psychotherapy 
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In the first section, I consider the plurality of possible meanings of emptiness in 
the psychoanalytic clinic. This first section is composed of three subsections: in the first, 
I consider Milrod’s suggestion that persistent emptiness may be indicative of a 
development deficit in the form of a weak reflective function. In the second subsection, I 
argue that assertions of emptiness in the analytic situation precisely indicate the 
unconscious presence of strongly warded-off emotional or cognitive experiences. The 
nature of these experiences must be explored with each patient, as they will naturally vary 
among individuals. The majority of the psychoanalytic literature on emptiness accords 
with Milrod’s interpretation of unconscious rage. However, in the third subsection, I 
argue that the clinical material Milrod provides supports an alternative interpretation, 
namely, that the subjective experience of emptiness in agoraphobia patients commonly 
indicates the presence of significant losses that have yet to be mourned. In the second 
section, I provide an analysis of agoraphobic anxieties in the normal process of mourning. 
As part of this analysis, I propose several explanations as to why agoraphobia patients, in 
particular, defend against mourning. In the third section, I argue that a structural 
emptiness exists in all individuals along with the pathological emptiness evident in 
certain patients. Pathological emptiness, I argue, is a complex defense organization that 
masks overwhelming unconscious material; for the agoraphobia patient, pathological 
emptiness is a defense against one’s own aggressivity and the painful experience of 
overwhelming loss. Structural emptiness, on the other hand, and as Winnicott argues,
106
 
is the basis for all learning; it is an aspect of the psychical apparatus that allows for the 
possibility of new thoughts, feelings, and experiences. An understanding of structural 
emptiness does not elucidate the particular meaning of pathological emptiness, but it does 
provide a technical counterpoint to the therapeutic emphasis on the transferential 
relationship. As I argued in Chapter Two, and below, structural emptiness is a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(PFPP), offering an account of a Lacanian psychoanalysis of a panic patient, but they do not address the 
persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) identifies in agoraphobia patients. Reed (2009) refers to Milrod (2007) 
only obliquely in an article on Green’s concept of the void; she does not consider agoraphobia, nor does she 
directly address the emptiness Milrod identifies. 
106
 See Chapter Two for my analysis of Winnicott’s arguments. Briefly, emptiness is a psychical response 
to hunger; hunger stimulates aggression, which is necessary for healthy ego development insofar as the self 
must reject all that does not belong to the self in order to establish the boundaries between self and other. 
Further, the experience of emptiness is the basis of all learning and of all new experiences.  
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consequence of entering into a language system; by following the psychoanalytic method 
of free association and abiding by the fundamental psychoanalytic rule – the pact between 
the analysand and the analyst of complete candor and complete discretion respectively – 
the analytic couple can make use of this structural emptiness in order to elucidate the 
individual meaning(s) of pathological emptiness. 
 
3.1. Meanings of Emptiness 
We are all familiar with the feeling of being “full of emptiness.” Emptiness is positive, in 
sensation, just as darkness is felt as an actual thing, not the mere absence of light, 
whatever we may know. Darkness falls, like a curtain or a blanket. When the light comes, 
it drives away the darkness; and so on.  
(Isaacs 1948, p. 88) 
Milrod (2007) presents the case studies of two agoraphobia patients, Deborah and Rita. 
Deborah began treatment of twice-weekly psychodynamic psychotherapy at the age of 
twenty-one for panic disorder with severe agoraphobia. Although enrolled as a college 
student, she was unable to attend her classes due to the increasing severity of her 
symptoms. Anxiety began affecting her school attendance in junior high, though her main 
complaints were nausea and dizziness. Milrod’s report indicates that Deborah’s mother 
experienced severe separation anxiety when apart from her daughter and limited 
Deborah’s social involvement in outings that would result in their separation. Deborah 
was an only child with “a childlike manner” and she “ascribed magical, omnipotent 
powers to her parents at times of heightened anxiety” (Milrod 2007, p. 1012). She 
“wound up repeatedly disappointed and furious if they too ran into difficulties managing 
practical problems” (p. 1012). Her agoraphobia remitted after eight months of treatment, 
after which emerged the quality of “emptiness.” Rita began four-times-weekly 
psychoanalysis at the age of twenty-nine for worsening panic disorder and severe 
agoraphobia, despite increasingly aggressive pharmacotherapy and several attempts at 
CBT. Her anxiety and agoraphobia symptoms began at the age of eighteen. Following her 
first panic attack and a six-week period of being housebound, she was able to return to 
school with the aid of pharmaceutical intervention. She worked with her father and lived 
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with her husband in her parents’ home. Rita was terrified of being alone and arranged her 
time accordingly; any moment she was alone, even at work, she watched television to 
“help take her ‘mind off stuff’” (p. 1016). She also exhibited claustrophobic anxieties, 
walking up and down twenty-two flights of stairs every day at work rather than taking the 
elevator. Rita was an only child, and her parents were “nearly absent” (p. 1016) during 
her childhood. Rita’s mother had a phobia of being touched and Rita couldn’t recall ever 
being embraced. Rita’s history is quite different from Deborah’s, though their 
experiences of emptiness are similar. 
Milrod’s description of emptiness includes both an emotional and an intellectual 
aspect. She defines the clinical phenomenon that she observes in her agoraphobia patients 
as an “inner constriction” that “affects [their] ability to think independently and to lead 
emotionally full and intellectually broad and stimulating internal lives” (2007, pp. 1008-
1009). Milrod refers to the phenomenon variously within her article as “emptiness” (p. 
1007), “inner constriction” (p. 1008), “internal vacancy” (p. 1009), and “subjective sense 
of incompleteness” (p. 1010) without remarking on the very different meanings of each 
of these terms. The complexities of the subjective phenomenological experiences of this 
emptiness are evident from the connotations of these various terms: emptiness implies a 
nothingness and a complete absence; constriction implies an intense anxiety; and, 
incompleteness implies a something missing along with the presence of something else. 
All of these meanings accord with Milrod’s descriptions of her patients’ experiences at 
certain moments; however, Milrod’s use of these various terms without clarification 
obscures her intended meaning, which remains unclear throughout the article; or, rather, 
the complexity of the phenomenon she encounters in her patients remains to be 
explicated.  
Milrod argues that it is necessary to determine clinically (and individually) 
whether the manifestation of emptiness in analysis is strictly defensive (evident in the 
transference) or whether the patient does not have the capacity for thinking about her own 
feelings.
107
 Milrod points to Levy’s (1984) excellent article on emptiness as a reminder to 
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 Bion makes a similar distinction regarding types of pathology, summarized by Ferro: “As we know, 
Bion distinguishes two types of pathology. The first and more serious concerns a deficiency of the α 
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distinguish between these two interpretations of emptiness; however, her emphasis on 
maintaining this distinction overshadows the multiplicity of meanings a single patient’s 
experience of emptiness may encompass. I return to Levy’s article in order to emphasize 
a different point, namely, that emptiness is neither straightforward nor simple. That is, 
emptiness in the analytic situation “differs from patient to patient both in how it feels and 
in its particular dynamic meaning” (Levy 1984, p. 388; my emphasis). Singer makes a 
similar point: the state of emptiness “reflects a spectrum of meanings at one and the same 
time” (1977a, p. 460). As with most expressions encountered in the course of an analysis, 
the specific meaning or meanings of emptiness must be explored with each patient and 
within the context of the analytic situation and the particular analytic moment. Emptiness 
includes the patient’s statements of feeling empty and the subjective experience of that 
feeling (for the patient and for the analyst, who may approach some experience of the 
patient’s emptiness in various ways, including, for example, through the 
countertransference). It bears repeating that the meanings of emptiness cannot be 
assumed to be fixed.
108
   
                                                                                                                                                                             
function, in which the inability to transform β into α elements is lacking, so that the former are evacuated, 
giving rise to hallucinatory and psychosomatic disorders, characteropathies, etc.; while the second, in 
which the α function is unimpaired, is observed when the apparatus for thinking thoughts is incapable of 
‘handling’ or using these thoughts” (2002, p. 67). See Wilde (2003) for her important analysis of the 
relationship between agoraphobia, and the α [alpha] function.  
108
 The common fantasy that meaning is stable and shared often results in striking miscommunications, a 
particularly dangerous interference in the analytic process. This fantasy exists in Lacan’s imaginary 
dimension, or register. Fink describes the nature of this potential interference: “In the imaginary register, I 
am focused on what I believe the other person is saying and trying to say as opposed to what the other is 
actually saying. Insofar as I operate in the imaginary register, I cannot hear a slip of the tongue, because I 
immediately correct it in my mind with what I believe the other meant to say. I do not really need to hear 
the other speak, because I think I already know what he is going to say, believing that I comprehend his 
point of view even before I hear it” (2010, p. 266). Or, in Lacan’s words: “the unconscious shuts down 
insofar as the analyst no longer ‘supports speech [porte la parole],’ because he already knows or thinks he 
knows what speech has to say” (1955/2006j, p. 297). Bion makes this same point, arguing that the analyst 
must suspend his memory, desire, and understanding in order for analytic work to be possible (1984, pp. 
143-145, 151). The capacity to tolerate the presence of emptiness is directly related to the capacity to 
tolerate the movement between coherence and incoherence; I expand on this point in Chapter Four. For 
now, let me emphasize the complexity of emptiness’s meanings, which is also evident in Levy’s 
enumeration of emptiness’s multifacedness: “[e]mptiness may appear as a complaint of feeling empty, as a 
fear of being empty, or as a belief that someone else is empty. Emptiness may appear along with feelings of 
depression, boredom, rage, restlessness, unreality, or may be felt as the entirety of experience, precluding 
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Milrod’s priority and, in my view, the success of her article, is the identification 
of this emptiness in agoraphobia patients. Secondarily, she offers a number of potential 
suggestions to explain this phenomenon. At times, it is difficult to distinguish between 
Milrod’s descriptions of the phenomenon and her explanations for it. The first 
explanation I discern is the possibility of a developmental deficit in the form of a weak 
reflective function (RF).
109
 Milrod and I agree that RF, as I detail below, refers to the 
ability to conceive of mental states in one’s own and in others’ minds, as well as to 
conceive of the otherness of others’ mental states. However, there is the possibility of 
inferring from the phrase “developmental deficit” the sense that these patients’ 
experiences and assertions of emptiness indicate an actual emptiness. For example, 
Milrod writes: “These patients cannot go out by themselves. The question is, can they 
think for themselves either, and if not, why not?” (2007, p. 1011). I caution against this 
interpretation of pathological emptiness as it risks, as I argue below, perpetuating the 
deeper elements of agoraphobia. Glucksman (2000), for example, makes the distinction 
between defense and deficit in patients with affect dysregulation. His clinical report, 
however, is of a single patient exhibiting both types of affect dysregulation, indicating the 
defensive aspect of any kind of “deficit.” While the term “developmental disturbance” is 
surely apt, and we can speak of “deficits of self-representation,” it is, I suggest, both 
imprecise and misleading to speak of a developmental deficit. I argue, contrary to Milrod, 
that the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness neither indicates an actual emptiness nor can 
it be explained by a “developmental deficit” in the form of a weak RF. Further, I contend 
that Milrod seems to conflate RF with conscious introspection. I am not suggesting that 
these patients do not have a weak RF. I am suggesting, rather, that these patients’ 
                                                                                                                                                                             
any other feeling” (1984, p. 388). Even if the experience of emptiness “preclud[es] any other feeling,” there 
are always feelings about the emptiness, including, for example, frustration, fear, and/or pride. 
109
 In Rudden et al. (2003), which Milrod co-authored, the authors imply that they agree with Kessler, who 
argues against “reductionistic ‘deficit theories’ for panic disorder” (1996, p. 1001). It appears, then, that 
Milrod favors a ‘deficit theory’ for the emptiness she finds in agoraphobia patients but not as a theory of 
panic disorder itself. Rudden et al. (2003) is not cited in Milrod (2007), and clarification of this apparent 
complication is not provided. Further, Milrod argues that panic-focused psychodynamic psychotherapy 
(PFPP) with a focus on strengthening RF is an effective treatment for panic disorder; thus, according to her 
view, an increase in RF is associated with a decrease in panic symptoms. However, it is not clear how, in 
her view, a weak RF explains the persistent emptiness apparent beyond the agoraphobic symptoms of 
anxiety and avoidance, which have presumably been alleviated by an increase in RF. 
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assertions of emptiness in the analytic session cannot be explained by appeal to the RF in 
either Milrod’s use of the term or in the sense Fonagy (1991) originally uses it (which I 
explicate below). The second explanation Milrod presents for her patients’ persistent 
emptiness is the repression of overwhelming affects, specifically rage.
110
 Milrod’s 
identification of repressed rage hiding behind emptiness accords with much of the 
literature and I do not disagree with her interpretations of repressed rage. However, I 
offer an alternative analysis of patients’ experiences and assertions of emptiness based on 
the clinical material Milrod provides: I argue that the phenomenon of emptiness Milrod 
identifies can be better explained by the presence of traumatic and unmourned losses.  
Green’s theories of the negative are useful and, as of yet, underemployed in 
understanding the clinical phenomenon of emptiness, which – diversely conceived – is a 
well-noted phenomenon. The negative, as Kernberg writes in his introduction to Green’s 
work, “exceeds by far the death drive, but also includes the expression of the death drive 
as an ever present, intrinsic and unavoidable aspect of all object relations” (1999, p. xiv). 
Importantly, Green identifies the work of the negative not only in what he calls the 
aggressive expressions of the death drive (expressed directly as attacks on self or other) 
but also in what he calls the destructive aspect of it. This “disobjectalising” function of 
the death drive is characterized by a withdrawal of investment: “Destruction without 
aggression can be expressed in a radical withdrawal from objects, or in a tendency to 
eliminate the very self as an agency searching for satisfaction” (Kernberg 1999, p. xv). 
However, as I discuss in more detail below, the negative, according to Green’s 
theorizations, is not fundamentally pathological; rather, the pathological expression of the 
negative is only a “‘negativisitic’ vicissitude of a potentially creative negative which 
suffering, rage and impotence have distorted and transformed into psychical paralysis” 
(Green 1999, p. 5). This description allows us to connect Green’s concept of the negative 
with Winnicott’s sense of emptiness as the basis of all learning and all new experiences. 
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 Milrod also asks: “From a more behavioral perspective, is it simply that it is only people with no interest 
in self-reflection, no curiosity about themselves or the rest of life, who can tolerate the restrictions 
engendered by agoraphobia?” (2007, p. 1009). However, she does not appear to consider this as a viable 
suggestion and does not provide any further reflection on the possibility. 
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 Green’s theorizations are relevant here for two reasons: firstly, he draws attention 
to the structural aspects of the negative and, thus, emptiness. That is, the negative is an 
integral aspect of the ego, not ever only a deficit or a defense. I discuss this element in 
detail below, in Section 3.3. Secondly, Green articulates the connection between the 
negative and melancholia, and identifies melancholia as a particular instance in which 
emptiness – or, the negative – becomes something else, or rather, takes on a different, 
more pervasive character. I discuss this element in Section 3.1.iii. Briefly, in melancholia, 
the negative acquires a greater complexity, to wit:  
We are in an all-too-present world of suffering resulting from loss, but the one 
who is suffering cannot know either what he is suffering from or what has caused 
his suffering. The more the suffering presents itself as an excess of internal 
presence caused by the absence of the lost object, manifesting itself by a psychic 
pain, the less the ego knows the nature of this suffering (the hate which is 
underlying it) and that of the object which causes it. (Green 1999, pp. 53-54)    
The absence of a lost object, then, can become more present than any original presence. 
This excessive presence of an absence characterizes melancholia and also, I suggest, the 
persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) describes in her agoraphobia patients.   
 
3.1.i. Emptiness as Deficit 
 As I indicate above, Milrod suggests that agoraphobics’ restricted exploration of the 
external world is paralleled by an equally challenged exploration of the inner world, of 
“reflecting on their lives or feelings, or permitting themselves to experience their feelings 
at all” (2007, p. 1009).111 Milrod utilizes the concept of mentalization, which Fonagy 
introduces and defines as “the capacity to conceive of conscious and unconscious mental 
                                                          
111
 Bodin (1996) anticipates much of Milrod’s argument and provides a clinical example of a patient 
suffering from “claustra agoraphobia” who used practical or physical activities, and an inhibition of her 
mentalizing capacities, as a psychic retreat from overwhelming emotional situations. Although Bodin 
suggests that Miss P’s increasing ability to mentalize effectuated her decrease in panic symptoms, he also 
describes her painful realization that her father had sexually abused her. Although Bodin does not offer 
details of this aspect of the analysis, some mourning is implied, as the realization “made her see herself as 
an orphan” (p. 187). Bodin also notes the patient’s movement from the paranoid-schizoid position to the 
depressive position, again implying the work of mourning in the progress of the analysis and the alleviation 
of the patient’s panic symptoms.    
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states in oneself and others” (Fonagy 1991, p. 641), as one way of thinking about her 
patients’ inner constriction. Milrod argues that the emptiness she observes in her 
agoraphobia patients might indicate an inhibition of the operationalized form of 
mentalization, that is, a weak RF (pp. 1009, 1011). She suggests that this persistent 
emptiness, like an inhibition of the RF, is indicative of a profound inability to relate to 
others. Her argument that her agoraphobia patients’ persistent emptiness is connected to a 
deficient RF is consistent with her findings (with colleagues) in a pilot study, “Reflective 
Functioning in Panic Disorder Patients” (Rudden et al. 2006), which supported the 
following hypothesis (based on clinical observations): “panic disorder patients use 
defenses involving ‘not knowing’ to defend themselves against the highly charged and 
conflicted affective states connected with their symptoms” (p. 1342). Significantly, 
despite the inferences Milrod draws, this study did not show that a higher RF was 
associated with any significant change in panic symptoms (Rudden et al. 2006, p. 1342), 
which suggests that what is “not known” is something other than unconscious 
emotional/impulse conflicts. That is, despite Milrod’s (2007) suggestion that her patients 
experience emptiness as a symptom of a deficient or inhibited RF – in other words, an 
inability to mentalize – the significance of real events that may have contributed to a 
limited RF (and thus led to her patients’ experiences of emptiness) is not explored. This 
possibility is also not suggested by Rudden et al. (2006). I argue that the analysand’s 
assertions of emptiness in the psychoanalytic setting are always, at least in part, 
defensive. The experience of emptiness is, in fact, a developmental achievement, and 
may be used either defensively or productively, as I argue in more detail below.  
 I return to Fonagy’s initial conceptualization of mentalization in order to clarify 
what the term is meant to refer to, and to indicate its limited applicability in Milrod’s 
(2007) patients. I argue that appealing to the concept of mentalization, or the capacity for 
RF, as an explanation for assertions of emptiness assumes a causal relationship between 
the two where only a correspondence can be shown; that is, do these patients experience, 
or assert, feelings of emptiness because they have a deficient RF or does the concept of 
RF merely describe, and not explain, the pathological experience of emptiness? Fonagy 
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(1991) links the “capacity to mentalize”112 with the capacity for symbolization, although 
he prefers the specificity of the concept of mentalization given the wide array of 
meanings related to symbolization in the psychoanalytic literature.
113
 However, despite 
this terminological manoeuvre, mentalization and symbolization are conceptually linked; 
that is, mentalization is a process of representation, with significant consequences for the 
individual’s experiences of self and other. Without this capacity, the separation of self 
and other (or self and object) is constantly threatened (Fonagy 1991, p. 642). The 
tenuousness of this separation, or boundary (as I argued in Chapter One), is a 
fundamental aspect in agoraphobia. Furthermore, the representation of affect, as idea, “is 
crucial in the achievement of control of overwhelming affect” (Fonagy 1991, p. 642). The 
inability to idealize, or represent affects mentally, of both self and other, consequently 
means that “affect in others can be appreciated only through direct experiencing via 
emotional resonance” (p. 642). That is, for those with an inability, or limited ability, to 
mentalize, affective experiences of others are knowable only through an elision of the 
divide between self and other. This affective experience is easily overwhelming. The 
subjective experience of emptiness can be used as a defence against the overwhelming 
experience of an other’s affective life because the boundary between self and other is 
only, if at all, nebulously conceived. The agoraphobic asserts her own emptiness in order 
to avoid being overwhelmed by her own emotional reality (specifically, her unconscious 
rage and/or unresolved loss) and, because of her inability to distinguish between her own 
emotional reality and that of her objects, to defend against being overwhelmed by others’ 
emotional states. I am not, then, suggesting that Milrod’s (2007) patients do not exhibit a 
weak or inhibited RF; I am suggesting, on the one hand, that assertions of emptiness 
cannot be explained by an inhibition of the RF and, on the other hand, that assertions of 
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 The concept of mentalizing, though introduced and elaborated by Fonagy, is evident in the early work of 
Ferenczi (1926). Ferenczi introduces the term psychophobia to describe the inhibition of what Fonagy will 
later call mentalization. Psychophobia is a regression to a “purely materialistic phase, characterized by 
excessive (perhaps even entire) projection (Ferenczi 1926, p. 318). For Ferenczi, negation, as a capacity for 
differentiation, is connected with autonomy. The ability to conceive of mental states in others’ minds, as 
well as the otherness of others’ mental states, is a critical component of the mentalizing faculty. Negation 
and the capacity to tolerate one’s own aggressivity are thus intimately linked with the reflective function.    
113
 I discussed symbolization in the psychoanalytic literature briefly in Chapter Two. In this thesis, my use 
of the term symbolization refers to the use of language as a system of symbols. Engaging in a process of 
symbolization, then, simply means putting one’s thoughts and feelings into words. See also infra note 6.  
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emptiness do not indicate a developmental deficit. As I indicate above, it is, in my view, 
more accurate and productive to describe this psychical phenomenon as a “developmental 
disturbance” in the form of a “deficit of self-representation.” 
 Fonagy and Target suggest that the psychological impetus for the development of 
RF is as follows: “By attributing mental states to others, children make people’s 
behaviour meaningful and predictable” (1997, pp. 679-680; original emphasis). The 
capacity does not depend on a particularly high level of intellectual activity; rather, the 
emphasis is on behaviour rather than cognition. Fonagy and Target emphasize that the 
point “is not that the individual should be able to articulate this [knowledge] 
theoretically” (1997, p. 680; original emphasis). Further, they distinguish RF from the 
conscious act of introspection: “Introspection or self-reflection is quite different from 
reflective function as the latter is an automatic procedure, unconsciously invoked in 
interpreting human action” (p. 681). The intellectual gains Milrod identifies in her 
patient, Rita, as indicative of an improved RF, then, are not consistent with Fonagy and 
Target’s development of the concept. Milrod indicates that Rita “was able to see that 
Laura [her daughter] was in part expressing despair about the emotional and physical 
distance her mother seemed to require from her, and she also recognized that she herself 
must have been in a similar emotional situation with her own mother”; Milrod suggests 
that this recognition “demonstrates considerable improvement in reflective capacity” 
(2007, p. 1020). However, Milrod appears to be conflating reflective capacity with 
conscious introspection, and mistakenly characterizing the cognitive and intellectual 
gains Rita has made as unconscious emotional knowledge. Milrod indicates the limits of 
Rita’s gain as a conscious development insofar as “this understanding did not alter Rita’s 
need to distance herself from Laura and her emotional demands, nor did it make her more 
empathic with her daughter’s distress” (2007, p. 1020). Again, despite Milrod’s 
characterization of this intellectual understanding as a gain in reflective capacity, it lacks 
the unconscious dimension by which that capacity is defined. The limited development of 
RF is likely connected, in my opinion, to the relationship of Rita and Deborah to their 
phobic companions (often mothers), whose behaviour was “routinely self-absorbed or 
thoughtless and controlling toward them” (p. 1021). Although Milrod indicates, and I 
agree, that this “parental input” cannot be considered the sole etiological factor in the 
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development of agoraphobia, this thoughtless behaviour could be (and ought to be) 
considered a key element in the patients’ inhibition of their RF. The relevance of parental 
treatment of these patients as objects rather than as thinking and feeling individuals 
clearly affects the patients’ own sense of themselves as thinking and feeling individuals. I 
suggest, then, that the development of agoraphobia and the development, or inhibition, of 
RF follow two independent courses. This suggestion is supported by much of the research 
on RF in individuals with, for example, borderline personality disorder (see, for example, 
Levy et al. 2006). It is also supported by Graf (2009), the results of which determined that 
the capacity for reflective functioning is not related to the severity of an individual’s 
agoraphobia. 
 Fonagy (1991) indicates that the inhibition of the RF (mentalization) is in itself a 
defensive function, even as it prohibits the development of more mature defensive 
functions such as repression. This point is sometimes lost in subsequent discussions of 
mentalization (which is now a popular concept in contemporary circles). To emphasize, 
then: mentalization is a capacity that depends on particular environmental factors in order 
to develop interrelationally; and, the inhibition of mentalization is also a relatively 
primitive defense brought about by psychic trauma. These two factors are undoubtedly 
related insofar as the psychic trauma that the inhibition of mentalization responds to is 
most likely not uncommonly the failure in some way of the facilitating environment to 
provide the necessary factors for the safe development of the mentalizing capacity: to 
practice mentalizing. This connection is suggested by Fonagy’s presentation of some 
case material of a borderline patient, Mr. S,
114
 marked by an inhibition of his mentalizing 
capacity and also by severe abuse suffered at the hands of his father and a severely 
depressive and intermittently suicidal mother.
115
   
                                                          
114
 Mr. S’s referring psychotherapist characterized him as narcissistic, schizoid, and prone to 
intellectualizing affective life. Fonagy notes his “transient psychotic-like episodes” (1991, p. 642). Again, I 
emphasize the complexities of psychic life and the co-existence of schizoid, psychotic, neurotic, and 
normal elements. While Fonagy develops the concept of mentalization through his work with borderline 
patients, he clarifies his own use of the term “borderline” as more descriptive, in distinction to the 
psychiatric diagnosis.  
115
 As becomes increasingly clear to Fonagy through the course of the analysis, this patient’s “experience of 
his mental self as empty, his experience of me [Fonagy] as non-human and his apparent inability to 
conceive of my [Fonagy’s] mental state to a degree that might permit communication could be understood 
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 Fonagy details the defensive aspect of the inhibition of the mentalizing capacity, 
arguing that, at least in the case of borderline functioning,
 116
 the inhibition of 
mentalization is “self-imposed and partial” (1991, p. 651). Even in the context of RF, 
then, the assertion of a psychic emptiness ought never to be taken as a purely descriptive 
manoeuvre; the subjective experience of emptiness does not indicate an absolute 
emptiness, but rather an inhibition of the awareness of aliveness due in part to an 
incomplete (or malformed; perverted) sense of the other in the self and the self in the 
other. Singer offers some clinical vignettes of borderline patients which support this 
argument and from which he similarly concludes: “behind the defensive scotoma or 
erasure, was the unacceptable and painful sensations rather than a structural defect” 
(1977a , p. 465).
117
 The significance of emptiness thus exceeds reflective functioning’s 
definitional reach. While a limited capacity to reflect on one’s own mental state, and on 
thinking and feeling more generally, likely results in an experience of emptiness, the 
agoraphobic’s experience of persistent emptiness is not sufficiently explained by a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
as an inhibition of and defence against conceiving of his own or his objects’ mental functioning” (1991, p. 
647; emphasis added). Again, a limited reflective function is already indicative of a defensive inhibition, 
even as it also indicates some inability to mentalize. 
116
 Connections between Fonagy’s description of his borderline patient and the persistent emptiness Milrod 
describes in her agoraphobia patients are evident. Fonagy writes of his experiences with his Mr. S: “It was 
not just his expressionless voice and matter-of-fact, harsh way of speaking but also the content of his 
utterances that left me with a sense of emptiness which I gradually realized was an echo of something that 
Mr. S experienced” (1991, p. 644; my emphasis). Following a “bad” dream of “a bureau with many 
drawers” which “should be full, yet […] were empty,” Fonagy interprets Mr. S’s “fear of finding only 
emptiness in himself and me [Fonagy]” and his fear that his relationship with Fonagy, experienced as an 
intimacy, “might replace his [the patient’s] emptiness in a way that threatened to make him feel entrapped 
and suffocated” (p. 644; original emphasis). Fonagy describes this movement between the fear of a vast, 
isolating emptiness and the fear of a suffocating intimacy as “claustra-agoraphobic shuttling” (p. 644, n. 1), 
again underscoring the connections between the type of borderline patient/behaviour Fonagy uses to 
exemplify the concept of mentalization and the anxieties of the agoraphobia patients discussed here. 
Fonagy suggests that, given the patient’s inability to mentalize, “analytic self-reflection could only yield to 
him a nameless dread of mental emptiness” (p. 644; my italics). Milrod also notes her patients’ dread of 
their own emptiness, further suggesting that this emptiness is not a pure emptiness, but is rather an 
emptiness replete with affective meaning. Significantly, and perhaps a notable distinction between the 
experiences of borderline and agoraphobic patients, Fonagy’s patient seemed to experience his emptiness as 
“a background against which the rest of the analysis took place” rather than as “a peremptory response to 
anxiety” (p. 644). 
117
 See Kohut (1971) for an example of an argument for the deficiency state of emptiness. Similar to 
Milrod, he argues that an empty state occurs due to the failure to internalize the idealized object at a 
particular stage of development due to experiences of disappointments, frustrations, and absences.    
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deficiency in reflective functioning. Further, while agoraphobia patients exhibit an 
inhibited RF, it is not their assertions of emptiness that tell us so. 
 Here, Green’s (1999) concept of negative hallucination118 may be instructive. 
Referring specifically to work with borderline patients,
119
 Green draws our attention to 
particular moments when the analysand fails to understand the analyst’s words, or fails to 
recognize her own words when the analyst’s reminds her of them: he identifies such 
moments as involving a “psychical agnosia”120 (1999, p. 175), a term that, in my view, 
encompasses the existence of psychical material and the analysand’s inability to access it. 
While this inability may correspond to a weak or underdeveloped RF, there is no 
confusion about an analysand’s assertions of emptiness being taken as fact. 
 Milrod suggests a possible meaning of emptiness in the clinical situation that is 
particular to the agoraphobic: “fears of the unsafe external world reflect and mirror an 
inner fear of the internal world, or of thinking and intense emotions” (2007, p. 1010). The 
implication of Milrod’s argument is that the overt symptoms by which agoraphobia is 
defined conceal the covert aspect of this pathology; external space is anxiously avoided 
as a projection of anxieties about internal (that is, psychical) space, including one’s 
impulses and object relations. The implication of this suggestion supports my argument 
                                                          
118
 Green distinguishes between repression – “employed against the internal processes of drives, affects, 
and representations” – and negative hallucination, effectuated against either internal or external 
perceptions, and cautions against confusing perceptions and representations (1999, p. 194). As I indicated 
in Chapter Two, language is both a representation and a perception (we find it and we create it): “it 
represents the relation between things and the relations of thought relations making it possible for the latter 
to be perceived” (Green 1999, p. 197). Language’s doubled nature as both perception and representation 
leads Green to distinguish “the silence of an absence of speech” and the silence “of the formation of words 
as tools for thinking” (p. 197). This latter silence characterizes negative hallucination and may be linked to 
Bion’s concept of the alpha function, or the absence of the capacity to think thoughts and to make 
experiences (beta elements) meaningful. See also infra note 107. 
119
 Green links negative hallucination to alexithymia and psychosomatosis without much elaboration (1999, 
p. 174); the kernel that connects them is the inability to symbolize, or nominate, unconscious affects and 
thus to have them. 
120
 Freud (1891) introduced the term “agnosia” to describe a neurological disturbance in the recognition of 
objects. Contemporary neuropsychology distinguishes many types of agnosia, which can affect visual, 
tactile, or auditory objects. Despite its symptoms, agnosia is not a disorder of the senses. Rather, for those 
with agnosia, a normal part of their life “has somehow been stripped of its meaning” (Teuber 1968, p. 293). 
See also Heilman and Valenstein (2011). Green’s suggestion of “psychical agnosia” precisely implies the 
individual’s inability to recognize or process words of psychical and emotional significance.  
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that the concept of RF cannot be utilized to explain the agoraphobic’s persistent 
emptiness and, more specifically, that the inhibition of RF is always to some degree 
defensive. That is, emptiness does not only involve the incapacity for self-reflection, but 
indicates a defense against what reflection reveals. The outside world still exists, even if 
the agoraphobic never ventures beyond the threshold of her self-defined safe space; 
likewise, the inner world is never “empty,” though it may remain unexplored.  
 
3.1.ii. Emptiness as Defense  
The patient’s declaration of emptiness in analysis indicates a paradox: while it serves a 
defensive function, it also draws attention to the repression of unbearable or forbidden 
thoughts and feelings. Klein argues that “certain manifestations of very acute anxiety and 
the specific defence mechanisms against this anxiety (particularly an increase in denial 
of psychic reality) indicate that an internal situation predominates at the time” (1940, p. 
365, n. 1; my emphasis). Although Klein is not referring to agoraphobia or emptiness in 
particular, the relevance is clear: emptiness can be seen as a defence mechanism against 
very acute anxiety insofar as it involves “an increase in denial of psychic reality.” The 
very declaration of this emptiness points to the fact of an overwhelming internal situation. 
The expression of emptiness “becomes in this sense the conscious experience of the 
absence of warded-off wishes along with their associated fantasies” (Levy 1984, p. 389; 
my emphasis). Emptiness is related to negation
121
 insofar as “a positive assertion that 
something is not there is required to maintain repression” (Levy 1984, p. 389). Negation 
is “already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is 
repressed” (Freud 1925b, p. 236). The same psychical movement is apparent in 
complaints of emptiness: there is something identified as emptiness, though the affective 
content (or the historical reality) of that something, of the emptiness, remains repressed. 
                                                          
121
 See Chapter Two for my discussion of the intellectual function of negation and its role in the 
development of a sense of self distinct from the world. Insofar as the individual uses negation as a mediator 
between external reality and psychical reality, it relates analogously to assertions of emptiness: that which 
is denied must first be unconsciously understood to exist. This denial must be treated appropriately, as a 
marker of a significant unconscious presence. Negation is a specific, and relatively sophisticated, psychical 
process that may be considered a manifestation of Green’s concept of the negative.  
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As Freud observed, “we never discover a ‘no’ in the unconscious and […] recognition of 
the unconscious on the part of the ego is expressed in a negative formula” (1925b, p. 
239). Therefore, the assertion “I am empty” already indicates the presence of something 
unconscious. Levy emphasizes this critical point regarding experiences of emptiness: 
assertions of emptiness may not always be predominantly defensive, but they are never 
only descriptive; that is, the analysand’s assertions of emptiness cannot be taken as 
accurately and comprehensively describing her inner world, however “empty” she may 
feel. A patient can express the subjective feeling of emptiness, but, as indicated above, 
the subjective feeling of emptiness is the conscious experience of unconscious material: 
the manifestation of latent meaning: “emptiness, despite its conscious assertion of the 
absence of something, portrayed in spacial and bodily terms, always consists of more or 
less specific latent mental content which, when brought to light, helps delineate and 
clarify the mental activity [...] represented by emptiness” (Levy 1984, p. 396; internal 
reference omitted).
122
        
 Emptiness is also related to negation insofar as meaning is established by 
discrimination or exclusion, a necessarily aggressive repudiation. The patient might 
experience an emptiness that indicates an inability to exclude, to aggressively repel 
otherness; emptiness, then, may also be a ‘too much,’ which one can think of as an 
emptiness of ‘self-ness.’ Ellonen-Jéquier (2009) aptly explores the potential fullness of 
asserted emptiness in a psychotic patient. Specifically, the analysis progressed 
significantly when Ellonen-Jéquier interpreted to her patient how much work went into 
her (the patient’s) creation of nothingness or emptiness. Prior to this interpretation, the 
patient had thought she was, in actuality, “deficient in certain [intellectual] areas” (p. 
849). Echoing Levy’s statement of caution, Ellonen-Jéquier emphasizes that the ego is 
doing a significant amount of work in the creation of emptiness. She writes:  
I was able not to fall into the trap of believing that there was a real emptiness or 
that some aspects were actually missing; the danger would have been to think, for 
                                                          
122
 I do not disagree with Levy’s point that assertions of emptiness always refer to unconscious psychical 
content; however, I add that the experience of emptiness is also constitutive of psychical life. Emptiness is 
structurally related to incoherence, which is one aspect of unconscious activity. I explore this connection 
between emptiness, incoherence, and psychical life below and further in Chapter Four. 
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example, that her ego had to be strengthened
123
 – whereas, in fact, her ego was 
already powerful and highly active, although in a particular manner. Believing 
that something was actually deficient would have entailed going along with the 
patient’s defence mechanisms. (p. 864; original emphasis) 
Even if a patient’s subjective experience indicates, for example, a low capacity for 
reflection, it would be a mistake to believe that the patient’s assertion of emptiness is 
indicative of an actual, unconscious absence. Furthermore, as Levy also indicates, the 
temptation and the mistake would be “to view emptiness as the state of things for a 
person, as patients often aggressively insist upon,” which would “deprive the patient of 
the opportunity to ‘fill in’ his awareness of his always active inner life” (1984, p. 396; 
original emphasis). Ellonen-Jéquier also “emphasized her [the patient’s] destructiveness” 
(2009, p. 847), engaging with the patient’s aggressive wishes and phantasies in relation to 
emptiness. The patient’s destructiveness was evident in the manner in which she 
“suppress[ed] all space between meanings” (p. 862) and “was gradually making me [the 
analyst] into almost nothing – I felt paralysed, I had no ideas, no feelings when I was with 
her” (p. 847). Transformation only became possible through the analyst’s interpretation 
of the work that the patient put into the creation of emptiness, or nothingness, in herself 
and in the analytic relationship. The patient was eventually able to express the effect of 
these interpretations: because the analyst “hadn’t tried to fill up any gaps,” the patient 
was able to see “that her feeling of emptiness was the outcome of the work she was doing 
inside herself” (p. 849).     
 Milrod indicates the defensive aspects of her patients’ persistent emptiness, noting 
that Deborah’s “emptiness had a partially defensive quality” (2007, p. 1015) and that 
Rita’s “inability to think” was an “enormous resistance” to their analytic work (p. 1020). 
Despite Milrod’s emphasis on the need to differentiate between emptiness as a defense 
and emptiness as a deficit, it is evident that these two meanings might occur at different 
                                                          
123
 Although Freud refers to strengthening a weakened ego (1940, pp. 180-181), it is clear that the term 
“strength” must refer to the ego’s original function, “to meet the demands raised by its three dependent 
relations – to reality, to the id and to the super-ego – and nevertheless at the same time to preserve its own 
organization and maintain its own autonomy” (1940, p. 172). A “weakened” ego, then, is not the same as a 
deficient ego. The work of analysis, if it can be said to strengthen the ego, must refer to re-organizing the 
ego’s efforts, which are overworked by the demands of the neurosis.    
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times, or simultaneously, in the same patient.
124
 Indeed, Eigen argues that these two 
elements are “profoundly linked” (1993, p. 216).125 The defensive activity of declarations 
of emptiness emerges out of a “destructive hate,” which we can also characterize as rage, 
anger, or the work of the death drive. I draw attention to Eigen in order to again 
emphasize the insufficiency of the ‘deficit theory’ of emptiness and in order to highlight 
the importance of unconscious affects in the clinical assertion of emptiness, specifically 
rage. Milrod highlights her patients’ unconscious rage, noting Deborah’s “rage at her 
mother’s controlling anxiety and chronic depression” and her “unconscious death wishes 
toward her mother” (2007, p. 1012); Milrod suggests that Deborah’s anxiety is in fact 
“fuelled by her rage at her mother” (p. 1013). Rita’s analysis focused at times on “her 
overwhelming rage at her parents” (p. 1018) and, “after years,” Rita “had a growing 
understanding that her excessive anxiety about being apart from her parents was 
connected to her long-standing unconscious murderous rage at them” (p. 1019). 
Similarly, Singer indicates that the conscious experience of emptiness may occur “over 
fear of one’s murderous, rageful impulses […], so that rather than feel full of evil and 
power, one feels weak, useless and empty” (1977a, p. 463). Ironically, fear of one’s own 
hostility leads to the destruction, via defense, of one’s powerful (and useful) 
aggressiveness. As a corollary, the pleasure, or gratification, patients’ exhibit in their own 
emptiness, particularly within the analytic context where emptiness becomes resistance to 
the analytic work, further indicates the work of the death drive. LaFarge (1989),
126
 Levy 
(1984),
127
 and Ellonen-Jéquier (2009)
128
 highlight the gratifying aspect of emptiness, 
further supporting my argument that assertions of emptiness can neither be taken at face 
                                                          
124
 See, for example, Glucksman (2000). 
125
 Eigen (1993) provides a brief discussion of a vignette Bion offers of a psychotic patient. He comments 
on the impossibility of knowing whether the patient’s “lack of discipline, his inability or refusal to conform 
to the rules of discourse” stems from “destructive hate” or a “deficiency.” This impossibility, he argues, 
“suggests how profoundly linked these two elements are” (p. 216).   
126
 LaFarge suggests that the defensive function of emptiness is, in particular, a defense against “aggressive 
object relations,” noting the “interplay of such empty states with aggressive fantasies” (1989, p. 986). She 
emphasizes “the highly deviant aspects of these states” (p. 994). 
127
 Levy cautions analysts against the temptation of “joining the empty patient” in the maintenance of 
“ultimately pathological gratifications” (1984, p. 403; my emphasis).   
128
 “In the analysis of psychotic patients, I have always noted the hidden pleasure they take in the emptiness 
that they create – forcing the other person to go looking for them – a pleasure that is mixed with feelings of 
revenge and persecution” (Ellonen-Jéquier 2009, p. 859). 
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value, that is, as indicating an actual emptiness, nor explained as a “developmental 
deficit.”  
 LaFarge (1989) argues that the experience of emptiness is, in fact, a 
developmental achievement. Following Isaacs, to whom I allude in the epigraph at the 
beginning of this chapter, LaFarge writes: “empty states are not a normal experience of 
early childhood. The young child does not see absence or darkness as empty, but fills the 
empty space with negative feelings and fears” (1989, p. 992). In Isaacs’s words, “the 
absence of satisfaction is felt as a positive evil. Loss, dissatisfaction or deprivation are 
felt in sensation to be positive, painful experiences” (1948, p. 88). LaFarge also 
highlights Winnicott’s (1974) idea of the fear of breakdown129 and emphasizes that “the 
child’s ability to maintain the idea of an absence, without filling the empty space, [is] a 
developmental accomplishment” (1989, p. 992). That is to say, the developmental deficit 
would be an inability to experience emptiness. These are two different but related points: 
the subjective experience of emptiness is not a naturally occurring state, but must be 
learned. Emptiness may be used as a defence or it may be experienced as a potentiality to 
new experiences; in either case, it is a complex state, indicating a relatively high degree 
of psychical development. Assertions of emptiness in the analytic space are thus 
distinguished from the experience of emptiness. 
 We might better understand the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness if we think not 
of her emptiness as being revealed, but of the affective content of her psychic reality 
being emptied. She ‘empties’ herself of anxiety, but is then unable to experience much 
feeling at all. LaFarge describes this phenomenon of emptying in severely ill borderline 
patients and notes that her patient’s “emergence from her ‘empty’ state was accompanied 
by anxiety” (1989, p. 983). The exchange, so to speak, between emptiness and anxiety is 
also evident in Ellonen-Jéquier’s patient, for whom the discovery of “all kinds of aspects 
of life” were met with “tremendous happiness, of course, but also a great deal of anxiety” 
(2009, p. 851).  While this patient seems to have been able to fill her emptiness with more 
feelings and the capacity to bear more of the happiness and sadness that life brings, 
                                                          
129
 I explore Winnicott’s idea of the fear of breakdown and primitive anxieties in Chapter Two on the 
development of the ego. I connect this idea to the concept of Nachträglichkeit and the use of language in 
the psychoanalytic situation in Chapter Four. 
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Milrod’s (2007) patients seem to have exchanged their intense anxiety for a life emptied 
of emotional experiences.
130
 At the same time, there are many hints in Milrod’s 
descriptions of both Deborah and Rita that suggest an on-going intense anxiety. Deborah, 
Milrod reports, “became anxious about the expectation of thinking and talking about her 
thoughts and feelings in therapy” (2007, p. 1014). While Milrod suggests that Deborah’s 
emotional life was now “free of anxiety” (p. 1015), she goes on to describe Deborah’s 
“underlying terror of depression and her deep terror of being unable to be different, or to 
be separate from her mother” (p. 1016). After years of psychoanalysis, Rita was able to 
move out of her parents’ house with her husband and have a child with him; however, 
despite saying that she “loved her daughter,” Rita “found it difficult to spend much time 
with her” and found her daughter’s expressions of emotional needs “’somewhat 
sickening’” (p. 1020). Rita continued to experience a “terror of asserting herself at all” (p. 
1018). Both Rita and Deborah “remained unable to tolerate intimacy, intense emotions, or 
very much thinking” (p. 1021). Despite the remission of their agoraphobic anxiety, it is 
evident that both Rita’s and Deborah’s emotional lives are greatly coloured by a profound 
anxiety concerning the limits of their selves, the limits of their emotional effects, and the 
limits of their rage. 
 The subjective experience of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients beyond 
the remittance of their overt symptoms shares some qualities of the experience of 
emptiness in psychotic, narcissistic, schizoid, and borderline patients discussed by other 
analysts’ case reports. This subjective experience of emptiness is primarily defensive, and 
arguments that it indicates a developmental deficit are unconvincing; rather, assertions of 
conscious emptiness are a form of negation that specifically indicate the intensity of an 
unconscious emotional experience. Although for some patients the feeling of emptiness 
itself causes a profound anxiety, for others the emergence from an empty state increases 
the level of anxiety. Analyses of the subjective experience of emptiness in patients 
                                                          
130
 Singer suggests, however, that in borderline patients, an increased sense of emptiness is associated with 
increased anxiety, connected to the quality of their emptiness that includes the dissolution of the self. The 
affective experiences associated with persecutory internal objects is preferable to their absence, which is 
experienced as a loss of the self (not a part of the self that can be mourned, but a loss of the self’s essence, 
so to speak) (1977b, p. 476). The loss of self is accompanied by an increase in anxiety, hence the great 
potential for suicide that Singer identifies. 
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suffering from a range of disorders include an emphasis on the patients’ unconscious rage 
and aggressivity, particularly towards (ambivalently) loved objects. Although one of the 
primary affects emptiness defends against is murderous rage, or any aggressive impulse, 
grief is another affect that requires particular attention but is infrequently recognized in 
the literature. As I discuss below, the relationship between emptiness and melancholia 
suggests that, for Milrod’s patients at least,131 the loss of agoraphobic anxieties results in 
feelings of emptiness when traumatic losses are not mourned. One of these losses 
particular to agoraphobia patients is the unconscious tie to the phobic companion. In the 
next section, I explore the relationship between loss and anxiety, and experiences of 
emptiness in agoraphobia patients for whom significant losses have not yet been 
mourned.      
 
3.1.iii. Melancholia: Emptiness and Anxiety 
The connection between experiences of emptiness and melancholia is especially relevant 
in agoraphobia patients. A contemporary respondent to Westphal’s early article on 
agoraphobia draws this connection: “the case seems essentially a form of mental 
depression in certain faculties […] closely allied to what is called simple melancholia” 
(White 1884, p. 1141).
132
 In a letter to Fleiss, Freud mentions briefly: “Melancholia 
appears in typical combination with severe anxiety” (1985/1895, p. 98). Freud also adds a 
short addendum to Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) in an attempt to ask some 
of the very difficult questions surrounding psychological responses to loss. Namely, he 
asks: “when does separation from an object produce anxiety, when does it produce 
mourning and when does it produce, it may be, only pain?” (p. 169). Although Freud 
suggests that the answers to this question continue to elude him, he offers one point that 
may be of help to us here: “When there is physical pain, a high degree of what may be 
termed narcissistic cathexis of the painful place occurs. This cathexis continues to 
                                                          
131
 Milrod indicates that the case studies she provides are more typical than exceptional in her many years 
of experience (2007, p. 1022). Bodin (1996) provides another discussion of a patient with “claustra 
agoraphobia” who uses coherence and “the silencing method” (1996, p. 181) as defenses against 
overwhelming affect (connected to discordant ideas). See infra note 111. 
132
 I discussed the history of the concept of agoraphobia in detail in Chapter One.   
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increase and tends, as it were, to empty the ego” (p. 171; my emphasis). An unbearable 
level of pain – whether physical or psychical, I contend – is accompanied by a kind of 
emptiness, a protective emptying of the ego, though what exactly the meaning of that 
emptiness is Freud never says.
133
 In her influential article on agoraphobia, Deutsch also 
indicates some relationship between the two pathological states: “The process [of 
phobias] reminds us of melancholia. There the object is introjected and its fate – the 
threat of death and the reaction of anxiety in the imperilled ego – is through the 
destructive instinct inflicted on the subject’s own ego” (1929, p. 68).134   
Despite these early, though brief, acknowledgements of the relevance of 
melancholia in understanding agoraphobia (and necessarily vice versa), the relationship 
between agoraphobia and melancholia has not, as of yet, been developed in the 
psychoanalytic literature.
135
 As Rudden et al. (2003) indicate, major depression is often 
comorbid with panic disorder. This comorbidity assumes, or follows from, a psychiatric 
diagnostic mode. The literature on both depression and panic disorder focuses on 
unconscious conflicts, particularly on guilt over aggression (which, in depression, is 
turned against the self). The need for mourning traumatic losses in patients with 
depression is not commonly discussed. Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) draws attention to the 
connections between attachment and separation, anxiety, and loss. The second volume in 
Bowlby’s trilogy focuses on anxiety and the third on depression, indicating – as Bowlby 
                                                          
133
 We also note that grief is a complicated process: more than the sadness resulting from a loss, grief 
includes suffering the loss and, as Klein (1940) writes, doing the painful work of rebuilding the internal 
world bereft of the lost object. Klein, in fact, offers this solution to Freud’s question as to why mourning is 
so painful: “[t]he pain experienced in the slow process of testing reality in the work of mourning thus seems 
to be partly due to the necessity, not only to renew the links to the external world and thus continuously to 
re-experience the loss, but at the same time and by means of this to rebuild with anguish the inner world, 
which is felt to be in danger of deteriorating and collapsing” (1940, p. 354). Although Freud seemed not to 
understand why mourning is so painful, the fact that it is indeed very painful work cannot be overstated. In 
melancholia, the bereft individual attempts to avoid suffering the loss which she has endured. Of course, in 
order to avoid suffering a loss, we must never have had it (the lost object) in the first place: an ultimately 
untenable paradox that the melancholic attempts to inhabit. 
134
 I will not go into detail here about the process Deutsch describes, as I have done so in Chapter One. My 
point here is to emphasize the connection between the development of phobias (including agoraphobia, 
which is the main subject of Deutsch’s article) and melancholia. 
135
 One exception to this absence in the literature is Bion, who describes the impairment of mourning and, 
consequently, symbolization, in claustrophobia (and agoraphobia), which he considers to be a result of an 
intolerance of frustration (1962a, 1965). See Willoughby (2001) for a Bionian analysis of claustrophobia. 
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and others theorize elsewhere – the assumed progression of separation: from protest, to 
yearning and searching (anxiety), and, finally, to detachment (melancholia). The more 
complex relationship between anxiety and mourning (beyond melancholia or depression) 
is not developed,
136
 although Rey briefly notes of schizoid patients exhibiting claustro-
agoraphobia: “What was extremely useful to the patients was [...] a developing capacity 
to think and experience mourning and reparation” (1994, p. 85). In the psychiatric 
literature, the connection between anxiety and depression is more elaborated, insofar as 
low dosages of some antidepressants offer relief to many patients who suffer from panic 
attacks.
137
 However, the question of why anxiety may be relieved for some individuals 
with antidepressants is not addressed.
138
   
In this subsection, I consider the connections between the agoraphobic’s persistent 
emptiness and melancholia. I argue that the agoraphobic, having finally escaped, so to 
speak, the maddening cycle of anxiety and avoidance, situates herself in a new cycle of 
avoiding grief and mourning (and the specific anxiety that mourning includes) by 
immersing herself in emptiness, or, in other words, by emptying herself of as much 
emotional content as possible. Above, I argued that assertions of emptiness in the analytic 
situation are not to be taken literally; that is, that the subjective feeling of emptiness is the 
conscious experience of an unconscious something. The nature of that something 
necessarily varies from patient to patient, and from moment to moment. I also argued, in 
agreement with Milrod, that one of the affects likely to be repressed and hidden behind an 
                                                          
136
 There are two articles in the psychoanalytic literature on the relationship between claustrophobia and 
depression. Gehl notes: “In frequent, rather dramatic episodes in treatment, interpretations have succeeded 
in greatly lessening the phobic anxiety only to find a melancholic state replacing it. At other times a state of 
depression has been relieved, only to find a claustrophobia making its appearance” (1964, p. 312). Asch 
argues that both claustrophobia and depression are specific reactions to the threatened loss of an object; he 
suggests that “the clinical picture of claustrophobia appears in place of depression when there is threatened 
object loss in an ego that has developed a propensity for displacement and avoidance” (1966, p. 728). I 
argue that melancholia (that is, depression, or defences against mourning) is particularly strong in the 
agoraphobic patient precisely because of this “propensity for […] avoidance.”  
137
 See, for example, Mitte (2005). 
138
 For examples within the psychiatric literature on the co-morbidity of panic disorder and depression, or 
agoraphobia and depression, see Breier et al. (1984), Kessler et al. (1998), Marchand et al. (1994), 
Starcevic et al. (1992), and Westenberg (1998). Rudden et al. (1996) provide an overview of this literature, 
concluding similarly that the psychological meanings of this comorbidity are largely unexplored in the 
psychiatric literature. 
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emptiness is the patient’s aggressivity and murderous rage. Here, I argue that another 
affect likely to be replaced by an emptiness particularly relevant to agoraphobia patients 
is loss, either the real loss of a loved object or the loss of the fantasies upon which the 
agoraphobic anxieties were maintained; perhaps, of course, both of these kinds of losses 
are present in any particular patient. 
Before moving on to an examination of melancholia in agoraphobia patients, I 
bring our attention to some more terminological complications. Steiner offers an 
important note about the psychological terminology for the various processes involved in 
mourning:  
It is confusing that the word depression has been applied both to the state that 
accompanies mourning and to that which results from the defences mounted 
against mourning. The path that leads towards facing the loss, and mourning it, is 
 associated with painful depressive feelings, involving guilt, regret, remorse, and a 
wish to make reparation. These feelings were thought by Klein [1952] to represent 
the depressive position and are very different from those observed in depressive 
illness. Although mixed states are common, severe depressive illness or 
melancholia results from defences against loss and hence against all those feelings 
associated with the depressive position. The clinically depressed patient is likely 
to suffer anxiety and persecution, to harbour grievance, and to deploy manic and 
obsessional defences that aid in denying the reality of the loss. (2011, p. 151)   
Clinical depression is caused, not by loss itself, but by the avoidance of grief in the face 
of loss. As Steiner notes, “mixed states are common”; indeed, during a state of acute 
mourning there will almost necessarily be moments of pathological depression 
(melancholia). In the psychiatric mode, these moments are not diagnosed as depression 
because the duration of the state is an integral aspect of the definition. However, we 
expect that those individuals doing the work of mourning will occasionally vacillate 
between mourning and melancholia, that is, between mourning and defending against 
mourning.   
 Freud offers the following symptomatological description of melancholia: it 
includes “a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of 
the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding 
feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and 
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culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment” (1917, p. 244; my emphasis). We 
quickly note the similar experiences of emptiness in agoraphobia patients whose overt 
symptoms have remitted. To reiterate what I have described above in more detail, 
Milrod’s (2007) patients demonstrate an inability to tolerate intimacy and seem to reject 
their own loving aspects.
139
   
In more detail, we recall those differences Freud notes between the normal 
process of mourning and its pathological counterpart, melancholia: 
Where the exciting causes are different one can recognize that there is a loss of a 
more ideal kind. The object has not perhaps actually died, but has been lost as an 
object of love […] [M]elancholia is in some way related to an object-loss which is 
withdrawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to mourning, in which there is 
nothing about the loss that is unconscious.
140
 (1917, p. 245) 
The unconscious aspect of the loss is particularly relevant in agoraphobia, where it 
frequently appears that the object lost, or one of the lost objects, is the tie between the 
patient and the phobic companion. Frances and Dunn describe the nature of this tie in 
detail, indicating three distinct levels: “the psychotic symbiotic, the narcissistic, and the 
differentiated dependent” (1975, p. 438). The first level, the psychotic symbiotic, implies 
a complete lack of self-object differentiation. The second type exists on a higher level of 
differentiation and includes an “intense narcissistic investment in the other” (p. 438) 
resulting in a degree of impaired self-object differentiation and self-object constancy. As 
long as the object (i.e., the phobic companion
141
) is present, a stable self constancy is 
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 Green writes on the negative in the case of melancholia: “it seems to know nothing about the way it has 
negativised itself in order to replace the lost object, losing its capacity for recognition and awareness, 
sacrificing the love it has for itself and the pleasure which it can draw from its own image” (1999, p. 54).  
140
 I disagree on a small point with Freud’s description of mourning: I suggest that even if the actual loss is 
consciously recognized, there will always be aspects of that loss that are unconscious. I do not know that 
we can ever be fully conscious of the losses we have suffered. As Klein writes, the “poignancy of the actual 
loss of a loved person is, in my view, greatly increased by the mourner’s unconscious phantasies of having 
lost his internal ‘good’ objects as well” (1940, p. 353). That is, the unconscious phantasies (“phantasies” 
instead of fantasies already implies their unconscious nature) concern the loved, internalized object even if 
the reality of the loss of the loved person is entirely conscious. 
141
 It is important to note that, when the phobic companion is another person (as opposed to a phobic object 
like those described in the Introduction: a cane, a pet, a house, etc.), the tie implies a mutual dependency, 
though the dependency may be more unconscious in the partner not exhibiting traditional agoraphobic 
symptoms. 
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possible. The third type predominates when there is a high level of dependency, but clear 
self-object separateness is maintained. Agoraphobia can be present on any of these three 
levels of differentiation, but for those patients with either the psychotic symbiotic or 
narcissistic tie to the phobic companion, “the real or symbolic loss of the phobic partner 
is experienced as a loss of part of the self – a threat to self constancy” (p. 438). This 
“threat to self constancy” is described clearly in the accounts of borderline and psychotic 
patients exhibiting agora-claustrophobic anxieties indicated above, but is also hinted at in 
Milrod’s patients (2007, pp. 1014, 1019).  
 The agoraphobia patient’s fantasies surrounding the phobic companion – for 
example, his or her ability to keep the patient safe – must be confronted with the reality 
of the phobic companion’s helplessness, as well as the patient’s own helplessness, in 
order for the symptoms of anxiety and avoidance to be addressed. The loss of this 
fantasy, a fantasy which was experienced as part of the self, leads to a melancholic 
feeling of emptiness. Levy makes a similar point: “confusion secondary to difficulties in 
the separation-individuation process may contribute to the experience of the self as 
empty” (1984, p. 392). It seems likely that the agoraphobic’s difficulties in the process of 
individuation lead to a particular experience of melancholia subsequent to the loss of the 
psychic connection to the phobic companion following remission of overt symptoms 
which served to maintain the fantasy of symbiosis. Milrod indicates this ongoing 
difficulty with her patient, Rita: “Likely her desperate need to define herself in keeping 
with and as being linked to one of her parents had been substituted in part by her 
relationship with me” (2007, p. 1020). Despite the remission of Rita’s overt agoraphobic 
symptoms, she has not been able to relieve herself of the need for a symbiotic tie with 
another. A similar development occurred between Milrod and her patient, Deborah, who 
“began to feel as though she and I [Milrod] were fused” (p. 1014). Again, this 
development became more salient in the analysis after the remission of Deborah’s overt 
agoraphobia symptoms.      
 Returning to Freud, we find a further distinction between mourning and 
melancholia: the melancholic suffers “an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard” 
(1917, p. 246). Freud’s astute explanation involves the ambivalence towards a love 
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object, an ambivalence with which we are now familiar: “the self-reproaches are 
reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient’s 
own ego” (p. 248). In melancholia, “countless separate struggles are carried on over the 
object, in which hate and love contend with each other; the one seeks to detach the libido 
from the object, the other to maintain this position of the libido against assault” (p. 256). 
The agoraphobic is unable to feel anything but emptiness because of the refusal to mourn 
the reality of her losses, a process which includes learning to tolerate her ambivalent 
feelings toward her phobic companion. Because the agoraphobic is unable to fully and 
functionally differentiate between self and other, the loss of the other cannot be mourned; 
thus, the ego remains bereft.   
 Milrod hints at the relevance of loss and mourning. For instance, she writes: “The 
loss of a phobic companion is experienced as the catastrophic loss of a part of the 
object/self symbiotic union” (2007, p. 1011). However, Milrod does not suggest a 
connection between the inner constriction her patients experience and the need to mourn 
this “catastrophic loss.” The complexities of mourning are overlooked, evident in the 
very brief mention of “a later focus” in the analysis with Milrod’s patient, Deborah, 
which “involved her deeply and secretly mourning the sudden death of a cherished older 
cousin, Marcy, who was killed in a car crash two months before the onset of Deborah’s 
somatic symptoms and agoraphobia at the age of thirteen” (p. 1012). I question the nature 
of Deborah’s “mourning” insofar as it seems more likely that this loss, rendered secret, 
was never truly mourned at all, rather than “deeply” mourned, as Milrod suggests. Instead 
of exploring this sudden death as another, earlier “catastrophic loss,” Milrod connects the 
death of this cousin to Deborah’s “unconscious death wishes toward her mother” (p. 
1012). I am not suggesting that Milrod is mistaken in this interpretation; rather, I am 
suggesting that there is potentially also an issue of unresolved mourning – that is, 
melancholia – in Deborah’s ongoing and persistent feelings of emptiness and that 
Deborah’s “unconscious death wishes” contribute to this unresolved mourning.142   
                                                          
142
 Dunn, in his commentary on Milrod (2007), offers a pertinent description of a sequence from one of his 
own patients, Charlotte, a nineteen-year-old woman who suffered from agoraphobia and, in particular, a 
travel phobia: when she was seven, Charlotte’s “best friend Annie was run over by a truck,” an “incident” 
which Charlotte “quickly forgot” (2007, p. 1030). Dunn’s description of the sessions focusing on this loss, 
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 Gassner (2004) suggests that the role of conflict over impulse expression and 
unconscious fantasy is over-emphasized in clinical reports of patients with panic disorder 
and/or agoraphobia, insofar as this emphasis has led to the neglect of the impact of 
development trauma. Gassner indicates examples of parental illness or death, parental 
substance abuse, and physical, sexual, or emotional child abuse (pp. 223-224). I add to 
these examples, as evidenced in Milrod’s and Dunn’s case reports, the early traumatic 
loss of a childhood friend.
143
 As Gassner indicates, the trauma of loss is compounded 
when a parental figure is unavailable to help the patient grieve or, further, prevents 
mourning by denying the severity of the loss:  
A significant aspect of the childhood trauma is that the parent(s) are unavailable 
to offer their child sustained, emotionally attuned, and reality-oriented help, the 
kind of responsiveness that would facilitate their child’s capacity to process and 
master the intense emotions and associated disturbing convictions that these real-
life ordeals inevitably generate. (p. 223) 
The combination, then, of developmental trauma and the absence of a supportive parental 
figure for the mourning process contribute to the traumatic effects of a childhood event. 
Both of these elements are evident in Milrod’s and Dunn’s patients. 
 Milrod describes other melancholic features of her patients’ emotional lives. 
These features evidently contribute to Deborah’s ongoing emptiness in particular. Milrod 
quotes Deborah: “My whole life has been about these symptoms that are just…gone. 
There’s nothing there, and it makes me upset. It’s not worse than the panic, but it’s a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and the accompanying injunction from Charlotte’s mother against mourning, draws out the relevance of 
melancholic factors in agoraphobia. Dunn interprets that “Charlotte must have sensed that her mother 
wanted Charlotte not to think about the accident or to have any feelings about it,” an impossible wish given 
that Charlotte, who in fact witnessed the accident, “must have been filled with frightful images” (p. 1030). 
Dunn provides this segment to support his (and Milrod’s) hypothesis that “certain patterns of pathological 
parenting play a role in the genesis of agoraphobia” (p. 1032). Again, I do not disagree with his assessment. 
However, he fails to emphasize the relation between melancholia (the refusal to mourn – based partly, 
perhaps, on an injunction against mourning) and his patient’s feeling “bored and empty” (p. 1030). 
143
 See also Bonomi (2003), Boulanger (2005), Brown (2005), Tarantelli (2003), and Torsti (2000), all of 
whom “emphasize that traumatized patients have generally impaired symbolizing capacities or that they 
defensively avoid symbolization [...]. That is, not only do they have trouble remembering their trauma, 
experiencing it, and integrating its meaning in their lives, but their very capacity to remember, to 
experience, and to integrate is impaired or its use defensively avoided” (Rosegrant 2010, p. 503). 
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weird feeling” (2007, p. 1014). Milrod interprets that “giving up her [Deborah’s] anxiety 
symptoms seemed to represent a loss to her, and also a sad separation from her mother” 
(p. 1014), but there is no indication that this loss has been worked through. Indeed, 
Milrod’s choice of words, that the absence of Deborah’s anxiety symptoms “seemed to 
represent a loss,” implicitly denies or devalues the reality of this loss. Instead, the loss of 
her mother-fusion was substituted with an analyst-fusion (p. 1014). There is a tension 
between Deborah’s experience of “nothing there” and the feelings that accompany that 
“nothing.” That is, there cannot be an absolute nothingness if there is also a “weird 
feeling.” There is an absence, surely, a something missing that had always been there 
previously, but there is not literally “nothing.” As indicated above, the expression of a 
nothingness is the conscious manifestation of an unconscious something, even if it is not 
apparent what that unconscious something signifies.     
 Problematically, Milrod suggests that, with her agoraphobic symptoms in 
remission, Deborah’s emotional life was “now free of anxiety” (2007, p. 1015). However, 
Milrod then writes that “psychotherapeutic focus on her boredom144 and superficiality 
consistently invoked both her underlying terror of depression and her deep terror of 
being unable to be different, or to be separate from her mother” (p. 1016; my emphases). 
I do not know if Milrod is implicitly suggesting a distinction between anxiety and terror, 
but it seems as though Deborah has repressed her anxiety in order to function and that she 
has not sufficiently worked through the repressed material at the root of her anxiety. Her 
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 Phillips considers the experience of boredom and emptiness in childhood development: “In the muffled, 
sometimes irritable confusion of boredom the child is reaching to a recurrent sense of emptiness out of 
which his real desire can crystallize. But to begin with, of course, the child needs the adult to hold, and to 
hold to, the experience – that is, to recognize it as such, rather than to sabotage it by distraction” (1993, p. 
69). According to the clinical reports of Fenichel (1934/1953) and Greenson (1953), emptiness and 
boredom are often encountered together. Milrod also indicates the co-occurrence of emptiness and boredom 
in her two clinical case studies (2007, pp. 1014, 1016, 1017, 1020). Writing on boredom, Fenichel and 
Greenson both emphasize its defensive function, particularly the defense against unacceptable instinctual 
wishes. Boredom may be a “screen for rage” (Phillips 1993, p. 76), as Milrod implies is the case in her 
patients, and also may indicate the repression of traumatic events. Greenson indicates of his patient: “It 
quickly became clear that in the bored state the affects connected to the traumatic events were repressed” 
(1953, p. 10). Weiss notes: “A sense of boredom and impatience often precedes a patient’s first anxiety-
attack” (1935, p. 69).  
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“terror of depression” is particularly striking, given that the description of her ongoing 
emptiness depicts a melancholic state. The recognition that mourning is called for would 
perhaps relieve some of her terror of depression as well as some of her depressive 
symptoms. 
 
3.2. Emptiness and Agoraphobic Anxieties in Mourning 
No one ever told me that grief felt so like fear. I am not afraid but the sensation is like 
being afraid. The same fluttering in the stomach, the same restlessness, the yawning. I 
keep on swallowing. 
 (Lewis 1961, p. 1) 
Emptiness in patients for whom overt symptoms of agoraphobia have remitted may 
potentially indicate the presence of losses which have not yet been sufficiently mourned. 
At the same time, agoraphobic anxieties may also appear during the process of so-called 
normal mourning. Klein identifies this phenomenon quite clearly, stating that “[i]n 
normal mourning early psychotic anxieties are reactivated” (1940, p. 354). However, 
there are very few examples in the psychoanalytic literature of agoraphobic anxieties 
during the process of mourning. Klein provides one of the very few descriptions of this 
process, clearly articulating the emergence of agoraphobic anxieties (although she does 
not identify them specifically as such). “Mrs A” is mourning the sudden death of her 
young son:  
After a few weeks of mourning, for instance, Mrs A went for a walk with a friend 
 through the familiar streets, in an attempt to re-establish old bonds. She suddenly 
realized that the number of people in the street seemed overwhelming, the houses 
strange and the sunshine artificial and unreal. She had to retreat to a quiet 
restaurant. But there she felt as if the ceiling were coming down, and the people in 
the place became vague and blurred. Her own house suddenly seemed the only 
secure place in the world. (p. 361; my emphasis) 
Klein provides one explanation for the sudden onset of agoraphobic anxieties during a 
period of mourning, suggesting that the “frightening indifference of these people was 
reflected from her internal objects, who in her mind had turned into a multitude of ‘bad’ 
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persecuting objects” (p. 361). That is, because the ‘good’ internal objects had not yet 
been firmly re-established, persecutory anxiety predominated. As we know, the absence 
of love is felt as hate; the indifference of the crowds, ignorant of her loss and her 
vulnerable state, were experienced as hateful and destructive. Klein continues: “The 
external world was felt to be artificial and unreal, because real trust in inner goodness had 
temporarily gone” (p. 361). The relationship between internal reality and external reality 
is the key consideration in the evaluation of these anxieties: the “chaos” of the internal 
world results in a hostile and frightening external world. In my words, following the 
arguments of the previous chapters, the limits of the self and of the other have suddenly 
become unstable.
145
 Whether the threat comes from inside oneself or from the 
surrounding people is unclear to the mourner; it is, rather, the collision of the two that is 
so frightening. Hence, the solitary safety of one’s own home is sought. 
 Mrs A provides a counter-example of mourning to the melancholic responses of 
Milrod’s and Dunn’s patients. Klein describes the complicated and painful mourning 
process Mrs A both endures and must actively participate in, as the loss of the loved 
person is accompanied by the loss of the protective function of the ‘good’ internal 
objects; ‘bad’ (persecutory, punishing, annihilating) objects predominate for a time. As 
the reality of the loss becomes internalized, ‘good’ objects can be re-established and 
‘bad’ objects become less powerful. In Klein’s words:  
Mrs A, who at an earlier stage of her mourning had to some extent felt that her 
loss was inflicted on her by revengeful parents, could now in phantasy experience 
the sympathy of these parents (dead long since), their desire to support and to help 
her. She felt that they also suffered a severe loss and shared her grief, as they 
would have done had they lived. In her internal world harshness and suspicion had 
diminished, and sorrow had increased. (1940, p. 359)     
Milrod’s and Dunn’s agoraphobia patients do not have the internal good parents with 
whom to share their grief. Even if it is true in reality that the parents suffered a great loss, 
they were not able to share their grief and therefore share their sympathy. These historical 
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 See also Davidson (2001, p. 294): “In the face of bereavement, for example, one feels utterly impotent. 
The profound experience of loss can seem to alter the shape of one’s family relations and life-world, 
forcing the subject to negotiate new spaces, or gaps in their lives where, previously, there were none.” 
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facts impede the patients’ own mourning processes, leading to severe melancholia and 
feelings of emptiness. The emptiness refers not only to the lost loved persons, but also to 
the absence of the good internal objects with whom they could share their sorrow and by 
whom they could be comforted. Reiterating Fonagy’s arguments about the development 
of the mentalizing capacity, we see that “disavowal should not be confused with absence, 
it is tantamount to an inhibition, which is permitted by the incomplete development of the 
capacity in the first place” (1991, p. 651). I emphasize this important point: the 
incomplete internalization of ‘good’ objects leads to the inhibition of mourning insofar as 
mourning the loss of the loved person would also necessitate mourning the absence of the 
‘good,’ sympathetic objects with whom one could share his or her grief. In the examples 
of Milrod’s and Dunn’s patients, mourning would require recognizing both the severity 
and painful nature of the traumatic childhood losses, and also mourning the painful 
absence of parents with whom the burden of those losses could be shared.
146
 I emphasize 
that this ‘painful absence’ is a presence; that is, it is the presence of a painful absence. 
Assertions of emptiness signify the very presence of this painful absence.   
 The transference relationship between Milrod and her patients helps to alleviate 
some overt agoraphobic symptoms, but also perpetuates the deeper elements of the 
disorder by acting as a substitute for the parental relationship.
147
 Milrod theorizes that 
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 I detail the theoretical relevance of loss and mourning in the process of ego development in Chapter 
Two, especially pp. 43-44. 
147
 The dependence on the analyst is another consonant element between Fonagy’s description of borderline 
functioning and Milrod’s description of her agoraphobic patients. As Fonagy writes, “the desperate 
dependence borderline patients manifest in the transference [...] may well concern their difficulty in 
maintaining analytic understanding as a functioning mental entity” (1991, p. 651; internal reference 
omitted). Milrod’s patients are unable to keep her alive in their minds outside of the analytic sessions; or 
rather, the analytic process is only alive in the moment and disappears from mental reach as soon as it is 
over (2007, p. 1019). This dependence, Fonagy argues, relates to the analysand’s use of the analyst’s 
mentalizing capacity, the relinquishing of which “inevitably bring[s] with it a fear of disintegration” insofar 
as the analysand is unable to maintain a representation of his or her own “coherent and mature identity” 
(1991, p. 652). Fonagy reports that Mr. S’s “sense of emptiness” referred to his inability to “conceive of 
himself as a person with various feelings and thoughts in the past and present” (p. 645). His various rages at 
Fonagy expressed an inability to tolerate the experience of his analyst thinking about him, since he was 
unable to think about himself and therefore to conceive of himself as a person about whom one could think; 
rather, he had to “conceive of his life as something which cannot be thought or felt about” (p. 645). Fonagy 
connects this emptiness to Mr. S’s early traumas, which “must have included a profound identification with 
the thoughtless state of the original abusers [his father and mother]” (p. 645). As a protective function, the 
inhibition of his mentalizing capacity was threatened by the developing analytic relationship, which incited 
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agoraphobia patients are unable “to function psychically for themselves without an 
external ego to guide them” (2007, p. 1023), and appears to put herself, as analyst, in the 
position of the guiding external ego. Although she argues that it is the patients who 
“unconsciously turn their psychoanalyst into the object they require in order to feel secure 
and complete” (p. 1023), she offers no indication that the analyst might be 
problematically complicit in becoming their patients’ required object. The problem, as 
Lacan articulates it, is clear: “If the intersubjective relationship in analysis is, indeed, 
conceptualized as that of a dyad of individuals, it can only be based on the unity of a 
perpetuated vital dependency” (1955/2006j, p. 288). That is, interpretations emphasizing 
the transference relationship, especially when formulated with the basic assumption that 
the analyst must be the agoraphobic’s guiding external ego (as Milrod implies), indicate 
and perpetuate the analyst’s dependency on the analysand as much as vice versa. Both 
Fonagy (1991) and Steiner (1993) note their patients’ painful experience of an increasing 
awareness of the analyst’s independence. This experience is one which Deborah and Rita 
have refused, leading to the denial of their own independence as well, further restricting 
the process of separation-individuation. 
 Klein provides a vital distinction between kinds of dependence that clarifies the 
unconscious significance of the agoraphobic’s dependence on her analyst, and its relation 
to mourning:   
The pining for the lost loved object also implies dependence on it, but dependence 
of a kind which becomes an incentive to reparation and preservation of the object.  
It is creative because it is dominated by love, while the dependence based on 
persecution and hatred is sterile and destructive. (1940, p. 360)   
The agoraphobia patient, particularly one no longer suffering from the overt symptoms of 
anxiety and avoidance, has learned that she is pathologically dependent on her phobic 
companion and that, to be ‘well,’ she must learn to be more independent, to not rely on 
others for her sense of self. She has learned these things, and they are true, but she must 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the incredible terror of an increased capacity to mentalize: “I said that he was just as frightened of mental 
aliveness in himself as in me; that the sadness inside him when he missed me was sometimes so unpleasant 
that it was easier to kill the thinking part of both of us than face the pain of experiencing the end of the 
session that he valued” (p. 647).   
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also learn more dependence, a good kind of dependence that allows her to mourn her 
losses and to internalize ‘good’ objects: a kind of dependence that is “dominated by love” 
rather than persecution and hatred.
148
 
 There are many and complex reasons, then, for why the work of mourning might 
be especially difficult for patients suffering from agoraphobia. As Lewis (1961) 
describes, grief feels startlingly like fear. For agoraphobia patients whose overt symptoms 
have remitted, the fear of their return (relapse is notably common in agoraphobia cases) 
might readily scare off, so to speak, the patient from suffering her losses, a process which 
would require the fear-like experience of grief. Not only does grief feel like fear, even 
normal mourning can stimulate the emergence of agoraphobic anxieties in particular. 
This emergence is due to the primitive nature of agoraphobic anxieties and also due to the 
nature of loss, which, in its essence, threatens to tear us apart.
149
 Secondly, the losses of 
the phobic companion, in fantasy, and of the agoraphobic anxiety itself, are difficult to 
recognize as losses that need to be mourned. Interpretations that aim at the analysand’s 
unconscious conflicts without acknowledging the depth and reality of these losses delay 
their necessary mourning. Thirdly, for the agoraphobic, mourning traumatic losses from 
childhood would require acknowledging how painful those losses are and how 
overwhelmingly alone she has been with her pain. Not only must the losses to death be 
mourned, but the absence of ‘good’ internal objects to whom one can turn to in grief must 
also be mourned. Finally, the agoraphobic has never known the kind of dependence 
“dominated by love” (Klein 1940, p. 360). Instead, she has been both pathologically 
dependent and devastatingly alone. Like the feelings of fear that come with grief, the 
feelings of dependence also present particular challenges to the agoraphobic patient.               
 It is clear that agoraphobia is not reducible to a single cause, or to any one of the 
single paradigms of theoretical understanding currently available. Gassner articulates this 
point, which has serious implications for theoretical and clinical work with agoraphobia: 
“Panic attacks and agoraphobic symptoms are clearly a multidetermined psychological 
disorder, and like other symptoms, there are undoubtedly many pathways to these 
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 Fairbairn (1944, 1963) refers to the “anti-libidinous ego,” which attaches to the rejecting object and 
which itself rejects and hates all dependence. 
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 Taylor and Rachman (1991) argue that sadness, like fear, is itself an aversive state. 
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manifestations of psychopathology” (2004, p. 224). Treatment plans that emphasize the 
diagnostic criteria for agoraphobia and, as it were, treat the symptoms of the disorder 
(such as CBT combined with pharmacotherapy), tend to result in some short-term 
positive effects but long-term ineffectiveness. Psychoanalytic psychotherapy that focuses 
on the transference seems to provide some long-term effectiveness against the recurrence 
of anxiety and avoidance, but also appears to reach an impasse if the transference 
relationship continues to be emphasized (as seen in Milrod 2007). At this point, we may 
inquire if perhaps the transference has become, as Freud originally thought it was, an 
obstacle to the progress of the analysis. What is beyond the ego of the analysand? How 
can we get beyond the transference, an egoic phenomenon, in order to relieve a persistent 
“inner constriction”? We must return to the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis and the 
pursuit, however impossible, of putting all of one’s thoughts and feelings into words. I 
address these questions, along with the unconscious function of incoherence, in Chapter 
Four. For now, I remain with the meanings of emptiness. In the next section, I argue that 
the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness is a pathological manifestation of a structural 
emptiness that is central to psychic life. Out of this structural emptiness, all new things 
emerge. 
 
3.3. Structural Emptiness  
Is there not a danger of overfilling the psychic space, when one should be helping to form 
the positive cathexis of the empty space?  
(Green 1975, p. 17) 
Green distinguishes what he calls “the no of the ego, the no of the super-ego and the no of 
the id” (1999, p. 269). He argues that the drives are expressions of the “no of the id,” an 
argument that is particularly relevant in the establishment of the boundaries and limits of 
the self. He writes:  
 Expelling what is bad allows for the creation of an internal space in which the ego 
 as an organisation can come into being, setting up an order founded on the 
 formation of links related to experiences of satisfaction. This organisation 
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 facilitates recognition of the object as separate in the space of the not-ego as well 
 as the reunion with it. (p. 272)   
The work of the negative is apparent prior to the differentiation of the ego from the id in 
the process of expulsion by which the ego is organized.
150
 This process indicates the “no 
of the id.” This process also indicates that the vulnerable moment exists at the frontiers of 
the self; and, in the process of establishing what belongs to the ego and what the ego will 
exclude from itself, there must be room for emptiness.
151
 I follow Green’s argument that 
the work of the negative “extends to the agencies of the psychical apparatus as a whole” 
(1999, p. 269). That is, the negative is a structural aspect of psychical life. I argue that 
the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness is a manifestation of Green’s pathological 
negative; however, the point of the structural emptiness is a technical one – how do we 
make use of structural emptiness in the treatment of persistent, pathological emptiness? I 
argue that structural emptiness reveals itself in the gaps created by language; following 
the psychoanalytic rule, ‘try to say everything,’ encourages the foray into more of these 
gaps so that the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness may be overcome, replaced with all 
kinds of feelings as well as an enjoyment of her structural emptiness out of which all new 
things emerge. 
 As I described in Chapter Two, the experience of emptiness is necessary for 
healthy ego development. Emptiness is the psychical representation of physical hunger, 
both of which stimulate aggression. The ego must use this aggression to repudiate the 
other and the external world in order to establish itself differentiated from the world. 
Without the experience of emptiness (hunger) and the resulting aggressivity, the 
individual is able to experience neither satisfaction nor love, but only frustration and a 
limited kind of gratification. Winnicott identifies emptiness as a constitutive experience, 
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 I described the details of this process and the relevance of agora-claustrophobic anxieties in ego 
development in Chapter Two. 
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 On the potentiality and vulnerability at the boundaries of the self, see also Milner: “...the basic 
identifications which make it possible to find new objects, to find the familiar in the unfamiliar, require an 
ability to tolerate a temporary loss of sense of self, a temporary giving up of the discriminating ego which 
stands apart and tries to see things objectively and rationally and without emotional coloring” (1952, p. 
189); and, Kumin, on schizoid emptiness: “Emptiness has become a fact of ego structure and the ego 
feeling will reside chiefly at the external ego boundaries, separated by a libidinal gulf from the developing 
self representations” (1978, p. 212). 
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arguing that the “basis of all learning (as well as of eating) is emptiness. But if emptiness 
was not experienced as such at the beginning, then it turns up as a state that is feared, yet 
compulsively sought after” (1974, p. 107). Similarly, and as I quoted above in Chapter 
Two, Kumin writes:  
It is thus that experiences of emptiness, for the schizoid patient as well as for the 
infant, are essential stages in the ultimate constitution of self in the world. The 
loss of the mother by the infant through repetitive experiences of cold, hunger, 
frustration and separation, which must be experienced by the infant as 
excruciating emptiness and annihilation, is a necessary precursor of introjections 
of the maternal imago and the development of internalized object relations, which 
strengthen the process of separation-individuation and the formation of the self.  
(1978, p. 214)  
Grotstein, writing on the vicissitudes of nothingness, also indicates the structural 
manifestations of emptiness: “Nothingness, similarly, may be primary or secondary. In its 
primary sense it is the matrix or ‘ether’ of primary meaningless and is the emptiness 
which must be experienced in order for meaningful experience to be realized” (1990, p. 
268). In Green’s words: “The dimension of absence, essential to psychic development, 
finds its place in the potential space between the self and the object” (1975, p. 18). 
LaFarge (1989), in her arguments against the deficit theory of empty states, refers to 
these descriptions of structural emptiness: the experience of emptiness is required for 
healthy ego development and is also a developmental achievement. To understand 
emptiness as a development achievement, we might also think of a different but similar 
example: the developmental achievement of the capacity for anticipation. If the 
individual has developed the capacity for anticipation, some painful experiences can be 
endured in order to achieve a greater satisfaction. If there is no capacity for anticipation, 
and therefore no tolerance for painful or frustrating experiences, there can be only a very 
limited, immediate kind of gratification. If there is no capacity to tolerate or enjoy 
emptiness, then there can be no room for creativity, no possibility for the emergence of 
new thoughts or feelings. As Winnicott argues, “only out of non-existence can existence 
start” (1974, p. 107; emphasis in original). This opening to new experience is the 
“positive element” of emptiness that is neither deficit nor defence. Emptiness, then, is not 
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simply a deficiency, nor is it only related to the ego and its mechanisms of defence, but is 
a structural aspect of the psychical apparatus.  
 Strongly related to ignorance, or not-knowing, the capacity to tolerate emptiness, 
like the capacity to tolerate one’s ignorance, is a necessary step towards the enjoyment of 
a full life. If these states of emptiness, ignorance,
152
 and silence
153
 are defended against, 
nothing new can emerge. Scott writes of “wooing” the unknown, “since from it all new 
good, as well as, bad and sad states, will come” (1981, p. 577). The ability to “woo the 
unknown” and love our ignorance depends on our faith in our capacity to mourn our 
losses: “With mourning, the realization emerges that a new beginning becomes possible” 
(p. 574).
154
 As I argue above, the agoraphobic’s pathological emptiness indicates the 
presence of losses not yet mourned. The agoraphobic defends against painful mourning 
and, in doing so, closes herself off to new experiences. Without faith in her capacity to 
mourn, the risk of more loss is too great. As Scott argues, “[w]e must accept the risks of 
new development leading to new opportunities and new zest, knowing that the more we 
risk the more we may lose” (pp. 574-575). The agoraphobic, with so many losses not yet 
mourned, is not able to take these risks. 
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 See, for example, Lacan: “Indeed, the analyst cannot follow this path unless he recognizes in his own 
knowledge the symptom of his own ignorance, in the properly analytic sense that the symptom is the return 
of the repressed in a compromise [formation] and that repression, here as elsewhere, constitutes the 
censorship of truth. Ignorance must not, in fact, be understood here as an absence of knowledge but, just as 
much as love and hate, as a passion for being – for it can, like them, be a path by which being forms. […] 
The positive fruit of the revelation of ignorance is nonknowledge, which is not a negation of knowledge but 
rather its most elaborate form” (1955/2006j, p. 297). Bion makes the distinction between K (knowledge) 
and –K (minus knowledge): –K is neither ignorance nor nonknowledge; indeed, K “covers everything the 
individual knows and does not know” (1992, p. 182).  –K is associated with “nameless terror” and involves 
envy’s destructiveness; rather than indicating nonknowledge, –K involves an attack on knowledge. I 
expand on the relevance of ignorance in Chapter Four; for now, I indicate its importance and its relation to 
structural emptiness.   
153
 I explore the relation between speech and silence, and the importance for both in the analytic situation, 
below and also in Chapter Four. Free association is, I argue, the vehicle in analysis by which the meanings 
of both speech and silence can be apprehended.    
154
 See also, Scott: “Our knowledge is finite, but our ignorance is infinite. Consequently, we can be 
frustrated by our ignorance or we can progress to being disappointed by our ignorance and also to learning 
to mourn the loss of our omnipotent beliefs. Possibly, eventually, we can learn to love and woo our 
ignorance, from which all new things will come” (1988, p. 88). See also infra note 55. 
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 The “unconscious fear of not knowing” (Ogden 1989, p. 195) is an important 
psychological construct in the analyses of patients who have tremendous difficulties 
creating and occupying their own potential space (which, as I argued in Chapter Two, the 
agoraphobic does). This unconscious fear develops from an inability to know what one 
feels and, therefore, “who, if anyone, [one] is” (Ogden 1989, p. 195). In response to the 
fear of not knowing, the individual creates the illusion “that he is able to generate 
thoughts and feelings, wishes and fears that feel like his own”; as illusion, this defense 
“further alienates the individual from himself” (Ogden 1989, p. 195). Ogden refers to 
these illusions as “misrecognitions,” and distinguishes this defense from the more 
extreme cases of alienation encountered in alexithymia, states of non-experience, and 
disaffected states; rather, Ogden describes patients “who are able to experience the 
beginnings of feelings of confusion, emptiness, despair, and panic, as well as being able 
to mobilize defenses against these incipient feelings” (p. 196). The agoraphobia patients 
discussed above fit Ogden’s description, alternately using panic and emptiness to defend 
against the fear of not knowing, which is ultimately a fear of the unknown and of what 
might emerge out of the spaces between knowing. In Milrod’s words, there is a “core lack 
of structure in the self-representation” (2007, p. 1023) of these patients.  
 Ogden highlights Lacan’s emphasis on the méconnaissance of the ego, and the 
problematic (though inescapable) introduction of the symbolic (namely, language) into 
our self-knowledge.
155
 Alienation is not just an effect of symbolization as such, but also 
depends on the nature of the symbol as something that predates the individual: “we do not 
create the symbols we use; we inherit them” (Ogden 1989, p. 197). Thus, we engage in 
the (necessary) illusion of self-expression; it is only possible to misname our experiences. 
At the same time, as Winnicott (and others, including Lacan) argues, we make the 
symbols we have inherited our own. Like the transitional object, which had to have 
existed before we can make use of it, and which we are able to make use of only as we 
create it anew, we are born into a language system: it exists long before we begin to 
                                                          
155
 See also Reeder on Lacan’s “symbolic castration”: “the acquisition of language establishes a splitting 
and division within the subject. But, what has been lost in symbolic castration is not so much the breast or 
even this or that person -- what is at stake is a severance from the immediate reality of experience in a 
process that reaches its height when the subject has become well-anchored in the realm of language to 
represent its world” (2012, pp. 38-39).  
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speak (to use it) and before we are even born. And yet, even as we can only misname our 
experiences, our use of language makes it something that it never was before, something 
new and uniquely our own. This paradoxical relation to the self is determined by the 
nature of language; it institutes a structural emptiness within every individual’s psychical 
apparatus. This structural emptiness has the quality of chinks in a suit of armour: as 
breaks or gaps in the integrity of the armour, chinks are both areas of vulnerability and 
necessary spaces that allow for movement. The armour can be inhabited by a body that 
requires movement only insofar as its chinks provide openings and spaces between the 
various pieces of the suit. If language is the suit of armour, gaps in the integrity – that is 
to say, wholeness or absolute coherence – of language allow it to be inhabited by an 
individual; the individual can use language only insofar as s/he can take advantage of the 
chinks, the structural emptiness, that is, the spaces where coherency falters.      
   Wilson, via the analyses of several obsessional narcissistic patients, investigates 
the doubled meaning of “the nothing that is a source of fear and the nothing that is a 
source of help” (2006a, p. 398). The former, “the nothing that is a source of fear,” is 
described above in the sections on pathological emptiness, and grief and agoraphobia; the 
latter, “the nothing that is a source of help,” refers to what I am calling structural 
emptiness. Like Wilson, I refer to Lacan because his notion of lack occupies a central 
position in his theories of subjectivity and psychical life. In Chapter Two, I discussed the 
centrality of lack in the constitution of the subject. Here, I am concerned with the 
manifestation of lack in the analytic situation and its connection to the agoraphobic’s 
persistent emptiness. In particular, I emphasize lack’s function within language in order 
to identify the transformative limitations of interpreting the transference particularly for 
agoraphobia patients who appear to be stuck within their subjective experiences of 
emptiness. Wilson takes up the question, empirically derived, of why the analyst’s 
mistakes are often transformative. Following Lacan, Wilson argues that the “analyst’s 
missing the patient, on a fundamental level, is an evocation of nothing or lack” (2006a, p. 
401; original emphasis). That is, when the analyst misses the patient, or the analyst’s 
interpretation misses the mark, there is a space opened between them out of which the 
patient can find something new about his or her own self. Wilson clearly articulates that 
both the analyst and the analysand must learn to tolerate lack in order for the analytic 
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process to unfold. Lack is essential to analysis and is essential to the very “nature of 
meaning” (p. 402). Although the analyst’s mistakes are particularly obvious ‘evocations’ 
of lack, “[t]here is always a limit or a lacking in any statement, even if the statement 
suggests an excess of meanings” (p. 402). Thus, the analyst’s mistakes are not the only 
instances of lack irrupting in the analysis. It, lack, is always there in the inevitably 
incomplete encounters between people. Wilson argues that a capacity to “explore this 
inevitable missing” in both the analyst and the analysand contributes to the analytic work, 
insofar as this “missing” creates an “interpretive space” (p. 402).156 Curiosity about this 
space provides opportunities for new thoughts and feelings. The problem arises when the 
meanings of this space are foreclosed, whether by the analyst’s embarrassment about 
making a mistake, the analyst’s narcissistic desire to make a clever interpretation, or the 
analysand’s anxiety about what the analyst does not know. Wilson summarizes: “The 
structure of the subject and the structure of things meaningful both rest on a space created 
by lacking” (p. 406).   
 In the cases of the agoraphobia patients discussed above we can say that the 
anxiety and avoidance – as well as all of the fantasies that go along with one’s identity as 
an individual with agoraphobia – concealed any meaningful encounter with lack, and 
therefore any encounter with the creation of meaning. Once overt agoraphobic symptoms 
have remitted, the emptiness out of which everything new appears is terrifyingly 
revealed:   
 When the components of the fantasy appear, the lack that supports and is hidden 
 by the fantasy can be ‘seen,’ or experienced. This experience is the experience of 
 nothing, and more precisely that nothing which supports what one thinks, where 
 one is, what one feels. It is an experience of confusion, of utter not knowing. One 
 can see then what one has used, psychically, to prop oneself up, so to speak. 
 (Wilson 2006a, p. 417).   
The agoraphobic’s loss of her anxiety and other phobic symptoms entails a significant 
encounter with the “utter not knowing” of who she is. Her experience of emptiness, then, 
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 See also Faimberg (1996, 1997) on “listening to listening.” I discuss this clinical technique further in 
Chapter Four. 
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is not at all surprising. However, insofar as her emptiness gets in the way of her lack, so 
to speak, it remains a pathological phenomenon.  
 Goldberg, in his commentary on Wilson (2006a), suggests (as critique) that “when 
a patient reaches a point of missing or of misunderstanding, it is not an invitation to settle 
for some sort of compromise; instead it is an opening to the pursuit of a more positive 
accomplishment” (2006, p. 432). Yes; the “opening” is exactly the point. I cannot speak 
for Wilson but, in my reading of his article, this opening is also part of his point. 
Although I am not as optimistic, perhaps, as Goldberg appears to be in the analyst’s (or 
the analysand’s) capacity to arrive at what might be called “a more positive 
accomplishment,” the “opening” and the “pursuit” is the goal of analysis. Lack, or 
emptiness, when it can be tolerated, provides this necessary opening towards something 
“more” – if it is to be more “positive,” well, that will always remain to be seen. In his 
“Response to Commentaries,” Wilson emphasizes this essential point: “an assumption of 
lack and the capacity to act follow one from the other” (2006b, p. 459). The meaning of 
this statement is perhaps clarified if re-formulated in its negative version: the denial of 
lack and the incapacity to act follow one from the other. That is, if lack, or structural 
emptiness, is defended against, there is no opening for new experiences, and no freedom 
to explore one’s internal and external worlds.      
 Reed’s commentary on Wilson (2006a) provides an important hesitation: “in 
Wilson’s paper there is an underlying rhetorical legerdemain that equates lack with 
missing the patient and missing the patient with good analytic practice. It is this current in 
Wilson’s paper that makes me uneasy” (2006, p. 451). Further, she writes:  
 Techniques appropriate for the normal negative, for patients who can express 
 affect and ideation together in the chain of signifiers characteristic of neurosis, are 
 not necessarily helpful for Green’s pathologically negative patients. It is a 
 question of letting space between analyst and patient evolve, but of allowing just 
 enough so that the patient’s frustration does not take on the flavor of the original 
 trauma. (p. 454)   
Wilson’s important work on the clinical use of lack (or what I have called structural 
emptiness, and Green has called the normal negative) as the structuring element in the 
constitution of the subject and of meaningfulness is hampered by his clinical example, 
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which provides evidence, rather, of pathological emptiness. Wilson indicates that Evan
157
 
endured severe maternal deprivation very early in his infancy; it is possible that Evan’s 
losses must be recognized, analytically, and worked through before it is possible for him 
to approach the profundity of his subjective lack.   
 In Chapter Two, I gestured towards the importance of all of emptiness’s meanings 
via Luepnitz, who indicates the most significant difference between Winnicott and Lacan: 
“For Winnicott, the central drama will turn around the infant’s loss or feared loss of 
maternal connection. For Lacan, while loss is obviously important, something even more 
profound is at stake – the lack built into subjectivity by the mere existence of the 
unconscious” (2009, p. 964). Analyses of loss and mourning encounter a limit, a barrier 
to a deeper experience, if the centrality of lack is never articulated; at the same time, we 
cannot approach the profundity of subjective lack if there is a loss, real or phantasied, in 
the way. As Green provocatively writes in his work on negative hallucination, “[p]leasure 
arises from its roots in need. Desire is a pivotal concept for one cannot overlook the fact 
that it is the satisfaction of need which sets it in motion” (1999, p. 183). That is, without 
the satisfaction of need, desire (and thus lack) is unmotivated, so to speak. The analyst, 
however, can make use of lack insofar as it is part of language and insofar as language is 
the analytic medium. Lack irrupts in the analysand’s speech in many and various forms, 
including slips of the tongue, silences, and bodily gestures
158
; by drawing attention to 
these moments of potential meaning-making, the analyst utilizes the structural nature of 
lack without overwhelming the analysand with its profundity. These little incoherencies 
are also manifestations of lack, or emptiness, and the capacity to explore these gaps in 
coherence encourages the analysand to greater explorations of his subjective experiences.      
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 In order to protect his patients’ anonymity, Wilson constructs a patient composite, which he nominates 
Evan, comprised of details drawn from several patients. 
158
 See also Lacan 1998, p. 234: “Desire always becomes manifest at the joint of speech, where it makes its 
appearance, its sudden emergence, its surge forwards.  Desire emerges just as it becomes embodied in 
speech, it emerges with symbolism.” 
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3.4. Conclusion 
In Chapter One, I discussed the distinctions between agoraphobia and “true,” or discrete, 
phobias. One of the main distinctions involves the nature of the phobic object: in discrete 
phobias, the phobic object is specifically identified and the phobia can be said to be a 
displacement of an unconscious fear onto the phobic object. In the case of Little Hans, 
which I offered as an early example, Hans’s unconscious fear of his father was displaced 
onto the horse and became the conscious fear that the horse would bite him. The phobic 
object, then, becomes a symbol of the unconscious fear. In agoraphobia, the precise 
nature of the phobic object is contentious. Agoraphobia, I argued, is not only the anxiety 
about space but, more specifically, the boundaries between spaces, including the spaces 
between the self and the world and the ego and its objects. As I argued in Chapter Two, 
agoraphobia signals an individual’s inability to create secure boundaries between the self 
and others, and also to creatively inhabit the spaces between the self and others (and the 
self and its objects). It develops out of an inability to delimit affects via symbolization, 
leading to, in Deutsch’s words, “a genuine dread of death” (1929, p. 51) or in Bion’s 
phrase, “a nameless dread” (1962a, p. 309). For patients with agoraphobia, particularly 
evident in those patients whose overt symptoms have remitted, the gaps inherent in 
language and in the meaning-making process of putting it all into words are defensively 
avoided. This avoidance mimics the agoraphobic’s avoidance of the external world, 
which, as I argue, is fundamentally an avoidance of intermediary spaces. These spaces, 
like the gaps in language, are avoided because the agoraphobic does not know what will 
emerge out of them.     
 Language inevitably fails to be wholly satisfying insofar as representation 
definitively encounters the gap between the sign and that which the sign attempts to 
signify; therefore, language, I argue, structures an emptiness that is central to psychic 
reality: the gap that always remains between what is said and what is. There is always 
something left behind, something that falls out during our attempts to express meaning. It 
leaves a gap, an emptiness, a silence, an ignorance. While in health, this emptiness is 
effectively a potentiality, an opening to (unconscious) experience, for the agoraphobic 
this emptiness is a barricade to experience. That is, rather than experiencing the 
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emptiness as a potential space wherein something productive might happen, the 
‘something’ that ‘might happen’ – which, for the agoraphobic, is either an overwhelming 
‘already-happened’ or a ‘nothing happening’ where something might have productively 
happened – is defended against by filling the emptiness with a blankness, like putting 
psychic locks on emotional doors and then experiencing them as impenetrable walls. 
Therefore, the freedom to be incoherent affords the agoraphobic the opportunity to 
experience her intrinsic emptiness as a potential space wherein something productive 
might happen rather than as a barricade to experience or as an emptiness that needs to be 
filled. In the next chapter, I argue that a therapeutic emphasis on narrative coherence 
displaces the focus from unconscious truth to a good story. The tasks of trying to be 
coherent and trying to say everything involve different processes and therefore have 
different results; likewise, the task of listening differs between trying to make sense of 
what is being said and waiting to see what sense emerges. It is not that incoherence in 
itself is preferable to coherence, but that when coherence is demanded, fewer feelings and 
thoughts are possible; when incoherence is tolerated, new and unanticipated feelings and 
thoughts can develop. Coherence, then, cannot be taken to dictate the process of 
psychoanalysis, or as its ultimate aim. I develop these arguments in the next chapter on 
the use and function of language in the psychoanalytic situation.    
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Chapter Four: In/Coherence 
In Chapter Three, I discussed the phenomenon of emptiness Milrod (2007) identifies in 
patients whose agoraphobic symptoms of anxiety and avoidance have remitted. Milrod’s 
discussion of the clinical case studies she presents emphasizes the transference 
relationship and implies (as she argues elsewhere: see Milrod et al. 2000, 2001, 2007) 
that it is this particular element of psychoanalysis that distinguishes it from the temporary 
effects of the psychiatric treatment of agoraphobia. However, the limitations of this 
emphasis are evident in Milrod’s assessment of one of her patients’ progress: “Likely her 
desperate need to define herself in keeping with and as being linked to one of her parents 
had been substituted in part by her relationship with me” (2007, p. 1020). The 
substitutive relationship with the analyst allows for higher everyday ‘functioning,’159 but 
it fails to relieve the patient’s psychic emptiness. In light of the failure of interpreting the 
transference to effect change in patients’ experiences of pathological emptiness, I argue 
that the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis – what Bollas (2013) calls the Freudian Pair: 
the freely associating analysand and the evenly suspended analyst – is the most important 
element in psychoanalysis generally, and in the psychoanalysis of patients with 
agoraphobia specifically. 
 As I argued in Chapter One, agoraphobia indicates a failure to symbolize – and, 
thus, to limit – the anxiety that results from the repression of libidinal and aggressive 
drives. Rather than the symbolic fear of a specific phobia, agoraphobia indicates the fear 
of symbolization itself.
160
 The persistent emptiness Milrod (2007) describes, along with 
the agoraphobic’s inability to limit her anxiety by locating a specific phobic object, is 
indicative of this inhibition of symbolization. As I argued in Chapter Two, the 
agoraphobic “object” of anxiety is intermediary spaces, which can be understood to 
include all of what Winnicott calls the third area of experience. As I developed in Chapter 
Two, this third area of (shared) experience develops from the diffusion of the transitional 
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 For example, this patient’s psychiatrically delineated agoraphobic symptoms of anxiety and avoidance 
remitted. She was able to move out of her parents’ house and into her own apartment with her husband 
(Milrod 2007, p. 1020). 
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 As I described in Chapter One, agoraphobia is “more gradually developed, more generalized, less 
demonstrably related to conditioning, more resistant to treatment and more likely to involve extensive 
character pathology [than specific phobias]” (Frances & Dunn 1975, p. 435). 
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object and, following Green (1975), includes the use of language. In order to alleviate the 
agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness, the agoraphobic needs to be able to learn to use 
language creatively. The creative use of language is only possible when the 
agoraphobic’s fear of destruction (of the object) or fear of annihilation (of the ego) is not 
too great. There are two problematic uses the agoraphobic makes of language: the first is 
indicated above and is symptomatic of her inability to symbolize, namely, to limit 
feelings by putting them into words. This problem may only become evident once, as 
Milrod (2007) shows, anxiety and avoidance recede to reveal the agoraphobic’s persistent 
emptiness. The second problem involves a particular reliance on specific narratives to 
defend against the gaps in language which, as I described in Chapter Three, emerge out of 
the subject’s structural emptiness. I argue that the agoraphobic’s use of language in this 
latter way is characteristic of a repetition compulsion, distinct from the more familiar 
behavioural repetition compulsion in which individuals re-enact troubling relationships 
and traumatic events.
161
 This second problem may be more apparent in frankly 
agoraphobic patients – that is, individuals currently beset by the anxiety and avoidance by 
which the disorder is psychiatrically defined – than in patients for whom these symptoms 
have remitted. Free association addresses both of these problems, providing the 
agoraphobic with the opportunity to experience her structural emptiness as a potential 
space wherein something productive might happen instead of as a barricade to experience 
or as an emptiness that needs to be filled. 
 I argue that the tasks of trying to be coherent and trying to say everything involve 
different processes and therefore have different results; likewise, the task of listening 
differs between trying to make sense of what is being said and waiting to see what sense 
emerges. It is not that incoherence in itself is preferable to coherence, but that when 
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 For some early conceptualizations of the repetition compulsion, see Freud (1914b, 1920) and Kubie 
(1939). Loewald makes a distinction between active and passive repetition, and suggests that the 
“compulsion to repeat unconscious conflicts, wishes, experiences, passively is due primarily to their having 
remained under repression, that is not exposed to the influence of the organizing activity of the ego” (1971, 
p. 61). The agoraphobic’s conscious repetition of her narratives belies the simplicity of this distinction, but 
also suggests the possibility that something in the agoraphobic’s unconscious remains repressed, 
unacknowledged, or unsaid. For a recent addition to the literature, see Künstlicher (2010), in which the 
connection between the repetition compulsion and the phenomenon of Nachträglichkeit is demonstrated, 
though not made explicit. I discuss this connection further in section 4.4. 
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coherence is demanded, fewer feelings and thoughts are possible; when incoherence is 
tolerated, new and unanticipated feelings and thoughts can develop. The agoraphobic is 
unable to tolerate incoherence: she either produces narratives that are too coherent or she 
produces empty narratives. The agoraphobic suffers from a restricted unconscious 
freedom in addition to the restrictions she places on her freedom of mobility. Following 
Bollas, I argue that there are two aspects of mental health: the ability to construct 
coherent narratives and the freedom to explore the feelings that precede coherence.
162
 The 
agoraphobic, I suggest, uses narrative to stave off the overwhelming emotions that 
accompany incoherence. An analytic emphasis on interpreting the transference colludes 
with the agoraphobic’s ego in the resistance of incoherence, inhibiting the development 
of free association. Focusing on narrative coherence forecloses the emergence of the 
unconscious in the gaps revealed by language, gaps which must emerge in order for new 
thoughts and feelings to be possible. The invitation ‘try to say everything’163 provides the 
space for these gaps to emerge and the opportunity to explore them.  
In this chapter, I explore agoraphobia and the uses of language in the 
psychoanalytic setting through three main themes: coherence as resistance; the analyst’s 
over-reliance on interpreting the transference as an impediment to the development of 
free and freer associations; and, the concept of Nachträglichkeit and the logic of the 
unconscious.
164
 These themes are all connected to the concepts of psychoanalytic truth 
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 Some patients exhibit a problematic lack of coherence. The inability to cohere can be related to a 
plethora of possible traumas and presents a different kind of psychic dilemma that is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. As Loewenstein indicates, and as I argued in Chapter Two, the “illusion of unity and identity 
[…] is an absolute necessity for being in this world that is less than harmonious (1994, p. 730). I do not 
think any of the theorists I consider here disagree that narrative is an important aspect of psychical life. The 
disagreement revolves around how one uses narrative analytically and where a patient’s narrative comes 
from. Here, I focus on the agoraphobic’s inability to explore the gaps in conscious experience, which is to 
say, the inability to use the experience of incoherence (and emptiness) creatively.  
163
 As I explore below, the articulation of the fundamental rule takes many forms. I note here the historical 
shift from Freud’s authoritarian insistence on free association to contemporary analysts’ “gentle 
exhortation” (Lichtenberg & Galler 1987, p. 63), evident in such phraseology as “try to say everything.” 
See also Busch 1994, pp. 364-365: “Lichtenberg and Galler’s characterization of the tone of the guidelines 
given to patients as ‘gentle exhortation’ (p. 63) captures a current dilemma for many analysts. The strident 
nature of Freud’s view of the method of free association seems alien, thus the ‘gentle’ component. Yet we 
still believe it necessary to ‘exhort’ our patients to hold back as little as possible.” 
164
 I refer to unconscious “logic” in the Freudian tradition. See, for example, Bollas (2013), Bradby (1920), 
Freud (1900, 1915), Green (1986), and Melnick (2000). See especially Matte Blanco (1959, 1973/2005, 
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and psychical reality, which provide the frame within which I develop my arguments. 
There is little consensus on what constitutes psychoanalytic truth. As I am here concerned 
with psychical coherence – and, relatedly, psychical reality – I follow Faimberg’s concept 
of psychic truths, which “are the consequence of the psychic work resulting from the 
demands of reality that are fashioned by the unconscious wish and the unconscious 
fantasy” (1997, p. 449). This definition is consistent with my arguments in Chapter Two, 
namely, that psychical reality is created through the ego’s mediation of external reality; 
both the facts of external reality and the ego’s mediation – or, better, modification – of 
those facts is clinically pertinent. Indeed, it is precisely the ego’s modification of external 
reality that is the concern of psychoanalytic work and is the realm of that work’s 
influence.   
 
4.1. Psychoanalytic Truth and Psychical Reality 
“Go ahead and lie.”  
(Stern 1966, p. 144) 
The question of psychical coherence is intimately connected to the question of psychical 
reality. In Chapter Two, I addressed the question of ‘realities’ along one line of thought, 
arguing that the agoraphobic is not able to take for granted the distinction between 
internal reality and external reality, and therefore cannot experience shared reality as 
illusion. Psychical reality refers to internal reality, which is formed in a process of 
creative differentiation; the process involves both identification of what is internal and 
what is external, and the creation of a uniquely individual internal reality at the same 
time. I developed these ideas in detail in Chapter Two. However, there is much more that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1975, 1988) for an elaboration of the “symmetrical” or “anaclitic” logic of the unconscious, which is 
contrasted with – in fact, defined against – the asymmetrical logic of conscious thought. Matte Blanco’s 
term “bi-logic” (1975) refers to the admixture of these two logics which forms most thought. The qualities 
of unconscious logic include: displacement; condensation; timelessness; the confusion of (inner) fantasy 
with (outward) reality; the absence of negation; and, the principle of non-contradiction (Freud 1915; Matte 
Blanco 1975, 1988). In this chapter, I am primarily concerned with the quality of timelessness – as 
displayed in the phenomenon of Nachträglichkeit – and its implication for the psychoanalytic treatment of 
agoraphobia.    
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has been said and much that remains to be said on the question of reality in 
psychoanalysis. At the same time, this question of psychical reality cannot be entirely 
extricated from psychoanalytic considerations of truth. As recent publications indicate, 
the natures of truth (Mills 2014) and of psychical reality (Rosegrant 2010) are entirely 
unresolved in the psychoanalytic literature, both clinically and theoretically. Some 
distinguish between “historical truth” and “material truth” (e.g., Avenburg & Guiter 
1957; Freud 1937); “narrative truth” and “historical truth” (e.g., Spence 1982a and 
Shengold 1985); “psychical reality” and “historical truth” (e.g., Schimek 1975); 
“narrative truth” and “theoretical truth” (e.g., Spence 1982b); “poetical truth” and 
“scientific truth” (e.g., Toynbee 1949). Truth is also variously distinguished from 
illusion, fantasy, lies, and error. Rather than belabour these various distinctions, I draw 
attention to a few critical points. The first point is quite simply that the questions of truth 
and of reality remain open. Mills, referring specifically to truth, summarizes this state:   
Psychoanalysis has no formal theory of truth. When analysts speak of truth, they 
are often referring to empirical matters, such as patients’ statements or disclosures 
that correspond to events in the real world, historical facts, recollection from 
memory versus construction via fantasy, sincere first-person narratives, and how 
truth is revealed or concealed in the analytic encounter. A close inspection of the 
psychoanalytic contributions on the question and meaning of truth is almost 
exclusively centered on clinical phenomena, while a genuinely unique 
philosophical theory peculiar to psychoanalysis remains unrealized. (2014, p. 268) 
Although the question of truth is unresolved, this is not to say that there are no arguments 
about the nature of truth in psychoanalysis; that is to say, while the question of truth may 
be unresolved – like many, if not most, psychoanalytic concepts – as a psychoanalytic 
principle, there are a finite number of specific arguments concerning the nature of truth in 
psychoanalysis. Most of these arguments concern the competing clinical relevance of 
narrative truth (that is, a “good story”) and historical truth (that is, “what really 
happened”). As I will argue below, following Faimberg (1997), neither of these exclusive 
options is clinically satisfying as each ignores the complexity of psychical reality.   
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 Hanly (1990, 2009) explicates the three philosophical theories of truth: 
correspondence, coherence, and the pragmatic.
165
 Although these theories have 
traditionally been opposed one to the others, Hanly importantly argues that they can 
function together psychoanalytically, that is to say, clinically.
166
 To this end, he implicitly 
moves from considering each one as a philosophical theory of truth to considering each 
one as a criterion for truth clinically. Briefly, the coherence theory of truth “requires 
logical consistency (non-contradiction) and explanatory completeness” (Hanly 2009, p. 
364). Ultimately, Hanly argues that clinical “[a]rguments based only on a criterion of 
coherence over-value logical consistency which while necessary is not sufficient as a 
criterion [for truth]” (2009, p. 365). While Hanly emphasizes an over-valuation of logical 
consistency, I point to the overvaluation of narrative consistency, which is more relevant 
clinically in the work of narrative-oriented psychoanalysts. Generally speaking, the 
narrativists privilege the coherence theory of truth over the correspondence theory, which 
requires that a proposition find its match in external reality. They argue that, working 
psychoanalytically, the material reality of the patient’s clinical discourse cannot be 
verified by any external source. Partly, the private nature of psychoanalytic work is 
responsible for this impossibility.
167
 The narrativists also express concern over the 
analyst’s supposedly authoritarian access to truth – as if there could be one absolute Truth 
– for those analysts subscribing to the correspondence theory. However, as Hanly argues, 
in the context of clinical psychoanalysis (as in the empirical sciences), “[c]orrespondence 
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 Cf. Muniz de Rezende (Lewkowicz & Flechner 2005), who distinguishes types of truth according to 
discipline: in formal sciences, truth requires coherence; in empirical sciences, it needs correspondence; in 
human sciences, it calls for symbolic consensus. Symbolic consensus is based on Blumer’s (1962/1969) 
symbolic interactionism in the discipline of sociology and is similar to critical pragmatism in its clinical 
significance. See also infra note 166.  
166
 In the history of psychoanalysis, the debate between correspondence and coherence is reflected in the 
longstanding debate on psychoanalysis as science or art; popular perspective has shifted from defending 
psychoanalysis as a science to holding that psychoanalysis is both art and science. See, for example, 
Bowlby (1979), Dugan (2010), French (1958), and Slochower (1964). Despite the consensus of popular 
opinion, the debate continues, and continues to develop greater complexity as findings from other fields 
(especially developmental psychology and neuroscience) are taken into account.  
167
 One can also argue that the past no longer exists in material reality and cannot therefore be confirmed or 
refuted. See, for example, Russell (1921). In the past century, arguments in this vein have gained 
complexity. Faimberg (1997), for example, distinguishes material reality from historical truths. 
Correspondence, for Faimberg, refers not to the relationship between psychical reality and material reality 
(by which she refers to an apprehendable, objective, and external world), but to psychical reality and 
historical truth (by which she refers to past events).  
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can be evaluated without omniscience, without absolute knowledge and without 
certainty” (2009, pp. 366-367).  Furthermore, correspondence “is not a question of 
absolute, automatic, intuitive certainty. It is a matter of accumulated evidence” (Hanly 
2009, p. 367). Both the coherence and correspondence theories of truth lack the third 
element that Hanly identifies as essential to the clinical enterprise: critical pragmatism:  
An idea or theory is true, if, by means of a technology specified by it and coherent 
with it, the theory can be used to change the course of nature. It is this concept of 
pragmatism that we find at work in Freud’s development of psychoanalytic theory 
and technique. In psychoanalysis the change in the course of nature we look for is 
the amelioration of neurotic disorders. The technique is the interpretation of free 
association and transferences in the analytic setup. The theories are about the 
causes of neuroses. (Hanly 2009, p. 368)  
Hanly overstates the psychoanalytic consensus on all of these issues.
168
 Nonetheless, his 
point regarding the clinical need for critical pragmatism as a criterion for truth is well-
taken. As Jacobs (2002) also demonstrates, without the critical pragmatic element of 
truth, correspondence and coherence is clinically insufficient.
169
  
 Hanly vacillates between arguing about the truth value of a theory, suggesting that 
a theory is true if it fulfills these three criteria, and the truth of statements made clinically. 
Although one might think that, on questions of truth, there could be no distinguishing 
between theoretical and clinical truths, we must nevertheless do so. This distinction is 
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 See Levy for a brief discussion, from the perspective of the editor of a leading psychoanalytic journal 
(JAPA), of “changing perspectives on the clinical role of interpretation” (2011, p. 1120) and other critical 
issues of dissension or contention among contemporary analysts. Kiersky and Fosshage also provide an 
editorial response to a case study with commentaries, noting “that something is missing in [this group of 
analysts], and that is the rigid, authoritarian analyst of the past who always knew more about the patient 
than she knew about herself” (2009, p. 355). Their response draws out the plurality of theoretical 
perspectives, which, of course, impacts each analyst’s clinical work. See also Goldberg (2012), who 
addresses the plurality of clinical aims through an examination of clinical failures. 
169
 See also Eigen (1983). Through the analysis of a dream from each of three patients, Eigen aptly 
demonstrates the limitations of coherence and correspondence. Referring to her dream, one patient 
succinctly describes her fear of the potential for “more” (more life, more experiences, more feelings): “‘But 
what if I cross the ladder and the boat is empty?’ [Eigen comments:] She apparently felt better off 
immersed in a fruitless or vicious circle with plenty of activity, if no real movement” (p. 215). Eigen’s 
patient echoes one of Milrod’s agoraphobic patients, who states: “‘I’d prefer to live without any of this 
emotional intensity. […] What I like is to do things’” (Milrod 2007, p. 1021). Only with the addition of the 
criterion of pragmatism is, in Eigen’s words, “genuine movement beyond the status quo” (p. 216) possible.   
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necessary precisely because of the nature of psychical reality. Here, I am not concerned 
with theoretical coherence, which, as Hanly points out, is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for theoretical truth. I am concerned with truth in its relationship to psychical 
reality and psychical in/coherence. 
 Holmes, a leading figure in British psychodynamic psychiatry,
170
 draws a 
conclusion on the significance of narrative coherence in attachment research, the 
psychoanalytic situation, and psychical reality: “It [attachment research] points to 
powerful links between the ‘narrative truth’ of the clinical situation and the ‘historical 
truth’ of the patient’s actual biography” (1999, p. 56).171 This conclusion is simply 
incorrect. As the Adult Attachment Interview manual clearly states, no assumption is 
made between reported and actual experiences (Main et al. 2002, p. 8). Furthermore, as I 
emphasized in Chapter Two, what is at stake in psychoanalysis is psychical reality. While 
the relationship between narrative truth and historical (or material) truth is certainly of 
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 Holmes has written extensively on attachment theory, narrative therapy, and psychoanalysis. See, for 
example, Holmes (1994, 1997, 1999, 2014) and Holmes and Slade (2013).  
171
 The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) is a semi-structured interview used as a psychological research 
measure of “adult state of mind with regards to attachment.” In other words, the AAI attempts to reveal the 
nature of an individual’s object relations using language as the medium between internal representations 
and behaviour. The AAI produces a transcript which is analyzed for the individual's discourse coherency 
about attachment experiences. The hallmark of a secure-autonomous speaker is precisely narrative 
coherence; in parallel, the various insecure states of mind with regard to attachment are characterized by 
different styles of incoherency. Coherence is defined according to the dyad; that is, coherence depends on 
the speaker and the listener, the text and the reader. Clinically, as Vaslamatzis (2007) demonstrates, the 
patient’s degree of coherence is determined according to the analyst’s understanding, or lack thereof, of the 
patient’s speech. In adult attachment research, coherence is defined according to Grice’s (1975) maxims of 
collaborative conversation: be truthful and have evidence for what you say; be succinct, yet complete; be 
perspicacious; and, be clear and orderly. The relevance of the AAI is due not only to its systematization of 
discourse analysis in terms of attachment status, but more importantly because of the link it demonstrates 
between language and behaviour. Specifically, a parent’s state of mind as determined via discourse is 
strongly predictive of his or her child’s attachment status, which is measured behaviourally through the 
Strange Situation Procedure (SSP). That is, a parent’s state of mind with regards to attachment, measured 
via discourse analysis, is strongly correlated with his or her child’s attachment style, measured 
behaviourally. The way a parent talks about his or her own attachment experiences corresponds, 
statistically, to the child’s attachment behaviours towards that parent (see, for example, Main et al. 1985). 
Research with the AAI demonstrates that the ability to be coherent regarding attachment experiences is 
correlated with positive outcomes (see, for example, Karen 1998; Berlin, Cassidy & Appleyard 2008). 
Correlatively, incoherence, evidenced via the violation of these maxims, is associated with adverse 
outcomes both individually and intergenerationally (see, for example, van Ijzendoorn & Bakermans-
Kranenburg 1997). For an example of the clinical application of the AAI in a psychotherapy patient, see 
Muscetta et al. (1999). See also Steele & Steele (2008). 
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interest, Holmes’s suggestion that there might be a correspondence between them based 
on coherence conflates the philosophical distinction between the coherence theory of 
truth and the correspondence theory of truth and ignores the gamut of clinical literature 
arguing against this very claim (including Spence [1982a, 1982b], whom I discuss 
below). Furthermore, such a position displaces the focus of the clinic from unconscious 
(psychical) truth to a good story, which, as I describe below, is also the pitfall of the 
narrativists.  
 The chasm between narrative truth and historical truth is well articulated by 
Spence, a psychoanalyst who follows a narrativist approach:
172
 “Narrative truth is 
confused with historical truth, and the very coherence of an account may lead us to 
[mistakenly] believe that we are making contact with an actual happening” (1982a, p. 
27). And further:  
[T]he particular satisfaction that comes from good narrative fit should not be 
confused with the excitement of making a historical discovery; constructions 
should not be shaded into reconstructions, and the difference between the two 
kinds of truth statements should always be kept in mind. (1982a, p. 185)
173
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 This “narrative approach” to psychoanalysis characterizes the work of, for example, Geha (e.g., 1993, 
1996), Riceour (e.g., 1970/1977), and Schafer (e.g., 1987, 1996). Geha describes the extreme version of 
this narrative approach, fictionalism: “Fictionalism maintains that all aspects of human experience are 
creations of imagination, that mind-made realities constitute for human beings their sole realm of existence, 
and that it is only about these realms that anything at all can be known. No other knowable realities exist” 
(1993, p. 209). Further, Geha argues that “psychoanalysis is basically a fictional enterprise” (p. 210). To be 
clear, he does not intend this argument as a criticism of the psychoanalytic project; rather, he uses this 
argument to frame his criticisms of psychoanalytic “realism.” Less extreme, Spence quotes Schafer on the 
analyst’s role: to “help [analysands] transform these narrations into others that are more complete, coherent, 
convincing, and adaptively useful than those they have been accustomed to constructing” (Schafer 1980, p. 
63; qtd. in Spence 1983, p. 460). Loewenstein (1991) provides a comparison of the narrative approach and 
the positivist scientific approach of the ego psychologists (e.g., Kohut 2011/1990; Hartmann 1939/1964a, 
1964b) and criticizes the narrativists and the ego psychologists alike for constructing coherence as one of 
the pillars of psychoanalytic truth. 
173
 Cf. Schimek: “What Freud (1899) said about conscious childhood memories – namely, that they are 
only memories ‘relating to our childhood,’ which do not simply re-emerge in the present, but are ‘formed at 
that time’ – should apply as well to the reconstruction of the past through the psychoanalytic process” 
(1975, p. 862); and Eickhoff, in his work on Nachträglichkeit, who also quotes Freud: “‘Our childhood 
memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the 
memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as people are 
accustomed to say, emerge; they were formed at that time. And a number of motives, with no concern for 
125 
 
 
Succinctly, Spence emphasizes: “Narrative fit speaks to narrative truth; it says relatively 
little about historical truth” (1982a, p. 187). Even as Spence distinguishes between 
narrative truth and historical truth, he privileges narrative truth for the transformative 
effects it may have in the analytic setting: “narrative truth has a special significance in its 
own right and [...] making contact with the actual past may be of far less significance 
than creating a coherent and consistent account of a particular set of events” (1982a, p. 
28; my emphasis). While the correspondence between narrative truth and historical truth 
may not be as close as Holmes suggests, the asymmetry between them may not be as 
radical as Spence argues.
174
  
 Avenburg and Guiter, following Freud’s use of “historical reality” to refer to the 
subjective experience and “material reality” to refer to that which may be confirmed by 
external sources,
175
 suggest that 
the concept of truth includes different realities and, in analysis, is capable of 
resolving the opposition between internal and external by pointing precisely to 
those moments upon which such distinction between psychical reality and 
external reality was founded, the moment when both realities were one and the 
same, i.e. only one truth, a material truth which was then preserved as historical 
                                                                                                                                                                             
historical accuracy, had a part in forming them, as well as in the selection of the memories themselves’” 
(Freud 1899, p. 322; original italics; qtd. in Eickhoff 2006, p. 1457). 
174
 Fitzpatrick Hanly provides an assessment of the current status of narrative in clinical psychoanalysis, 
suggesting that the “idea of a ‘narrative approach’ has come to mean that the history of the psyche of a 
patient is inaccessible and that what the analyst should aim to achieve in the process of the analysis is the 
co-construction of a ‘story’ agreed to by both analyst and patient. The psychoanalytic process constructs a 
fiction that is somehow helpful” (1996, p. 445). Referring to the clinical process (as opposed to theory), 
Fitzpatrick Hanly importantly argues that psychoanalytic discourse cannot be reduced to a narrative process 
without doing injustice to its integral aspects: “Disorganized, disconnected and fragmentary, with gaps 
whose content lie in the unconscious, and lacking any clear beginning-middle-end sequence, 
psychoanalytic ‘discourse’ has a unique status. To use the word ‘narrative’ (with its connotations of clear 
‘beginning, middle, end sequence’ and ‘coherence’) for this special discourse can blur many distinct 
features of free association and can ignore the deeper structures of the psyche that are glimpsed through 
disjunctions in the associative process” (p. 451).  
175
 It is interesting to note that the shift from contrasting historical reality with material reality to contrasting 
narrative truth with historical truth implicitly conceals the fictional aspects of any “history,” which is 
always already a subjective narrative construction of past events. Schimek traces this shift in Freud’s work, 
noting that “Freud started with the assumption that the analyst was unearthing unconscious memories of 
actual events, then only fantasies, then a psychical reality inherited from prehistoric events, and, finally, 
back to individual experiences that ‘did really happen’” (1975, p. 858). See Schimek (1987) for the further 
development of these arguments. 
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truth in our subjectivity, separated from that other reality which is present, 
immediate and conventional. (1976, p. 17) 
“Truth,” then, brings us back to Chapter Two, the question of what is internal and what is 
external, and the process of reality-testing. As I suggest above, the question of truth is 
here of interest in its relation to coherence and the process of free association. As with the 
question of internal versus external, the question of truth is deceptively – impossibly – 
simple. The traditional philosophical notions of truth, established according to either 
correspondence or coherence, counters the work of free association in the psychoanalytic 
setting. As Stern suggests to one of his patients, “‘Go ahead and lie’” (1966, p. 144). 
With this permission to deviate from the “truth,” Stern encouraged the patient to “[make] 
up stories, creating material out of the spontaneous imaginative elements of his mind on 
the spur of the moment” (1966, p. 144).  
 I do not endeavour to construct a philosophical or metapsychological theory of 
truth. I wish only to indicate the impossibility of arriving at Truth, which is my second 
point here. Drawing attention to the truth of speech, Lacan states: “I always speak the 
truth. Not the whole truth, because there's no way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally 
impossible: words fail. Yet it's through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto 
the real” (1990, p. 3). This statement brings us back again to my arguments in Chapter 
Two. The real is that which resists. Narrative coherence indicates that the real remains 
outside of the story. As I argued in Chapter Three, the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness 
is better explained by the presence of traumatic and unmourned losses than by a deficient 
reflective function (as Milrod [2007] suggests). The historical reality of these losses must 
be given their due weight. Miller argues that, clinically, “what is said is not to be 
measured against what is” (1990, p. xxii). Further, the truth “is related to the real […] by 
the impossible-to-say” (Miller 1990, p. xxiii). A narrative’s coherence, then, more likely 
indicates an altogether different relation to “historical reality” than the one Holmes 
suggests above. This impossibility (“saying it all”), like the “impossibility” of following 
the fundamental rule and the “impossibility” of analytic neutrality, does not entail that 
there is no use in the attempt. That is, the real resists symbolization, but one works at it 
and one gets better at saying more. There is always, as Faimberg notes (and I return to 
below), “an insistent residue” (1997, p. 449), but the more that can be said, the closer one 
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is able to approximate truth: to approach psychical truth and account for the unconscious 
compromises between material reality and the mediating ego. As Bollas argues (and I 
developed in Chapter Two):  
The analyst must return to the patient’s presentation of his or her facts of life not 
because they bear some meta-truth in themselves that will displace the patient’s 
projective constructions of an internal world, but because the patient is entering 
the intrinsically traumatic in the process of analysis, unconsciously asking that 
the trauma of things done be addressed. (1995, p. 113; original emphasis) 
The truth of the psychoanalytic process is this: that the patient is “unconsciously asking 
that the trauma” be recognized by someone other than herself. As I argued in Chapter 
Two, it is only once the loss is acknowledged in external reality that the patient – and 
especially, I argue, the agoraphobic – can begin to take for granted the distinction 
between internal and external. 
 
4.2. Free Association, Coherence, and Resistance  
Free association that reveals a coherent theme is already affected by anxiety, and the 
cohesion of ideas is a defence organization. 
(Winnicott 1971, p. 55)  
As I suggest above, the agoraphobic individual displays a kind of repetition compulsion 
of narratives. Frances and Dunn note that some “[agoraphobic] patients report repetitive 
ruminations or fantasies which they ‘use’ to protect them from frightening situations” 
(1975, p. 438).
176
 Capps and Ochs (1995), Davidson (2000, 2001), and Hollway and 
Jefferson (2001) provide some data on the specific “repetitive ruminations” that 
agoraphobics use. Although Frances and Dunn suggest that the “repetitive ruminations or 
fantasies” protect agoraphobic individuals from frightening situations, Capps and Ochs 
importantly add that “agoraphobia is in part kept alive through [...] repeated 
psychological reconstructions of panic” (1995, p. 21; my emphasis). Capps and Ochs 
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 See also Parsons 2000, p. 41: “He spoke without emotion and his narrative technique obviously served 
to keep him affectively out of touch with what he was describing. Near the end of one session I commented 
on his organised way of presenting himself: perhaps it might be to try and ward of inner feelings of chaos.”  
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perform a three-year case study on agoraphobia and discourse; Meg is the subject of this 
study. Through an analysis of Meg’s discourse, Capps and Ochs demonstrate that 
agoraphobia is not only “kept alive” but continuously revivified and reinforced.177 
Davidson works with groups of agoraphobic women and suggests that “[e]ach individual 
has a different story to tell, and many continue to speculate and rework their narratives to 
the present day” (2001, p. 293). Unlike other psychological disorders, these individual 
stories about the disorder seem to be an integral aspect of the agoraphobic experience. 
Hollway and Jefferson consider the question of why these repetitive ruminations, which 
the agoraphobic often uses – consciously – in the aim of understanding her agoraphobic 
anxieties, are unsuccessful in relieving those anxieties. Hollway and Jefferson draw 
attention to the unconscious uses of narrative to, as Frances and Dunn indicate, “protect 
them from frightening situations,” or, I add, to protect themselves from frightening 
feelings of, specifically, rage and grief.  
 Fink (2010) has argued that it is not necessary for a patient to understand the 
aetiology of her traumatic neuroses in order for the alleviation of her symptoms. On the 
contrary, understanding can be used, intellectually, to defend against overwhelming 
affects.
178
 As I argued in Chapter Three, Milrod’s patients exhibit an increased 
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 I return to Capps and Ochs, and their case study of Meg, in Section 4.4.   
178
 See also Grotstein: “Understanding is a myth, a falsehood – on its way to becoming a lie – and subverts 
transcending experience” (1981, p. 29). For a clinical example, see Jacobs 2012, p. 65. Although Jacobs’s 
point is not that understanding is not necessary, or can even impede, analytic progress, he provides a clear 
clinical vignette of the limits of understanding. Indeed, like the agoraphobic patients I describe here, 
Jacobs’s patient uses narrative – in this case, phrases previous of his analysts had used – to defend himself 
against overwhelming affect and true engagement with his unconscious, leading to little psychical 
transformation or growth: “He carried the analyst’s words—he memorized phrases—with him like a magic 
talisman that he pulled out for use when needed. His defenses against true reliving and re-experiencing, 
both within and outside of the transference, remained unchanged” (2012, p. 65). See also p. 66: “Perhaps 
his intellectual grasp of the conflicts that lay behind his symptoms and many aspects of his character had 
increased, but this knowledge had not seemed to touch him.” Although some (see, for example, Goldberg 
2012, p. 162) have misread Fink (2010) as arguing against the analyst’s understanding, it is clear Fink 
refers specifically to the analysand’s understanding. At the same time, a therapeutic emphasis on 
understanding certainly distracts the analyst from his primary task of listening. Fink is not against 
understanding as such but, more specifically, he is cautioning against using understanding as a primary aim 
of psychoanalysis insofar as it interferes with psychical change: “Understanding what happened, why it 
happened, and how it changed is all well and good, as long as it does not get in the way of the change 
itself” (2010, p. 261). As Phillips phrases it, the “question is what we use understanding to do” 
(Holdengräber 2014; original emphasis). 
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intellectual understanding of their emotional lives; and yet, to reiterate, “this 
understanding did not alter Rita’s need to distance herself from [her daughter] Laura and 
her emotional demands, nor did it make her more empathic with her daughter’s distress” 
(Milrod 2007, p. 1020). 
 As I developed in Chapter Two, the ego is “a coherent organization of mental 
processes” (Freud 1923, p. 17). Resistance is a defence that arises in the clinical setting 
and is the work of the ego struggling to maintain its coherent and familiar self, to not 
admit conflicts into its being. Many theorists have written on the (false) lure of 
coherence. Stern connects truth and coherence, and importantly argues that a patient’s 
strict adherence to “the truth” may interfere with his ability to free associate:  
[F]or some people, free-association is immoral, in accordance with their strict 
background of speaking only the truth and only what they are sure is the truth. 
[...For some, this means] that one has a responsibility to be sure that what is 
spoken corresponds to a rational, conscious estimate of truth. [...I]n order to speak 
along those lines, one must be coherent and accurate so that there is no question 
but that what is spoken is the truth. (1966, p. 143) 
Meerloo similarly notes that “[w]hen patients talk continuously and coherently in the 
therapeutic session, they rarely associate freely” (1959, p. 76). Fink writes: “It is the 
analysand’s ego that seeks to force his thoughts and speech to be coherent, whereas it is 
his ‘free associations’ (as unfree as they ultimately are, in a deeper sense) that allows us a 
glimpse of the repressed” (2007, p. 45). And, further: 
We do not assume that the analysand is of one mind – indeed, we assume that the 
analysand is inhabited by contradictory thoughts and desires, some conscious, 
some preconscious, and some unconscious – and we certainly do not want to be 
complicit with the analysand’s ego when it attempts to impose coherence and 
consistency on what comes out of the analysand’s mouth. (Fink 2007, p. 46; my 
emphasis)  
To clarify: we do not assume that the analysand is “inhabited by contradictory thoughts 
and desires” because she is ill but because that is the very nature of subjectivity. As 
Loewenstein argues, by  
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focusing on coherence […] the narrativists compromise Freud’s insight that the 
subject is divided; that in the subject who says ‘I’ there is an ‘otherness,’ one that 
is erratic, everchanging, ambiguous, contradictory and, as Freud taught us in so 
many ways, defies coherence, certainty, and consistency. (1991, p. 11)  
The coherence of statements regarding an individual’s drives, thoughts, reflections, and 
desires must be distinguished from the coherence of statements regarding “facts,” 
behaviours, or actions. I reiterate Fink’s statement, bearing in mind this important 
distinction: “we assume that the analysand is inhabited by contradictory thoughts and 
desires” (2007, p. 46; emphasis added). 
 Winnicott develops a similar idea of coherence as defence: “free association that 
reveals a coherent theme is already affected by anxiety, and the cohesion of ideas is a 
defence organization” (1971, p. 55). The analyst’s role is to support the emergence of 
incoherence or, perhaps, to bear the communication of nonsense. Winnicott warns against 
the dangers of being “a clever analyst” and of trying “to see order in chaos,” which would 
force “the patient [to] leave the nonsense area because of hopelessness about 
communicating nonsense” (1971, p. 56). As I argued in Chapter Two, via Milner, the 
illusion of shared experience is only possible if there is a time when “it will not be 
necessary for self-preservation’s sake to distinguish clearly between inner and outer, self 
and not-self” (1952, p. 192). If the analysand has to abandon her attempt to communicate 
nonsense, she also has to forsake this opportunity of relief from the conscious distinction 
between the internal and external worlds. As Winnicott writes, an “opportunity for rest 
has been missed because of the therapist’s need to find sense where nonsense is” (1971, 
p. 56). As I also argued in Chapter Two, if the analyst can make room for the analysand’s 
experience of this “opportunity for rest,” the agoraphobic develops a greater sense of 
what is internal and what is external. When this distinction can be taken for granted, the 
third area of experience (shared reality) can be inhabited and language can be used 
creatively rather than only defensively. 
 Singer notes, “[m]any patients […] fear unlimited and unbounded free 
association, for that opens them up to infinity and psychological annihilation, since they 
cannot grasp or get hold of any continuity and coherence of their thought, and thus of 
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themselves” (1977b, p. 475).179 Although Singer is referring to borderline patients and 
their characteristic lack of a stable and coherent sense of self, his remark is equally 
applicable to agoraphobia patients. It is precisely a secure sense of the self separate from 
the other that the agoraphobic lacks and it is only through an exploration of the limits of 
the self via free association that the agoraphobic is able to establish the boundaries 
between self and other that will allow her to explore freely both her external and her 
internal worlds. 
 Green develops the connection between free association and the negative, which, 
as I argued in Chapter Three, manifests pathologically in agoraphobia patients as 
‘persistent emptiness’: “Free association [...] is still the most prototypical expression of 
the negative. What does free association mean if not loosening the noose of the positive 
which constrains consciousness?” (1999, p. 37). I draw attention to Green’s metaphor of 
the noose: even in the thought of a noose, one feels one’s breath quickening and 
becoming shallow; the noose impinges the breath as the tyranny of the positive tightens 
around the agoraphobic, constricting her worlds, both internal and external. If the 
negative cannot be tolerated, the noose tightens. Approaching emptiness, or the open 
door, cannot be without its anxiety. If the analyst can encourage this exploration of space 
and freedom via free association, the analysand can contemplate and risk more feelings 
and more experiences (that is, more experiences in the internal and the external worlds). 
  As I described in Chapter Two, the ego is an essentially coherent organization of 
psychical reality. An adherence to coherence, which is the cause of the agoraphobic’s 
suffering, interferes with destabilizing the ego’s organization. In health, the ego need not 
adhere to its organization so rigidly, as evidenced in Green’s additional description of the 
ego’s functions: “The ego must chiefly be able to establish flexible connections, which 
alternately are going to be done, forming temporary hypotheses and conclusions, and be 
undone, in order to leave room for others who give a better representation of the 
situation” (1986, p. 20; my emphasis). In Bollas’s terms, coherence is precisely not 
                                                          
179
 Lacan writes: “with the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, the analyst is far from directing the subject 
toward full speech, or toward a coherent discourse – rather, the analyst leaves the subject free to have a go 
at it”; further, “this freedom is what the subject tolerates least easily” (1958/2006b, p. 535). See also Adler 
and Bachant: “Expressive freedom, like any freedom, is both a burden and an opportunity” (1996, p. 1024). 
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psychoanalysis’s therapeutic goal; rather, the goal is to increase the analysand’s freedom 
to free associate, to “crack up” the coherent narratives that the conscious mind is 
constantly writing. This dialectic movement between uniting disparate ideas and breaking 
up those unities is evidence of “unconscious freedom” (Bollas 1995, p. 3).180 The 
agoraphobic, I suggest, uses narrative to stave off the overwhelming emotions that 
accompany incoherence. She uses narrative to resist the disorganization, the undoing, of 
the ego’s connections.181 The agoraphobic protects her neuroses to prevent a descent into 
psychosis.
182
 As Green writes, “[r]esistance opposes the danger of disorganisation 
through a loss of control of speech and through speech which gives rise to a fear of 
madness” (1999, p. 270).  
 Bollas argues that the psychical processes involved in dream work also occur 
during waking life
183
: the movement between condensation and dissemination
184
 is the 
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 Rey – whose work I discussed in Chapter Two – also indicates that one aim of psychoanalytic treatment 
is “to increase freedom of choice” (1994, p. 32). Similarly, Meerloo states: “when a neurotic patient is 
really able to associate freely (in the psychoanalytic sense) he is, in effect, cured” (1959, p. 76). Milner 
makes a similar point: “as all analytic experience shows, it is when the patient becomes able to talk about 
all that he is aware of, when he can follow the analytic rule, then in fact he becomes able to relate himself 
more adequately to the world outside. As he becomes able to tolerate more fully the symbolic reality of the 
analytic relationship and the literal reality of libidinal satisfaction outside the frame of the session, then he 
becomes better (1952, p. 194). 
181
 See also Wilson, who argues that the patient often consciously experiences her own moments of 
transformative insight as “the emergence of something alien within the self, usually of a drive-related, 
affective, and at times uncanny nature” (1998, p. 54). Wilson argues that the theoretical emphasis on the 
ego’s integrative and narrativizing functions may impede our clinical understanding of these moments of 
insight. 
182
 As I suggested, tentatively, in Chapter Two, it is possible that agoraphobia is a defense against a further 
breakdown towards schizophrenia. It is this breakdown that the agoraphobic fears and protects against. It is 
the analyst’s responsibility to maintain the boundaries of the analysis to protect against an unlimited 
breakdown. See also, Adler and Bachant 1996, p. 1021: “Honoring the boundaries of this structure [the 
analytic situation] serves to guarantee the safety of both participants by channeling and absorbing the 
powerful psychological forces released by the psychoanalytic process. […F]ree association and analytic 
neutrality are the fundamental structural pillars of the psychoanalytic situation, providing stability in the 
wake of the regressive and progressive currents of the psychoanalytic process” (my emphases). I discuss 
Adler and Bachant’s work further below. 
183
 See also A. Freud (1937/1966/1993): “The dreamer’s psychic state differs little from that of the patient 
during the analytic hour” (p. 15). The phenomenon of secondary revision refers to the “phenomenon of 
ordering, connecting and making [dreams] intelligible” (Breznitz 1971, p. 407). This phenomenon 
explicitly connects the psychical processes at work in dream and waking states. As Breznitz and Stein both 
argue, “[s]econdary revision […] is not confined to the sleeping state, but merges into waking and is the 
major contribution of waking thought to the final version of the dream” (Stein 1989, p. 70; see also 
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dialectic of the unconscious. The process “starts with a sequence of psychically intense 
experiences during the day, continues with the dream ‘event,’ followed by cracking up 
the dream contents through free association” (Bollas 1995, p. 3). Unconscious freedom is 
“found in the necessary opposition” between these two movements, each of which offers 
its own truths (p. 3). The aggressivity inherent in this process is clear: “Free association is 
creative destruction. […] It is essential to one’s personal freedom to break up lucid 
unities of thought, lest consciousness become a form of ideational incarceration” (Bollas 
1995, p. 53). As I argued in Chapter Two, via Winnicott, aggressivity “creates the quality 
of externality” (Winnicott 1951, p. 93). It is precisely a sense of externality – or rather, a 
confident sense of what is internal versus what is external; and, hence, a sense of what 
belongs to the self, as well as the self’s limits – that the agoraphobic lacks. The 
agoraphobic, I suggest, is unable to mobilize her aggressivity in the service of this 
creative destruction.  
 As opposed to Bollas, who follows Freud (1900) in arguing that these two 
processes of uniting and “cracking up” are conversely related,185 Spence (1982a) argues 
that there is too much conscious control over free association for that to be the case.
186
 
Specifically, Spence writes that the “partitioning” required for the dream’s articulation 
“introduces an element of conscious control into what is assumed to be a largely 
unconscious and automatic process”; furthermore, “the very fact of fragmentation does 
damage to the integrity of the dream” (Spence 1982a, p. 67). This last point takes us back 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Breznitz 1971, p. 407). Fitzpatrick Hanly notes that “[s]econdary revision brings it about that the more 
coherent is the telling of a dream the more distorted it may be and the more defended the patient against the 
latent content in which its meaning lies” (1996, p. 451). See also Bion’s (1962b) waking dream state, 
which, as Ferro (2005) discusses, broadens the dream work to include both sleeping dreams and waking 
dreams. 
184
 “Dissemination” is Bollas’s term for the ‘cracking up’ process of free association. It helps move the 
dream work, traditionally associated with condensation and displacement, into waking life. I return to the 
logic of the unconscious below, which includes, for example, these processes of condensation and 
displacement, timelessness, and the absence of negation. See also infra note 164. 
185
 When there is a moderate level of resistance, Freud writes, “the dreamer’s associations begin by 
diverging widely from the manifest elements, so that a great number of subjects and ranges of ideas are 
touched on, after which, a second series of associations quickly converge from these on to the dream-
thoughts that are being looked for” (1923, p. 110). 
186
 Many have noted that free association is not actually ‘free.’ See, for example: Busch (1995); Fink 
(2007); Freud (1925a); and, Scarfone (qtd. in McDermott 2003). See also infra note 202. 
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to Bollas’s term “cracking up,” which implies more than denies the aggressive nature of 
free association and the “damage” to the dream’s integrity (whatever it is that “integrity” 
might mean in terms of a dream
187
) that Spence warns against. Consciousness can never 
be entirely absent from the work of analysis; to argue that free association is too 
conscious of a process implies, as a corollary, that consciousness is contrary to the work 
of analysis, or interferes with the work of analysis. Spence’s argument is that how we 
choose to put our dreams into words affects our memory of them; on this point, we agree. 
Spence suggests, as a consequence of that argument, that there is something inherently 
limited about language and that attempting to put pictures into words is, inevitably, an 
impossible task. Again, I concur. However, I additionally argue, the words we choose to 
describe a dream image is as significant as the dream image itself. That process of 
selection is part of the analytic work: choosing to say some words and choosing not to 
say others even as we try to say it all. The dream work – not the dream – is most 
significant to the process of analysis,
188
 which, as Aron indicates, is precisely Freud’s 
argument:  
Freud believed that the narrative coherence of dreams argued against their being 
considered the product of random neurological processes. In clinical work with 
dreams, however, Freud argued that analysts “should disregard the apparent 
coherence between the dream’s constituents as an unessential illusion” (1900, p. 
449). [...D]reaming is both meaningful and motivated, but the meaning and 
motivation are to be found not in the manifest content, but in the dreamer’s 
associations. (1989, p. 110)   
Again, the dream’s “apparent coherence” is a red herring and leads the analytic work 
away from the unconscious (Aron 1989, p. 114). Aron indicates that an analytic focus on 
the manifest content of dreams (namely, the narrative or the story rather than the details 
and their associations) is accompanied by either a movement away from, or a complete 
rejection of, the method of free association; furthermore, the abandonment of the free 
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 As Stein indicates, “[m]ost of the dreams told to us are ‘dreamlike,’ full of contradictions and 
inconsistencies, mixed up in time and space, making little sense at first” (1989, p. 67) 
188
 See also Faimberg 1997, p. 440: “In the session, for example, we interpret not a dream, which is an 
absent object, but the account of a dream, which forms part of the context of the history of the 
transference” (original emphasis). See also Lacan 2006i, pp. 393-394: “‘Only the dream’s elaboration 
interests us,’ Freud says.” See also Green (1975). 
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association method is often accompanied by a de-emphasis of the role of psychic conflict. 
Focusing on narrative coherence forecloses the emergence of the unconscious in the gaps 
revealed by language, gaps which must emerge in order for new thoughts and feelings to 
be possible. 
 To this end, Lacan argues that narrative coherence is antithetical to the work of 
analysis, which requires precisely, as I indicate above, a dismantling of coherence: 
Certainly, there is no question of restoring the chain of those reactions through the 
narrative, but the very moment in which the account is given can constitute a 
significant fragment of the chain, on condition that we demand that the patient 
provide the entire text and that we free him from the chains of the narrative. 
(2006a, p. 65; my emphasis) 
Narrative coherence, rather than indicating an individual’s state of psychological well-
being or providing a therapeutic end-goal, can become a prison not unlike the 
agoraphobic’s so-called safe space. What was once a retreat from the terrifying outside, 
the terrifying world of possibilities, becomes its own enclosure from which one cannot 
escape. 
 Stern suggests a connection between the process of free association and the state 
of original unity out of which the ego develops. This connection returns us again to the 
concerns of Chapter Two. He writes: 
On a certain primitive level of the unconscious, we might conjecture that free 
association represents the full reign of the polymorphous perverse activity of a 
child which at one time was all-pervasive and ego-syntonic. To achieve in 
psychoanalytic treatment the capacity for the optimum in free association means 
recapturing that childhood state when reality was almost indistinguishable from 
fantasy and differences were usually irrelevant. It means again attaining the 
feelings of that early period of our life when words, any words, were greeted like 
the first bloom of spring, and before the first frost of the fear of the social 
consequences of these words were felt. This was the pre-Oedipal period before the 
enormous filtering process began which has left so many people stifled of free 
expression or imagination and in a world with too sterile a sense of reality. (1966, 
p. 146) 
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Stern’s comments, taken into consideration alongside Avenburg and Guiter (whom I 
reference above), allow us to connect psychoanalytic truth and free association. As I 
argued in Chapter Two, for the agoraphobic, something has gone awry in the process of 
creative differentiation, which is to say in the development of the ego out of an original 
unity. To return to, as Stern writes, “that childhood state” in phantasy provides the 
agoraphobic patient another opportunity to re-evaluate the relationship between internal 
and external realities “by pointing precisely to those moments upon which such 
distinctions between psychical reality and external reality was founded” (Avenburg & 
Guiter 1976, p. 17). The agoraphobic remains inhibited by “the fear of the social 
consequences of [...] words”; the analyst, then, and as I developed in Chapter Two, must 
encourage the development of the analysand’s free associations by assuring her that the 
analyst will not be destroyed in external reality.
189
 
 
4.3. Free Association and Transference 
It is perfectly true that psychoanalysis, like other psychotherapeutic methods, employs the 
instrument of suggestion (or transference). But the difference is this: that in analysis it is 
not allowed to play the decisive part in determining the therapeutic results. 
 
(Freud 1925a, p. 11) 
 
 As I indicate above, Milrod’s (2007) discussion of the clinical case studies she presents 
emphasizes the transference relationship and implies (as she argues elsewhere: see Milrod 
et al. 2000, 2001, 2007) that it is this particular element of psychoanalysis that 
distinguishes it from the temporary effects of the psychiatric treatment of agoraphobia. I 
argue that the limitations of interpreting the transference in effecting change – 
particularly in relieving the agoraphobic’s “persistent emptiness” – is evident in Milrod’s 
(2007) description of her patient’s progress. To reiterate, the substitutive relationship with 
the analyst allows for higher everyday functioning, but it fails to relieve the patient’s 
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 See also Fink 2010, p. 272: “The neurotic is often afraid of the hostility that inhabits him, but if we face 
it openly, often he can too, and this opens the door to exploring it through speech, destroying neither 
himself nor others in the process.” 
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psychic emptiness. While it is necessary to understand both the fundamental rule of 
psychoanalysis and the phenomenon of transference, the relation of the one to the other is 
equally important in the practice of psychoanalysis. Following Freud (1914a, 1925a), 
psychoanalysis is defined by the particular method of free association: free association is 
the method; transference is a tool.  
 
There are two trends within the (scant
190
) literature on free association. The first 
(and historically earlier) trend, which assumes that the concept is familiar enough that it 
hardly bears repeating,
191
 concerns exceptions to the fundamental rule. Laforgue (1937), 
for example, suggests a less strict adherence to the rule for those who obsessively attempt 
to follow the rule to the letter, with the inhibiting effect of not allowing any associations 
to develop; and, for those analysands who refuse to follow the rule, that their refusal be 
analyzed as a symptom rather than forced to comply.
192
 The rule is a therapeutic rather 
than an orthodox one, which ought to be followed insofar as it does not impede the aims 
of analysis. Scott (1958) follows Laforgue’s argument and provides his own version of 
the rule. Scott begins an analysis with, “Try to lie down and talk about anything and 
everything” (1958, p. 108). He suggests, however, that speech can become a defense 
against noise. Like Stern’s patient, who needed permission to “lie,” Scott indicates that 
                                                          
190
 Mahoney (1979) provides a review of contributions to the psychoanalytic literature on free association. 
Although Kris suggests that the psychoanalytic literature on free association is “especially rich” (1982, p. 
ix), contemporary emphasis has shifted. A “Title” search on pep-web.org (Psychoanalytic Electronic 
Publishing) for “free association” returns 229 matches. 78 matches actually have “free association” in the 
title; the remaining 151 returns were published by Free Association Books, but are not concerned with the 
concept of free association. By contrast, a similar search for “transference” returns 1013 matches. Bollas 
notes this theoretical shift: “From Dora onwards the analytical literature reveals an increasing 
preoccupation with the Transference and correspondingly there is a dramatic decrease, not only in the 
literature on free association but, more tellingly, in the intellectual exploration of this division of function” 
[i.e., of “the free associating analysand and the evenly suspended analyst, a relation specifically designed to 
elicit unconscious lines of thought with the aim of discovering some of the latent mental contents”] (2013, 
p. 88; p. 85).   
191
 Laforgue, for example, writes: “By the fundamental rule of psycho-analytic treatment we mean, as you 
know, the injunction which we give to our patients that, during the analytic hour, they are to tell us 
everything which comes into their minds and to conceal none of their thoughts, whatever they may be” 
(1937, p. 35; my emphasis). 
192
 This force would clearly not serve the aims of analysis as contemporary analysts understand it, which is 
beyond the “revelation” or simple unearthing of unconscious material. And yet, this argument needed to be 
made; see infra note 163. 
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some patients may need permission to communicate extra-verbally – with sounds that are 
not quite yet speech – as he observed in some regressive patients. In these cases, he re-
formulated the rule: “Try to talk, etc., and if you can’t talk, try to make some kind of 
noise, and if you don’t know what kind of noise to make just guess” (Scott 1958, p. 108). 
Scott points to the ‘pre-verbal’ infant, to whom a mother makes many sounds, both 
stimulating and comforting, that are not words and from whom babbling necessarily 
precedes speech. Noises can communicate something the analysand is not yet able to put 
into words. As I suggest above, there are times when the analyst must bear the 
analysand’s nonsense.  
 
The second, more recent, trend in the literature on free association concerns its 
centrality in the psychoanalytic session. Some (e.g., Adler & Bachant 1996; Bollas 2013; 
Busch 1995; Fink 2007; Kris 1983, 1992) consider that free association and the analyst’s 
encouragement of free association (by way of, for example, “analytic neutrality”) form 
the pillars of the psychoanalytic situation. Others (e.g., Hoffman 2006; Smith 2001, 
2004) emphasize the relational aspects of the analysis. Although each side specifically 
disagrees with the other, both highlight words’ powerful psychological effects. Hoffman, 
for example, writes: the “idea that words are a completely different category of ‘action’, 
protected by the sacrosanct rule of ‘free association’, denies the enormous power that 
words have in the construction of human experience” (2006, p. 59). For Hoffman, the 
enormous power that words have means that they must be moderated. The sentence 
quoted above is immediately preceded by: “No one would think twice about telling a 
patient who was starting to undress to keep his or her clothes on” (Hoffman 2006, p. 59). 
Hoffman implies that some words spoken out loud are akin to a patient undressing: in 
some sense inappropriate.
193
 Adler and Bachant, from the opposing point of view, make a 
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 Hoffman provides the clinical example of a “patient who suddenly turns hostile” (2006, p. 57), 
responding to all of his [Hoffman’s] interpretations with various sarcastic replies such as: “‘If you say so’ 
or ‘I guess you know’ or ‘Whatever you say, Hoffman’ or ‘Sure, that must be it, sir! You’re the boss’” (p. 
56). Hoffman suggests the following might be an appropriate reply: “‘You know you’re being awfully rude. 
I want to understand what this is about, but I don’t think I deserve to be treated this way, so I wish you’d 
find another way to express what you are feeling. In fact, I wish you would tell me more about what you 
are feeling more directly’” (p. 58). This suggestion is, of course, an interpretation that explicitly request 
further associations. Some analysts might suggest that it is precisely Hoffman’s insistent “attempts to 
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similar point: “expressive freedom is not an unconditional privilege”; to the contrary, 
“there may be times when a patient engages in verbal acts which violate the safety or 
dignity of the therapist” (1996, pp. 1028-1029).194 But, for those who privilege free 
association as the method particular to psychoanalysis, it is precisely the power of words 
that differentiates them from other kinds of “actions.” The transformative potential of 
psychoanalysis is in “the enormous power that words have in the construction of human 
experience.” As I state above, I argue in line with those who consider free association 
part of the fundamental rule, distinctive to the method of psychoanalysis. Given the 
agoraphobic’s problematic engagement with language and her limited ability to 
symbolize (that is, to put her feelings into words), an overemphasis on interpreting the 
transference to the detriment of the development of the analysand’s associations 
entrenches the relational aspects of the disorder. In order to break through this relational 
dilemma, the analyst must clear an appropriate space – an emptiness; a silence – to make 
room for the unconscious. Interpreting the transference repeats what the agoraphobic 
already knows and leaves no room for what neither the analyst nor the analysand have yet 
to discover of the analysand’s psychical reality. In light of this argument, I turn now to 
the specifics of the fundamental rule, including both free association and the analyst’s 
role in relation to the analysand’s free associations, variously conceived of as “evenly 
hovering attention” or “neutrality.”195  
 Lichtenberg and Galler (1987) conducted a survey, which asked analysts how 
they presented the fundamental rule to their analysands and what considerations led to 
their choice of initial guidelines. A number of respondents indicated that they did not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
interpret and understand” (Hoffman 2006, p. 58; my emphasis) that led to his patient’s trenchant hostility. 
If he could set aside the desire to understand, it might be more possible for the patient to say more about 
what he is feeling.  
194
 I draw attention to the different connotations between Hoffman’s sense of inappropriate words and 
Adler and Bachant’s explicit concern for the analyst; unlike some straw-men arguments against “analytic 
neutrality” (which Adler and Bachant argue for), Adler and Bachant demonstrate a clear recognition of the 
analyst as a person involved in the progress of the analysis. See also infra note 195. 
195
 I suggest that both “analytic neutrality” and the analyst’s “evenly hovering” or “evenly suspended” 
attention refer to the same analytic stance in relation to the analysand’s free associations. I refer specifically 
to Adler and Bachant’s explication of analytic neutrality, which includes three specific aspects: “neutrality 
with regard to conflict, neutrality with regard to sequence, and neutrality with regard to transference” 
(1996, p. 1021). Analytic neutrality, in this technical sense, “does not imply the eradication of the analyst as 
a person from the interaction” (1996, p. 1032). Clinically, analytic neutrality helps to maintain the analytic 
stance of evenly suspended attention and serves to encourage the analysand’s free associations.  
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make a point to articulate the fundamental rule to candidates (those patients training to be 
psychoanalysts themselves) or to so-called sophisticated patients who already knew what 
was expected of them (Lichtenberg & Galler 1987, p. 59). These analysts seem to have 
overlooked the rather basic point of psychoanalysis that saying something aloud has an 
effect; knowledge is not sufficient, nor can it be assumed. That is to say, it is not enough 
that an analysand knows what is expected in the psychoanalytic clinic, at least in part 
because the fundamental rule – distinct from the process of free association – is the 
“pact” to which Freud (1940, p. 174) and Lichtenberg and Galler (1987, p. 48) refer. The 
fundamental rule is an agreement that must be negotiated between the analyst and the 
analysand and not just ‘understood’: nothing ‘goes without saying’ in analysis! 
Something left unsaid is at least as significant as what is said aloud.
196
 And, as 
Lichtenberg and Galler’s survey makes clear, the formulation of the fundamental rule, 
and therefore the pact between analyst and analysand, is far from uniform. 
 The specific words one uses to describe the fundamental rule are, as I imply 
above, important. Freud, for example, provides this formulation:  
We tell the patient that without further reflection he should put himself into a 
condition of calm self-observation and that he must then communicate whatever 
results this introspection gives him - feelings, thoughts, reminiscences, in the 
order in which they appear to his mind. At the same time, we warn him 
expressly against yielding to any motive which would induce him to choose or 
exclude any of his thoughts as they arise, in whatever way the motive may be 
couched and however it may excuse him from telling us the thought: “that it is 
too unpleasant,” or “too indiscreet” for him to tell; or “it is too unimportant,” or 
“it does not belong here,” “it is nonsensical.” We impress upon him the fact that 
he must skim only across the surface of his consciousness and must drop the last 
vestige of a critical attitude toward that which he finds. (1920b, p. 130)
197
   
                                                          
196
 See Lacan (2006a, 2006c). And see Dor 1985/1998, p. 152 for Lacan on “the said,” “the half-said,” and 
“the saying.” See also Harari 2004, p. 76: “Lacan wanted to convey that the only thing truth can do is 
speak, that what we may attain of truth can be reached through speech, into whose bosom truth slips. Truth 
is said, but it is not fully said. […] In order for something to be said, something else must inevitably remain 
unsaid. This is where the register of the Real appears. Truth is real because it cannot be fully said.” 
197
 This passage is repeated almost verbatim in Freud 1923, p. 238, with the additional note: “It is uniformly 
found that precisely those ideas which provoke these last-mentioned reactions are of particular value in 
discovering the forgotten material.” Bollas draws attention to this latter note (2013, pp. 86-87). 
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Lichtenberg and Galler describe the deceptive simplicity of the rule thusly: “Analytic 
patients are to put into words all their thoughts, feelings, and perceptions” (1987, p. 48). 
The entirety of Freud’s version of the fundamental rule is implicit in Lichtenberg and 
Galler’s formulation, but is certainly not explicit. Their description beyond this sentence 
explicates the effects of following this rule, but is not integral to the rule itself. The rule 
of psychoanalysis is not just that the analysand will follow the method of free association, 
but refers more precisely to the pact between the analyst and the analysand.
198
 The second 
essential aspect of the fundamental rule, Bollas draws attention to Freud’s description of 
the analytic role:  
The attitude which the analytic physician could most advantageously adopt [is] to 
surrender himself to his own unconscious mental activity, in a state of evenly 
suspended attention, to avoid so far as possible reflection and the construction of 
conscious expectations, not to try to fix anything he hear[s] particularly in his 
memory, and by these means to catch the drift of the patient’s unconscious with 
his own unconscious. (Freud 1923, p. 239; qtd. in Bollas 2013, p. 86) 
The fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, then, is the pact between the analysand and the 
analyst that each will fulfil their particular role in the analytic session. Bollas calls this 
fulfillment the “Freudian Pair,” referring specifically to this division of function: the 
freely associating analysand who has the evenly suspended attention of the analyst.
199
 
 Milner, in her important work on symbolism, indicates something of the 
relationship between free association and the transference: 
The analytic rule that the patient shall try to put all that he is aware of into words 
does seem to me to imply a belief in the importance of symbolization for maturity 
as well as for infancy; it implies the recognition that words are in fact symbols by 
means of which the world is comprehended. Thus in the daily battle with our 
patients over the transference we are asking them to accept a symbolic relation to 
                                                          
198
 Only several writers (e.g., Mahoney [1979] and Kanzer [1972]) have noted the distinction between free 
association and the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis. Free association is the method of psychoanalysis 
and, as Kanzer notes, “predisposes to withdrawal and narcissistic states”; this method is complemented by 
the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, the pact between analyst and analysand, which “involves a two-
person relationship” (1972, p. 265). 
199
 See also McDermott: “In the analytic situation, the evenly hovering attention of the analyst is as 
important as the analysand’s free associations” (Hoffer; qtd. in McDermott 2003, p. 1349).  
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the analyst instead of a literal one, to accept the symbolism of speech and talking 
about their wants rather than taking action to satisfy them directly. (1952, p. 194) 
The transference influences the patient’s free associations; the transference may even 
determine the patient’s associations – or, more precisely, it may determine which of the 
patient’s associations she is able, or not able, to articulate out loud. Lichtenberg and 
Galler suggest that the rule, insofar as they have expressed it here (as above), is 
“deceptive” since “all analysts know that no patient can or will be able to follow [it]” 
(1987, p. 48). Green expands on the “deceptive” element of the rule: the “fundamental 
rule of not filtering and not selecting is transgressed consciously and unconsciously” 
(1999, p. 270). Note, Green’s negative formulation: not filtering and not selecting. Anna 
Freud clarifies the therapeutic value of both the rule and its transgressions: “what 
concerns us is not simply the enforcement of the fundamental rule of analysis for its own 
sake but the conflict to which this gives rise” (1937/1966/1993, p. 15).200 Just as the 
analyst’s mistakes often lead to transformation (namely, the possibility of new thoughts 
and new feelings),
201
 the analysand’s “transgressions” of the fundamental rule provide 
openings for further explorations. Adler and Bachant note that the conflict frequently 
concerns associations concerning the analyst: “the burdensome aspects [of expressive 
freedom] will come to the fore first as patients attempt, one way or another, to circumvent 
or circumscribe the radical implications of this invitation” (1996, p. 1024).202 Thus, the 
relationship between free association and the transference is once again highlighted as 
method and interference/tool.  
                                                          
200
 See also McDermott, who refers to Scarfone: “the principle of free association as he understands it is 
neither descriptive of what goes on in the session nor prescriptive of what can be turned on and off. He 
proposed that it may be an index showing that thinking is not free, a probe as to where resistance lies. In his 
view, free association is a challenge we artificially put to the patient to show how unfree associations are” 
(2003, p. 1355). 
201
 See my discussion of Wilson on lack in Chapter Three. Faimberg (1997), whose work I discuss below in 
respect to the concept of Nachträglichkeit, considers misunderstanding – both the analyst’s and the 
analysand’s – to be an integral aspect of the psychoanalytic process that leads to the discovery of the 
analysand’s psychic reality. 
202
 See also Meerloo 1959, pp. 75-76: “What originally was called ‘free' association appears to be not at all 
free; it is bound to numerous limitations and is modified in various ways. The flow of ‘free association’ is 
hampered by an infinite combination of feelings of shame, guilt, fear and hostile attitudes and unique 
inhibiting factors usually combined under the name resistance. The therapist plays an immediate role in the 
patient’s form of censorship, even though apparently ‘everything’ may be said. The initial rapport and 
transference determines what the patient dares to say.” 
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 The movements between speech and silence in the clinic provide further evidence 
of the connection between free association and the transference. As I indicated in Chapter 
Three, emptiness and silence are analogous insofar as silence, like emptiness, can be used 
to defend against, for example, an unsayable truth. At the same time, silence can also be a 
pause between the insistence of speech, a pause that makes room for a new thought, a 
new word, or a new feeling. Silence may simply indicate a moment of rest; a lack of 
silence may indicate the impossibility of rest. The analyst’s silence, Lacan writes, 
“implies speech, as we see in the expression ‘to keep silent’ which, speaking of the 
analyst’s silence, means not only that he makes no noise but that he keeps quiet instead of 
responding” (1955/2006j, p. 291; original emphasis). Reik (1963/1968) discusses the 
analyst’s silence – the analyst’s keeping silent – and the effects this silence has on the 
analysand; the analysand interprets the analyst’s silence in various ways according to his 
emotional state in that particular moment. The analyst’s silence may be experienced as 
comforting or as persecuting, and all things in between: 
Slowly the analyst’s silence changes its meaning for the patient. Something occurs 
to the patient which he does not want to tell, or whose telling is difficult for him. 
He talks further of other things, but what he is suppressing keeps forcing itself upon 
him and allows him to discuss other things only with difficulty; now he is silent like 
the analyst. It is as if the analyst’s silence has spread to him, as if he has become 
infected with it. (Reik 1963/1968, p. 176)               
The analyst’s silence, then, encourages the analysand’s “free” associations insofar as that 
which the analysand does not want to say becomes more and more insistent in his or her 
mind. If the analyst interrupts silence with speech, the analysand is able to respond to the 
analyst’s comments rather than attend to that which he is attempting to suppress. This 
point, that the analysand interprets the analyst’s silence in various ways according to his 
or her own fantasies, indicates the development of the transference. The transference, as a 
tool, may be used to encourage further free association, but the point of both the analyst’s 
silence and any transference interpretations is to aid the analysand in saying more: saying 
difficult things more freely and saying new things that he or she has not previously been 
able to say aloud. Or, the analysand does not become “infected” with the analyst’s silence 
and instead uses a wall of words to defend against silence. Reik writes: “In analysis we 
have become familiar enough with patients whose continuous speech has the sense of not 
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saying precisely the most important things” (1963/1968, p. 183). That is, “people often 
speak because they cannot bear silence” (p. 184). If there is no silence, nothing new can 
emerge. Speech can be mobilized as a defence against everything that silence, as Reik 
says, “betrays” (p. 186). This relationship between silence and the development of the 
transference also indicates the relevance of structural emptiness, which is a necessary 
aspect of the process of the analysis and, specifically, in the development of free 
associations. Emptiness, as I detailed in Chapters Two and Three, is the basis of learning 
and of all new experiences.   
Lacan describes the two conditions that constitute the free association of 
“‘analytic experience’”:  
[I]ts first condition is formulated in a law of non-omission, which promotes 
everything that “is self-explanatory,” the everyday and the ordinary, to the status 
of interesting that is usually reserved for the remarkable; but it is incomplete 
without the second condition, the law of non-systematization, which, positing 
incoherence as a condition of analytic experience, presumes significant all the 
dross of mental life – not only the representations in which scholastic psychology 
sees only nonmeaning (dream scenarios, presentiments, daydreams, and confused 
or lucid delusions), but also the phenomena that are not even granted a civil status 
in it, so to speak, since they are altogether negative (slips of the tongue and 
bungled actions). (2006a, p. 66; my emphasis)
203
   
Bollas argues that “the psychoanalyst’s preoccupation with the Transference” causes the 
“suspension of the division of mental function central to the Freudian Pair” (2013, p. 88; 
my emphasis). Arguing in the tradition of Mahoney (1979) and Kanzer (1972) in 
distinguishing the method of free association from the fundamental rule of 
psychoanalysis, Bollas pays particular attention to the analyst’s role as listening with 
evenly suspended attention in order to counter what he sees as a privileging of the 
conscious work of the analyst in interpreting the transference.
204
 Bollas argues that the 
                                                          
203
 See also Lacan 2006e, p. 462.  
204
 Fink (2007) criticizes short-term psychotherapy for its “normalizing” aims (implicit in concepts like 
“high functioning”). See especially Chapter 9 (pp. 206-230), “Non-normalizing Analysis,” connected to his 
critique of transference interpretations existing in the realm of the imaginary. Fink notes the connection 
between an over-emphasis on transference interpretations and short-term psychotherapies (which Milrod’s 
PFPP entails – usually 12 week clinical trials). One of the problems with “normalizing” therapeutic 
practices, focused on promoting “high functioning,” is that it overlooks the deeper unconscious forces at 
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Transference need not interfere with the analytic process so long as free association is 
allowed to develop. Bollas repeats Lacan’s emphasis on free association as constituting 
psychoanalysis and also draws our attention back to Freud’s description of the 
analysand’s position and function. Like Lacan, Bollas highlights the analytic value Freud 
places not so much on the ideas the analysand finds most disagreeable to say, but on the 
ideas that he deems “too unimportant” or “irrelevant to what is being looked for” (Freud 
1923, p. 238; qtd. in Bollas 2013, p. 85). While the Transference might include material 
that the analysand finds particularly disagreeable to speak aloud, this need not interfere 
with the analytic process so long as the analysand continues in her function of free 
associating to other ideas: “Whatever wish, memory, or internal relation the patient may 
project on to the analyst – that is whatever content it reveals – does not shut down the 
mind that thinks it” (Bollas 2013, p. 89). Further, he writes: 
The patient might think that by not reporting a troubling idea he or she was not 
talking about what was really on the mind. However, that will only be true of the 
manifest content. The patient may not have been talking about what was 
consciously in mind but, as we know, the Freudian definition of what is on the 
self’s mind is determined by the complexity of the unconscious – by all the 
interests occurring at any moment in psychic time driven by unconscious desires, 
memories, anxieties, curiosities, and so forth. (p. 90)
205
  
While some (for example, Fonagy, in McDermott [2003]) believe that focus on one small 
part of an analytic session reveals the greater meaning of the whole, Bollas returns to 
Freud’s description of the free associative process and reiterates Freud’s theory of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
play. As I suggested in Chapter Three, Milrod’s (2007) patients (Rita and Deborah) have become more 
“independent,” but the kind of dependence situated in the realm of love is entirely absent from their psychic 
lives; in fact, that kind of dependence is now consciously avoided (even as they unconsciously strive 
towards it) just as previously any kind of independence was anxiously avoided. For another critique of 
“normalization” in psychoanalysis, see Molino & Ware (2001).      
205
 Bollas emphasizes Freud’s description of analytic communication occurring between the unconscious of 
the analyst and the unconscious of the analysand. Jacobs indicates that Isakower also emphasized this 
analytic communication: “Isakower’s notion of the analytic instrument, with its emphasis on the coming 
together of two minds to create one instrument, the unconscious transmission of thought and feeling that 
takes place between patient and analyst, and the shift in levels of consciousness in both that makes possible 
the grasping of the unconscious, appealed to me as one of the most imaginative and creative ways of 
conceptualizing the kinds of communication that take place between patient and analyst. In his 
formulations, Isakower made an effort to extend and develop Freud’s seminal idea that unconscious 
communication between the minds of patient and analyst is an inherent feature of analytic sessions.” (2002, 
p. 17) Jacobs, too, explores this aspect of analytic experience. See also Jacobs (1983, 1987, 1992, 1993). 
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sequential contiguity: the sequence of one’s associations reveals their unconscious 
relevance.
206
 It is not, then, any single part of the analysand’s associations that is 
significant but rather the sequence of associations:  
Unconscious thinking is not held in any single mental idea, but takes place as a 
logical process. It is revealed not in one narrative unit [...] but in the links between 
narrative units. In the caesura one finds the logical possibilities. It is exactly in 
and through these gaps that the logic of thought occurs which is never subordinate 
to the Transference. (Bollas 2013, pp. 90-91).
207
  
Any theory, and any clinical work, that purports to take the unconscious as its object 
cannot, therefore, neglect these gaps, these experiences of emptiness, and these inevitable 
incoherencies – or, worse, attempt to fill them in. 
 The entirety of psychoanalysis as a practice and a methodology is founded on the 
power and force of speech, and the ambiguities and malleability of language. Lacan 
emphasizes this point: “the analyst is different in that he makes use of a function that is 
common to all men in a way that is not within everyone’s grasp [portée] when he 
supports [porte] speech” (1955/2006j, p. 290). In the cases of Milrod’s (2007) 
agoraphobia patients (discussed in Chapter Three), for whom interpreting the transference 
has led to some “higher-functioning,” the point of the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis 
seems to have been lost, especially if the analyst takes protestations of emptiness as 
statements of fact. What does the emptiness hide? Is it anger, or grief? Is it something 
else entirely that neither the analyst nor the analysand will ever begin to approach if it is 
taken literally?
208
 The meanings of emptiness necessarily vary among analysands, and 
therefore must be explored with each individual guided by the fundamental rule of 
                                                          
206
 Bollas quotes Freud: “In a psychoanalysis one learns to interpret propinquity in time as representing 
connection in subject-matter. Two thoughts that occur in immediate sequence without any apparent 
connection are in fact part of a single unity which has to be discovered; in just the same way, if I write an 
‘a’ and a ‘b’ in succession, they have to be pronounced as a single syllable ‘ab’” (Freud 1900, p. 247; qtd. 
in Bollas 2013, p. 18). 
207
 Lacan also draws attention to this particularity of the psychoanalytic setting: “If we wish to recognize a 
reality that is proper to psychical reactions, we must not begin by choosing among them; we must begin by 
no longer choosing. In order to gauge their efficacy, we must respect their succession” (2006a, p. 65). 
208
 I refer again to Ellonen-Jéquier’s (2009) work with a psychotic patient, which I discussed in detail in 
Chapter Three. She writes: “I was able not to fall into the trap of believing that there was a real emptiness 
or that some aspects were actually missing” (p. 864; original emphasis).  
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psychoanalysis, the pact that the analysand will ‘try to say everything’ and the analyst 
will try to listen. The analyst cannot know what the analysand will say and cannot know 
what the emptiness hides. The analyst must learn to bear her own ignorance in order to 
discover the analysand’s truth. As Loewenstein writes:  
[A] commitment to the pursuit of the Freudian unconscious entails a commitment 
to forego the temptation to supply our patients or ourselves with reductive but 
coherent histories. The curative effect of our praxis may be accounted for by its 
very refusal to offer the analysand yet another false sense of unity but rather 
increase the analysand’s capacity to withstand the ambiguity, contradiction, and 
discontinuity that marks our present experience and our past. (1991, p. 26; 
emphasis added) 
For the agoraphobia patient, in particular, who lacks a clear and stable sense of the 
boundaries between self and other, the process of trying to say everything can push the 
analysand up against her limits. The agoraphobia patient for whom emptiness covers over 
aggression will be able to experience the reality of her aggressive limits as she articulates 
her rage and destructiveness, putting it into words, and watching as everything around her 
does not, as she feared, fall apart.
209
 The patient for whom emptiness covers over grief 
(which can, of course, be the same patient) will be able to experience the limits of her 
loss; that, although it feels as if she has lost a world (and, indeed, she has, as any 
significant loss renders us bereft, torn asunder, in its destruction of the illusion of shared 
space), she is capable of rebuilding an inner world around what she has lost, integrating 
her loss into her new world. This rebuilding, building anew, is only possible if the patient 
is given the opportunity to say it all aloud and only if the analyst is not too afraid of what 
emerges out of the patient’s emptiness; that is, only if the analyst is not too afraid of 
being overwhelmed by the analysand’s grief and/or aggressiveness.  
 As I argued in Chapter Two, following Busch (1995), the analyst must create the 
analytic frame with each patient, in part by communicating that the data produced by the 
analysand’s free associations is the raw material upon which the analysis is based. Thus, 
the method of free association is utilized to produce a therapeutic frame distinctive to the 
                                                          
209
 This is not to say that aggressivity is not dangerous, or that it is impotent. To the contrary, aggressivity’s 
force must be utilized. The fear of aggressivity’s danger renders it impotent. See also Eigen (2002) on the 
plurality, force, and dangers of rage. 
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psychoanalytic method. This frame, as I argued in Chapter Two, provides the analysand 
with some boundaries against which she may begin to define herself. Part of the process 
of putting it all into words is the re-transcription, so to speak, of past events: 
Nachträglichkeit, which, as I discuss in the following section, is a phenomenon based on 
speech that depends on the “timelessness” of the unconscious. 
  
4.4. Nachträglichkeit and the Logic of the Unconscious   
The symbolic not only means an order which structures the ineffable and helpless world 
of infancy, but also an order which brings up to date the inarticulable infantile 
experience. That is the Freudian ‘deferred action’ [Nachträglichkeit] where what 
happens later reinterprets and shapes what had happened before. For Freud, as for 
Lacan, psychoanalysis is the reinterpreting and reordering of one’s own history, one’s 
own trauma and one’s own destiny through the power of language. This is the heart of 
the psychoanalytic rite. 
(Benvenuto 1999, p. 30). 
As I argue above, the agoraphobic’s repetitive use of narrative resembles a repetition 
compulsion. Dahl parenthetically notes that the compulsion to repeat follows the same 
psychical mechanisms as the phenomenon of Nachträglichkeit
210
:  
Nachträglichkeit manifestly entails the action of a force, analogous to that of the 
compulsion to repeat, that seeks to symbolize the unfamiliarity and confusion of 
the original experience – whether as a real event that was not understood or as a 
diffuse primary-process scene – so that it can subsequently [nachtraglich], in 
accordance with the reality principle, be structured, thought, understood, and 
perhaps also mastered. (2010, p. 741; my emphasis)  
Narrative is most commonly contrasted with a repetition compulsion.
211
 However, as I 
argue above, for individuals with agoraphobia, the process of narrating and narrativizing 
                                                          
210
 For arguments connecting repetition compulsion and Nachträglichkeit, see also: Casoni (2002); 
Faimberg (2013); Marion (2012); and, Perelberg (2006, 2008). 
211
 See, for example, Kliman, Rosenberg & Samples (2007). See also Bornstein 2012, p. 75: “…she was 
expressing herself partially through a repetition compulsion, not a narrative….” Bornstein correspondingly 
argues against free association. He argues that it is “impossible” for the patient to tell her story, not because 
we, as subjects, are too complex and conflicted to fit within the narrative of a “story,” but because “she 
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their experiences seems to be a compulsive aspect of the disorder that serves to entrench 
the symptoms of anxiety and avoidance into the individuals’ lived experiences. This use 
of narrative limits the agoraphobic’s experience of the world as much as her physical 
avoidance of space does. 
 I refer above to Capps and Ochs, who argue that “agoraphobia is in part kept alive 
through [...] repeated psychological reconstructions of panic” (1995, p. 21). I turn now to 
the details of this three-year case study on language and agoraphobia. Capps and Ochs’s 
case study of a principally housebound agoraphobic, “Meg,” offers an example of the 
practical implications of the problem of persistent primitive anxieties
212
 coupled with 
language. Meg uses narrative to keep her primitive anxieties alive, fearing what may 
happen if she were to venture out of her safe space without recognizing that what she 
fears most has already occurred. Meg’s first experience of overwhelming panic is 
precipitated by a near-drowning experience: she is unable to breathe, literally engulfed by 
water. Throughout her narratives, including her defining moment of claustrophobic panic 
while stuck in a highway traffic jam, Meg’s stories are peppered with references to 
needing to escape without knowing what she needs to escape from. It would be easy to 
suggest that all of Meg’s agora-claustrophobic experiences are a retroactive defence 
against her childhood experience of near-drowning; that is, to suggest that Meg continues 
to relive that first anxiety in the attempt to psychically gain mastery over it. However, 
Meg not only recounts her traumatic anxiety experiences; she also reframes her 
autonomous and successful experiences into helpless, potentially anxiety-inducing ones. 
She (re-)frames her narratives in such a way as to cast herself as fundamentally prone to 
anxiety and worry, as a weak person overwhelmed by life rather than as a person who has 
suffered from anxiety in particular situations because of a limited set of experiences, with 
the potential for new and positive experiences.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
experiences fear of humiliation, rejection, and too much affect and understanding” (2012, p. 71). This 
“impossibility” leads him to abandon the pursuit of free association. Cf. Adler & Bachant (1996). 
212
 See Chapter Two for my discussion of primitive anxieties and their relation to ego development. Briefly, 
I argued that insofar as agora-claustrophobic anxieties are a necessary structuring experience for the 
development of the infant’s psychic life, they are not pathological; however, the inability to move beyond 
primitive anxieties in adulthood becomes pathological. 
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 Nachträglichkeit is the term Freud uses to describe the temporal dimension, the 
delay, in the aetiology of neuroses.
213
 Lacan (1988) argues that subsequent experiences 
filter into our past and into our memories so that what we experience next affects how we 
experience our past more than our past determines or even influences how we experience 
our future.
214
 Meg utilizes this aspect of language in a pathological way, to de-structure 
her past and to reconstruct herself as helpless rather than masterful, ensnaring herself in a 
trap of impotent anxiety, the only way out of which is, paradoxically, increasingly 
overwhelming anxiety. Meg’s problematic use of language does not centre on a lack of 
narrative coherence; rather, she uses narratives to limit her experiences of the world. Her 
narratives become walls that she builds around herself, more impenetrable than any 
physical walls could be. While it is clear that Meg’s past anxiety experiences are 
affecting her future, it is also true that her memory – which she rewrites – of her past 
                                                          
213
 Freud writes: “I admit that this is the most delicate question in the whole domain of psycho-analysis. 
[…] According to this view [that early childhood ‘memories’ are retrospective phantasies], wherever we 
seemed in analyses to see traces of the after-effects of an infantile impression […], we should rather have to 
assume that we were faced by the manifestation of some constitutional factor or of some disposition that 
had been phylogenetically maintained. On the contrary, no doubt has troubled me more […]. I was the first 
[…] to recognize both the part played by phantasies in symptom-formation and also the ‘retrospective 
phantasying’ of late impressions into childhood and their sexualisation after the event” (Freud 1918, p. 103, 
ft.). He also mentions the “deferred effect” of a threat of castration in the case of Little Hans: “At the time 
it was made, when he was three and a half, this threat had no effect. […] It would be the most completely 
typical procedure if the threat of castration were to have a deferred effect, and if he were now, a year and a 
quarter later, oppressed by the fear of having to lose this precious piece of his ego” (1909, p. 35). 
Furthermore, Freud indicates the regularity of this deferral in the formation of neuroses: “In other cases of 
illness we can observe a similar deferred operation of commands and threats made in childhood, where the 
interval covers as many decades or more” (1909, p. 35). See also infra note 214. 
214
 For example, Lacan writes: “It’s not what happens afterwards which is modified, but everything which 
went before. We have a retroactive effect – Nachträglichkeit, as Freud calls it – specific to the structure of 
symbolic memory, in other words to the function of remembering” (1988, p. 185). While this is only one of 
the meanings implicit in Freud’s use of the term, it has become the most salient of meanings (and effects) 
for French psychoanalysts, for which the French translation, après-coup, allows. Strachey’s English 
translation of the term, deferred action, implies the opposite temporal movement: an original event becomes 
traumatic at a later, second event. This traumatic process is effected due to the biphasic nature of human 
sexual development. Freud uses the term most frequently in his discussion of Emma (1950/1895), letters to 
Fleiss (1985/1895), and the Wolf-Man case (1918). Regarding the aetiology of Emma’s neurosis, Freud 
writes: “The change in puberty had made possible a different understanding of what was remembered. This 
case is typical of repression in hysteria. We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only 
nachträglich become a trauma. The cause of this state of things is the retardation of puberty as compared 
with the rest of the individual’s development” (1950/1895, p. 356). For more on the history of the concept 
of Nachträglichkeit, see Laplanche (1999), Laplanche & Pontalis (1967/1973), and Thomä & Cheshire 
(1991). 
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experiences is coloured by her expectation of future anxiety. Meg spends a great deal of 
her time sitting in her home retelling her panic narratives to herself; she becomes 
retroactively overwhelmed by her past experiences, even by experiences which were not 
at the time problematic. For example, when Meg recounts her pregnancy, she tells it in 
the present tense and emphasizes her helplessness: “I’m nine months preg--- almost nine 
months pregnant…I can’t---If I wanted to leave I couldn’t” (Capps & Ochs 1995, p. 62). 
Using language, Meg traps herself into her anxiety, reframing past successes as anxious 
experiences, fearing the impossibility of doing something she does not even want to do. 
Via Nachträglichkeit, Lacan explicates (and complicates) the relation of speech 
and truth: 
[I]t is present speech that bears witness to the truth of this revelation in current 
reality and grounds it in the name of this reality. Now only speech bears witness 
in this reality to that portion of the powers of the past that has been thrust aside at 
each crossroads where an event has chosen. (2006c, pp. 212-213)
215
 
It is not narrative that speaks the truth, but simply speech that speaks it. Truth is, as I 
imply above, mutable, depending on which reality we are concerned with. Historical – 
material – reality has one kind of truth; narrative truth corresponds to a different kind of 
reality. These truths and these realities are, however, interdependent elements. So, unlike 
Holmes, who suggests that narrative truth may reflect historical truth, and unlike Spence, 
who suggests that the two are completely distinct, Faimberg (2014) argues that, if we are 
listening, we are always surprised to discover in what individual ways these truths are 
intertwined in psychical reality. We are always surprised to discover something new 
about the psychical reality of an other.
 
As I argued in Chapter Two, one can only be 
surprised by an other subject in this way if one recognizes the subject’s otherness 
(Zachrisson’s [2013] “actual other”), which is also to say that one can only be surprised 
by the other if one is open to being surprised and is able to tolerate not being “sure” about 
how history has been mediated by the other. Whatever knowledge one may have about 
history or material truth, the only access to psychic reality – an other’s and even one’s 
                                                          
215
 Freud, as Faimberg draws attention to, also connects language and psychical reality: “‘Indications of 
discharge through speech are also in a certain sense indications of reality – but of thought-reality, not of 
external reality’” (Freud 1950, p. 373; qtd. in Faimberg 1997, p. 441). 
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own – is via this openness to being surprised. The phenomenon of Nachträglichkeit 
demonstrates that the nature of psychical reality demands a certain degree of incoherence 
in order for any event to have psychical effects. Clinically, then, and as I write above, 
when coherence is demanded, fewer feelings and thoughts are possible; when 
incoherence is tolerated, new and unanticipated feelings and thoughts can develop. When 
coherence is taken to be the aim of psychoanalysis, there is no room for the flashes of 
insight
216
 that allow the agoraphobic to reexamine, unconsciously, the distinction 
between internal and external realities.  
 Faimberg argues that Nachträglichkeit “gives us a conceptual frame of 
unconscious psychic temporality with which to explore and understand how 
psychoanalysis produces psychic change” (2007, p. 1223). Nachträglichkeit includes the 
work of a dual-process: the first aspect is in the formation of neuroses; the second aspect 
is in the relief from neuroses. Faimberg’s (2005) broader conceptualization of 
Nachträglichkeit emphasizes the complexities of the temporal dimension in the work of 
analysis, which is never merely a historical reconstruction, or re-ordering, and never 
purely a question of the here and now (that is, the transference relationship). Faimberg 
argues that this broader conceptualization – that is, not just at work in the development of 
the neurosis, but also characterizing the work of analysis – is implicit in Freud’s work, 
even though he never articulates it explicitly.
217
 Faimberg refers to Kardiner’s (1977) 
exposition of his analysis with Freud, and an example of Freud’s interpretation of one of 
his dreams. Freud interprets that a figure in Kardiner’s dream “…was a projection into 
the future of what you actually feared in the past. What you feared was therefore not what 
was going to happen but what actually had happened, and which you not only forgot, but 
feared to recall” (Kardiner 1977, p. 55; qtd. in Faimberg 2005, p. 1230). Faimberg’s 
analysis of this moment in Kardiner’s analysis with Freud, as well as other moments in 
the analysis, supports her argument that Freud was working with a broader 
conceptualization of Nachträglichkeit. That is, Freud was not only interpreting the 
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 See Wilson (1998). 
217
 Some (see, for example, Sodré 1997) argue that British psychoanalysts utilize the concept of 
Nachträglichkeit without calling it such. This argument finds support in Winnicott’s essay “Fear of 
Breakdown” (1974), (which I discussed in Chapter Two), and which details the process implied in the dual 
temporality of the German word without direct reference to the concept (in any translation).     
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material, but was also constructing
218
 new meanings that did not previously exist for the 
analysand. There is a new connection made, based on relations of affect and meaning, 
between past and current experiences.
219
 As I express above, this is the process by which 
Meg reconstructs her past experiences as coloured by anxiety; only this process, then, can 
be effective in the relief of Meg’s agoraphobic symptoms and the emptiness that, we 
infer, her agoraphobic symptoms cover.    
 Thomä and Cheshire point out that this process of reconstruction is not a 
retroactive causality: it is unnecessarily confounding, they argue, to “contemplate 
revising our standard ideas about time-sequences and time-relationships (‘temporality’)” 
(1991, p. 413). Rather, the “causal inter-actions involved in Nachträglichkeit [take] place 
between the mutually contemporary contents of a storage-system” (Thomä & Cheshire 
1991, p. 413; final emphasis added). As Freud states in a letter to Fliess, “the material 
present in the form of memory-traces [is] subjected from time to time to a re-
arrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances – to a re-transcription” (1985/1896, 
p. 233; original emphasis). Put laconically, things happen over time; time is continuous, 
in some fashion or other, so things that happen in the past have an effect on present 
happenings and on possible futures; perhaps most importantly, they have an effect on our 
experience of the present and on our experience of the possibilities of the future. Our 
memory of things past is alterable, even though the past itself is inalterable
220
: we can add 
layers of meaning to our experiences and construct new meanings for experiences that 
were previously inassimilable. Our memory of the past – and the meaning we ascribe to 
past experiences – changes our way of experiencing the present and our present changes 
our way of anticipating the future. Our expectations for the future affect our way of 
experiencing in the present through relations of meaning and relations of affect. Meaning 
can be added, but not eradicated; that is, like a palimpsest, the unconscious records 
                                                          
218
 See also Freud 1937, pp. 258-259: “His [the analyst’s] task is to make out what has been forgotten from 
the traces which it has left behind, or, more correctly, to construct it” (original emphasis).  
219
 For Kardiner, the past experience is the unresponsiveness of his mother after she died while he was 
alone with her (at three years of age) and a subsequent childhood phobia of masks (Kardiner 1977, pp. 61-
62; qtd. in Faimberg 2005, p. 1232). The current experience was a recurring dream of his own immobilized 
face reflected back at him in a mirror, and the distress and anxiety accompanying the dream.   
220
 As Eickhoff writes, “Nachträglichkeit provides the memory, not the event, with traumatic significance” 
(2006, p. 1453). 
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meaning and any erasure leaves behind an imprint.
221
 We cannot unknow, so to speak; we 
can only know more. The desire to unknow (which is impossible) prevents the acquisition 
of new knowledge, which is necessary to move beyond trauma. As I argued in Chapter 
Three, the agoraphobic’s loss of her anxiety and other phobic symptoms entails a 
significant encounter with the “utter not knowing” of who she is. The unconscious fear of 
not knowing is complicated by this desire to (impossibly) unknow. The analyst does not 
know what the analysand cannot say, does not have words for, or is trying not to say; the 
analyst can only encourage the analysand, in various ways, to follow his or her 
associations and say more and, thus, to know more. Without incoherence, the 
interpretation of the transference can only be a repetition of what is already known.  
 Faimberg adds an important dimension to the psychoanalytic process beyond free 
association and evenly suspended attention that Bollas describes occurring between 
analyst and analysand, which she calls “decentred listening,” or “listening to listening” 
(1997, p. 442).
222
 The function of this additional dimension is precisely to create 
connections between psychic reality and historical truth using the phenomenon of 
Nachträglichkeit. Specifically, the concept of ‘listening to listening’ that Faimberg 
describes includes four aspects:  
(a) listening out for how the patient hears the analyst’s interpretations or silences; 
(b) retroactively assigning meaning to the analyst’s interpretations and silences on 
the basis of this listening to listening; (c) allowing the process of listening to 
listening to appear in the interpretation; and (d) ensuring that the patient can listen 
to the way the analyst listens to him so that he can become able to listen to 
himself: we shall then have two subjects whose listening is decentred. (1997, p. 
442)
223
 
                                                          
221
 For the most pertinent of Freud’s essays concerning repetition, see Freud (1899, 1914b, 1919, 1920a, 
1926). For some significant (post-Freudian) additions to the literature, see Bass Alan (2006), Felman 
(1982), Green (2003), Künstlicher (2010), and Loewald (1971). Lacan more or less replaces the concept of 
the repetition compulsion in his theorizations with the insistence of the signifying chain. See, for example, 
Lacan (2006d, 2006h); also, Lacan 1993, p. 242: “Repetition is fundamentally the insistence of speech.” 
222
 See Faimberg (1996) for her early formulation of “listening to listening” and Ferro (2002) for his 
clinical application of listening to the analysand’s associations to his interpretations.  
223
 Faimberg’s description of this decentred listening recalls Busch’s argument that the specificity of the 
analytic frame depends on communicating to the patient that the patient’s free associations are the data 
upon which analytic understanding is based, which I discussed in Chapter Two.         
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As Faimberg explicates via a clinical vignette, the process of listening to listening 
indicates that the patient’s “psychic reality is connected with a certain historical truth” 
(1997, p. 447). As I argued in Chapter Two, the nature of agoraphobia in particular, 
characterized by an unconscious confusion of self and other and the boundaries between, 
requires a theoretical perspective that takes into consideration real – namely, external – 
experiences and the patient’s representation of these experiences. From this connection 
between perception and representation, Faimberg describes psychic truths, which “are the 
consequence of the psychic work resulting from the demands of reality that are fashioned 
by the unconscious wish and the unconscious fantasy” (1997, p. 449). In psychic truths, 
Faimberg argues, there is an “insistent residue, a dimension of the ‘real’” (1997, p. 449) 
that remains. Again, as I argued in Chapter Two, the real resists symbolization; but only 
through the symbolic dimension can the real be apprehended, again underscoring the 
clinical use of language (rather than, for example, a clinical focus on the therapeutic 
relationship as the mechanism of change). Like Hanly, who suggests that “we are obliged 
to live with uncertainty” (2009, p. 371), Faimberg indicates the necessary capacity of the 
analyst to “listen from a position of not knowing” (1997, p. 450).224 This (limited) 
uncertainty and not knowing is a partial guarantee that the “(re)construction of historical 
truths is not a mere intrusion of the analyst’s theory” (Faimberg 1997, p. 450).225  
                                                          
224
 Winnicott (1971), Bion (1970, 1984), and Lacan (2006e, especially p. 471) also consider this capacity to 
linger in uncertainty to be an essential aspect of the analyst’s function. See also infra note 108. 
225
 Guralnik (2014a, 2014b) powerfully depicts the impact and insistence of historical reality in her case 
history of Nyx, a German woman whose parents were both children of Nazis. Guralnik’s own parents were 
both children of Jewish Zionists who lost most of their family in the Holocaust. Guralnik writes: “Working 
psychoanalytically with this kind of background invite[d] the ongoing manufacturing of an illusion that we 
[were] simply two individuals, doing our own thing, and not subjects of history and nationhood. Yet this 
illusion was bound to crack under the weight of material seeking meaning” (2014a, p. 129). Although not 
every individual is directly bound to an event as historically significant as the Holocaust, every individual 
is part of History: a human history filled with all manner of real horrors often beyond imagining. As 
Faimberg writes in her commentary on Guralnik’s article: “In the psychoanalytic process, we are trying to 
construct a time and a space to discover with surprise in what way material reality has impinged in the 
psychic makeup of our patients. In other words, for the particular situation at hand, we come to see how 
History has been mediated. In psychoanalysis, then, we discover in a fragmentary way, in a contradictory 
way, always with surprise, how History appears mediated by links between parents and grandparents in 
relation to the patient’s psychic way of functioning as is (re)constructed in the history of the transference. 
This is so because the psychic makeup of the patient is made of all this” (2014, p. 157; original emphasis).  
Wolff, much earlier than Guralnik and largely against the grain of his contemporaries, argues similarly that 
“the patient’s neurotic suffering in the present has its roots as much in the experience of social history as in 
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 The concept of Nachträglichkeit is implicit, as Eickhoff (2006) and Faimberg 
(2005, 2007) argue, in Winnicott’s ideas about the fear of breakdown. As I discussed in 
Chapter Two, the fear of breakdown is caused by and invokes primitive anxieties, which 
are overwhelming and unthinkable because the object of fear is a breakdown that has 
already happened. That is, Winnicott describes the complicated subjective experiences of 
time and trauma, wherein what is past causes a present anxiety about the future. In his 
discussion of primitive agonies, Winnicott refers to experiences that occur prior to the 
development of the ego, and, as such, no subject existed, so to speak, to have the 
experience (in order to organize it). As I argued in Chapter Two, experiences for which 
the subject has no words might also cause the (re-)emergence of primitive anxieties and 
contribute to an on-going fear of breakdown. That is, it might be that the problematic 
insufficiency of (some particular element of) language persists beyond ego development. 
Therefore, the subject may experience a debilitating anxiety perceived to be future-
oriented but caused by a previous experience that the subject is unable to put into words.  
Winnicott connects the fear of breakdown and primitive anxieties with the 
experience of emptiness. We are thus able to recognize the connections between the 
agoraphobic’s experience of emptiness and her anxiety, as well as agoraphobic anxieties 
and psychic development, fear of one’s own aggression, and the task of putting it all into 
words. As I argued in Chapter Two, the psychical experience of emptiness is derived 
from the physical experience of hunger. The infant will necessarily experience hunger; 
the very experience of hunger’s emptiness, no matter how temporary, is perceived as a 
deprivation. The experience of emptiness stimulates aggression and leads to the further 
development of the ego. This emptiness is constitutive in ego development and is thus 
connected to the primitive anxieties that belong to the time before the ego properly 
existed. For the agoraphobic, something has gone wrong in the process of ego 
development; I argued in Chapter Three that, for the agoraphobia patients Milrod (2007) 
describes, persistent emptiness indicates the presence of unmourned traumatic losses. As 
I introduced in Chapter Two, the fact of the lost object’s existence in external reality is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the residues of infantile wishes and fantasies” (1988, p. 380). More emphatically, he argues that in order to 
“distinguish absurd from possible valid constructions, criteria of coherence and good fit in the ‘narrative 
tradition’ are unhelpful, if not meaningless” (p. 389).  
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only reaffirmed insofar as others acknowledge the real loss of that object. The analyst 
must return to these real experiences of loss in order to address the agoraphobic’s 
emptiness. Only when these real losses are symbolized will the agoraphobic be able to 
develop clearer boundaries between the internal and the external, and create the world 
that is waiting outside for her to find. 
 The logic of the unconscious is different from the logic of the conscious mind, 
which corresponds more to what we might understand as a narrative logic.
226
 In order to 
achieve the goals of psychoanalysis, to increase unconscious freedom, psychoanalytic 
work must follow the logic of the unconscious. Green describes the main characteristics 
of the unconscious:  
[I]t ignores time; it does not take negation into account; it operates by 
condensation and displacement; and it does not tolerate any expectation or delay. 
It succeeds in expressing itself by turning around the obstacles which would 
attempt to prevent it from making itself known; in other words, it permits our 
unconscious desires to experience a certain form of realization. (1986, p. 18) 
Building on Green’s first point, that one of the main characteristics of unconscious logic 
is that it “ignores time,” Schubert writes:  
Every psychoanalysis contains contradictory relationships to time. The indefinite 
duration of the complete analysis and the monotonous rhythm of the recurrent 
sessions create in the analysand an illusory eternal time perspective. This is 
contrasted by the reality of the analytic contract, which is time-limited and entails 
separate analytic sessions with distinct time-frames. The timeless perspective 
stimulates regression and dependence, while the time-limited perspective requires 
development, process and the setting of goals. It is under these diametrically 
opposite conditions that the psychoanalytic work takes place. (2001, p. 93)  
The phenomenon of Nachträglichkeit functions according to unconscious logic, 
specifically the temporal dimensions. Psychoanalytic work takes advantage of the 
                                                          
226
 See Matte-Blanco (1988) for an elaboration of asymmetrical, symmetrical, and bi-logic. Asymmetrical 
logic is conventional and follows familiar principles of reasoning, including, for example, the concept of 
two-valued logic: either A or not A (either proposition A is true or it is not true). These principles do not 
hold according to symmetrical logic – the logic of the unconscious – whereby A can be both true and not 
true. Most thinking combines these two logics in what Matte-Blanco calls “bi-logic.” See also infra note 
164.  
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timeless nature of the unconscious, reproducing it in a sense with the “illusory eternal 
time perspective” and simultaneously creating a conflict with that perspective with the 
“reality” of the analytic frame. In order to effectuate unconscious change – that is, to 
increase unconscious freedom – analytic work must utilize the logic of the unconscious. 
Analytic work must follow the movement of the dream work, the movement of free 
association, and the movement between coherence, incoherence, and back again.     
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The fantasy inherent in the pursuit of coherence ignores and displaces the centrality of 
aggression in creative psychic life and in the freedom for that creativity, as well as 
denying the influence of the unconscious in psychic life. The exact (and exacting) 
repetition of specific narratives (like those of Meg) forecloses the possibilities of 
aggressivity and of creativity, which concurrently prevents the establishment of 
externality. Denying one’s own aggressive impulses is to imprison oneself in 
consciousness insofar as the limit of unconscious feelings has not been established. It is 
not that the unconscious becomes less influential in psychic life; rather, the agoraphobic 
‘wards off,’ so to speak, the reality of the unconscious through repetitive narrative. The 
agoraphobic does not have the freedom to “crack up,” the freedom needed for and 
expressed in the free associative process of analysis. Again, the agoraphobic is able to 
cohere, but not to disseminate
227
; the agoraphobic is overwhelmed by the nature of the 
associations, the (passionate, intense) feelings experienced in the freedom of associating. 
This freedom is, as a number of authors have pointed out, both an opportunity and a 
burden.
228
 Bollas refers to the overdetermined psychic moment as an intensity; the 
intensity of that moment is only recognized after the fact (nachträglich) through the 
second movement of the unconscious dialectic. The feelings that comprise that psychic 
intensity can be repressed if association is foreclosed, discouraged, or even not explicitly 
encouraged. Bollas writes, “[h]uman mental life does not have such a compositional unity 
to it, although narrative unities can be constructed about people’s lives. Instead,” he 
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 Disseminate refers to the “cracking up” of conscious and coherent intensities. See also infra note 184.  
228
 See infra note 179. 
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argues, “we endure millions of psychic intensities in our life” (1995, p. 68). Mental life, 
then, involves the experience of psychic intensities and, in relative health, the “cracking 
up” of these intensities through discursive free association, as opposed to narrative 
coherence. The ability to free associate – to experience unconscious freedom – is 
requisite for developing a coherent narrative about life events that belongs to the 
individual’s psychic reality and not to some other reality.229 The feeling comes first and 
then the thoughts about the feelings. In order to effectuate unconscious change, analysis 
must work with – not against – the logic of the unconscious, the logic of the dream, the 
logic of free association. In the psychoanalytic situation, the fundamental rule supersedes 
the demands of coherent narrative. As Bollas (1995) argues, the two processes are 
opposed: one cannot ‘say everything’ and construct a coherent narrative simultaneously. 
One aspect of psychoanalytic work, then, is creating a coherent narrative; but the other 
aspect, which is distinctive to psychoanalysis, is the invitation to 'say everything'. The 
aim of psychoanalysis is beyond either of these aspects: as Phillips argues, “the cure” 
psychoanalysis ideally offers is the cure for self-knowledge, not of self-knowledge; the 
cure for one’s “wish to know [one’s self] in that coherent, narrative way” (Holdengräber 
2014). Via the movements between narrative and free association – coherence and 
incoherence – the analytic frame grows, so to speak and, I argue, along with the frame 
grows an accompanying sense of the boundary between self and other (in other words, a 
sense of one's limits). The experience of these limits is necessary for the agoraphobic to 
live in the world (so that she no longer feels she is risking the existence of the world, or 
of her self, by being in it, by engaging with it). Part of the psychoanalytic experience, 
with the invitation to “say everything,” is learning to negotiate the chiasmic gap between 
self and other; this experience is not available within the paradigm of narrative therapies 
or narrativist psychoanalysis. The structure of the frame, which the analysand participates 
in constructing and is able to experiment with destroying (because of the analytic rule), 
offers the possibility for the agoraphobic to experience new ways of relating to objects 
(including destructively). Once the agoraphobic has developed a faith in the distinction 
between self and other and between internal and external realities, she can begin to 
creatively inhabit the spaces between rather than anxiously avoid them. 
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 See, for example, Faimberg (1981/2005b), Faimberg (1988/2010), and Faimberg and Corel (1990/2005). 
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5.0. Conclusion: To Calm Anxiety 
A phobia, in other words, protects a person from his own curiosity. 
(Phillips 1993, p. 14) 
In this thesis, I have responded to Milrod’s (2007) article, in which she describes a 
phenomenon of persistent emptiness in agoraphobia patients for whom the symptoms of 
anxiety and avoidance have remitted. Milrod’s findings have important implications for 
the long-term efficacy of agoraphobia treatments, offering a possible explanation for the 
limited efficacy of standard treatments of CBT and pharmacotherapy. As I indicated in 
Chapter Three, her findings have not been addressed in the literature subsequently. 
Milrod’s findings opened up an avenue to further our understanding of agoraphobia; in 
this thesis, I have used these findings to contribute to the theoretical understanding of 
agoraphobia and I have developed the clinical implications of these theoretical 
contributions. 
 I have attempted to explicate the complexity of the phenomenon Milrod 
encounters in her patients by connecting the agoraphobic’s persistent emptiness with the 
pathological experience of emptiness well-noted in other disorders (e.g., Kumin 1978) 
and the structural phenomenon of emptiness experienced in the development of the ego. 
My explication of psychic emptiness supports an alternative interpretation of the clinical 
material Milrod provides counter to Milrod’s suggestion that her patients’ persistent 
emptiness can be attributed to a weak reflective function (RF). I suggested that assertions 
of emptiness in the analytic situation precisely indicate the unconscious presence of 
strongly warded-off emotional or cognitive experiences; specifically, the subjective 
experience of emptiness in agoraphobia patients commonly indicates the presence of 
significant losses that have yet to be mourned. I proposed several explanations as to why 
agoraphobia patients, in particular, defend against mourning.  
 At the same time, Milrod’s findings contributed to my elucidation of the nature of 
agoraphobia and added to our, heretofore limited, understanding of agoraphobic anxieties 
in the process of ego development. The psychoanalytic paradigm of mental life uses an 
examination of psychical disorder to deduce the nature of all psychical processes, 
including pathological and ‘normal’ processes. The nature of agoraphobia, inflected with 
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Milrod’s findings, offers an exemplary model of disorder to augment our understanding 
of both normal and pathological psychical processes. This augmented understanding, 
which includes the agoraphobic’s pathological uses of language in the service of avoiding 
emotional experience, provides support for the argument that language is the fundamental 
tool of psychoanalytic treatment in the alleviation of mental suffering. Milrod’s (2007) 
discussion of the clinical case studies she presents emphasizes the transference 
relationship and implies (as she argues elsewhere: see Milrod et al. 2000, 2001, 2007) 
that it is this particular element of psychoanalysis that distinguishes it from the temporary 
effects of other treatments of agoraphobia. However, the limitations of this emphasis are 
evident in her description of her patients’ progress. As I argued in Chapter Three, the fact 
of structural emptiness provides a technical counterpoint to this emphasis on interpreting 
the transference as a means of addressing the agoraphobic’s experience of persistent, 
pathological emptiness; likewise, as I argued in Chapter Four, the agoraphobic’s 
pathological use of language – in producing narratives that are either too coherent or, 
alternatively, producing ‘empty’ narratives – can be countered through the fundamental 
rule of psychoanalysis. This rule, that the analysand ‘try to say everything,’ is sustained 
by the analyst’s commitment to listening to what the analysand tries not to say in addition 
to what she is able to say.  
I have suggested that the agoraphobia patient performs an emptying of the 
emotional valences of her psychical life in order to protect her ego from overwhelming 
affect, principally rage and/or grief. The banishing of such affect does not, however, 
result in an experience of calm. It is an anxious emptiness. We think of calming anxiety: 
one’s task might be to calm one’s own anxiety, or one might seek another to calm one’s 
anxieties. Is calm the absence of anxiety? If anxiety, even in the form of an anxious 
emptiness, hides overwhelming affect, then it would follow than an absence of affect 
would result in calm. But this is not the case. Calm is filled with feelings, not absent 
them. Calm is the potential to feel all of the feelings one might have. Phillips suggests 
that a phobia “protects a person from his own curiosity,” (1993, p. 14); we might thus 
think of curiosity as an antidote to the anxiety that phobias both hide and highlight. The 
guiding question might change from ‘how does one relieve anxiety?’ into ‘how does one 
cultivate curiosity?’. Rather, these questions might be two sides of the same coin insofar 
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as curiosity is not possible where there is too much anxiety and the true relief of anxiety 
makes room for curiosity. I believe the resolution of this paradox is connected to the 
movement between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions that I have described 
in Chapters Two and Three. That is to say, we are able to develop a zest for life when we 
begin to have faith in our capacity to mourn (Scott 1981); similarly, we are able to 
develop our curiosity when we have faith in our capacity to survive wherever it is our 
curiosity may lead us. While we may all be familiar with the proverb ‘curiosity killed the 
cat,’ the rejoinder is probably less familiar: ‘but satisfaction brought it back!’ That is to 
say, curiosity might be deadly but also worthwhile and, further, one might be able to 
survive the destruction that curiosity entails.   
 
5.1. Limitations of Current Project 
In this thesis, all of my clinical data is derived from the published clinical work of other 
psychoanalysts. There are two limitations that follow from this circumstance. The first, 
which I discuss in more detail below in my recommendations for further research, 
concerns the very issue of writing and reading clinical case studies. There is a well-noted 
impossibility of translating what occurs in the psychoanalytic session to the 
comparatively brief case study and, even more so, the case vignette. This impossibility 
has to do with the physical limitations of transcribing, describing, and analyzing an 
analysis that itself likely spanned (at least) hundreds of hours. The impossibility is 
compounded by the task of trying to account for the ineffable effects of the unconscious 
communication between analyst and analysand. As little as has been published on writing 
clinical material, even less has been written on commenting on them. There are a few 
preliminary warnings, so to speak, such as Samuels’ (2000) note that it never feels “easy” 
commenting on someone else’s clinical material: it is both a difficult task and the attempt 
results in no small amount of unease. For me, this unease follows not only from the 
attempt to comment and critique someone else’s clinical material, but from my own lack 
of clinical training and expertise. I have attempted to focus my commentary on clinical 
material on the theoretical discussion surrounding it, but, of course, the clinical 
implications are significant. I have attempted to draw out those implications without 
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assuming the position of clinical surety that no one, and certainly not myself, can claim, 
and especially not regarding someone else’s clinical work.  
 
5.2. Questions for Further Research 
There are a number of avenues for further research; some of these I have indicated 
throughout. Most urgently, a comparative investigation of the phenomenon of emptiness 
in agoraphobia, borderline, and psychotic patients is called for. One aspect of this 
comparative analysis would consider the various psychoanalytic concepts that might 
include a subjective feeling of emptiness, including Deutsch’s (1942) “as if” personality, 
Winnicott’s (1965) False Self, and McDougall’s (1984) concept of “dis-affection.” 
Importantly, this comparison could elucidate the meanings of emptiness in all patients 
and lead to more efficacious techniques for the alleviation of, what is for some, a very 
painful experience. Singer (1977b) has noted that borderline patients who experience 
both a feeling of emptiness and an acute fear of emptiness are at risk for suicide. It 
remains to be studied whether agoraphobia patients with persistent emptiness face the 
same risk.
230
   
  Secondly, there is an emerging sense in the literature of the complexity of 
psychical reality, and an emerging sense of the complex relationship between history and 
subjective experience. As I have made clear throughout this thesis, the realm of 
psychoanalytic influence is psychical reality. The question that remains to be explored 
further is: what of “history” needs to be taken into account in the analysis of psychical 
life? As I have indicated in Chapter Four, this question develops out of the work Wolff 
(1988) began on the influence of “social history” in the development of the neuroses and 
has most recently been considered by Guralnik (2014a). As commentary on Guralnik 
(2014a) clearly indicates (see: Bohleber 2014; Faimberg 2014; Wolff Bernstein 2014; 
and, Guralnik 2014b), there is a lack of consensus on what level of “history” 
interpretations in the psychoanalytic clinic are valid. The mutual influence of an 
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 Within a psychiatric framework, Bolton et al. (2008) have found that the presence of any anxiety 
disorder is an independent risk factor for suicide attempts. 
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individual’s psychic functioning and social life is understood in only a very limited sense; 
the possibility for psychoanalytic work to address broader social problems thus remains 
underdeveloped. The need for such development is also indicated in the topic of one of 
the most recent issues of Psychoanalytic Inquiry 34(7), “Analytic Lives in a Wounded 
World,” published in October 2014. 
 Thirdly, in working on this thesis, a question has presented itself to me that is 
tangentially connected to the questions of truth and psychical reality: what do we take for 
“truth” in reading case histories? In reading case histories, how do we interpret – and thus 
change – what we read? These questions have a lengthy history in the literature on 
interpretation and literary analysis, but have been rarely addressed in the psychoanalytic 
literature. Theoretical articles on writing case histories in psychoanalysis tend to address 
the question of patient confidentiality (see, for example, Aron 2000; Goldberg 1997). As 
an example of the complexity and clinical relevance of writing and commenting on case 
histories, I refer again to Guralnik (2014): Bohleber, in his commentary on Guralnik 
(2014a), is summarizing Nyx’s (Guralnik’s patient) history; he writes: “The patient is the 
fifth and last sibling; the third child died after eight weeks, while the fourth was a 
miscarriage” (Bohleber 2014, p. 146). Guralnik’s original statement is as follows: “Nyx 
was the fifth child to be born. The two eldest siblings thrived, but the third died at eight 
weeks. Her mother got pregnant again, but a few weeks prior to her due date decided to 
lift a heavy table, which ultimately caused the baby to die in utero” (2014a, p. 130). 
Guralnik’s paper is entitled “The dead baby,” and so my mind was attuned to these 
issues, but I was struck by Bohleber’s characterization of a (nearly?) full-term loss as a 
miscarriage. Even medically speaking (which is not concerned with the individual’s 
subjective experience of the loss), any loss after 20 weeks gestation is classified as a 
stillbirth; only losses prior to 20 weeks gestation are classified as miscarriages. Further, I 
question with what certainty Guralnik can state that the baby died because of the 
mother’s decision “to lift a heavy table.” The connection between those two statements is 
not immediately apparent from a medical or physiological perspective. Given that much 
of Nyx’s conscious suffering circles around her guilt at drinking during her pregnancy 
and her fears of having irreparably damaged her young daughter (despite what Guralnik 
reports of pediatricians’ assurances of her normal development), an unconscious 
165 
 
 
identification with a mother “responsible” for the death of her unborn child in this way 
may have compounded Nyx’s own feelings of shame. Nevertheless, the “truth” of the 
“miscarriage” evades us; all one can do is remain aware of its evasions and attempt to 
account for the specific ways in which it slips out of our minds. Further research would 
approach the analysis of writing and reading case histories from the perspective of 
literary analysis and interpretation. Case histories with published commentaries would be 
particularly useful in this analysis. Michels (2000), Scharff (2000), and Coen (2000), with 
commentaries (Pulver 2000; Bernstein 2000; Rubovitz-Stein 2000; Szecsödy 2000; 
Tuckett 2000; Wilson 2000), begin to address these questions and note both the relative 
paucity of such discussions and the absolute imperative for them.  
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